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CHRONOLOGICAL EPITOME

OF THE

W A R S

IN

THE LOW COUNTRIES,

FROM

THE PEACE OF THE PYRENEES IN 1659,

TO

THAT OF PARIS IN 1815;

WITH

REFLECTIONS, MILITARY AND POLITICAL.

BY

COLONEL SIR JAMES CARMICHAEL-SMYTH, BART.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL IN THE CORPS OF ROYAL ENGINEERS,

C.B. K.M.T. K.S.W.

AND AIDE-DE-CAMP TO HIS MAJESTY.

Diū magnum inter mortalis certamen fuit, vi ne corporis, an virtute animi, Res Militaris magis procederet. Postea verò quàm in Europà, Galli cæpere urbes, atque nationes subigere; lubidinem dominandi. . . . belli habere; maximam gloriam in maximo imperio putare; tum demum . . . atque negotiis compertum est, in bello plurimum ingenium posse.—*an Catilinarium.*

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TO
FIELD-MARSHAL HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS
THE DUKE OF YORK,
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF ALL HIS MAJESTY'S FORCES,
K. G. G. C. B. G. C. H.
&c. &c. &c.

SIR,

EVERY effort, however humble, which can, by possibility, be of service to the British army, being certain to meet with the approbation and protection of your Royal Highness, I am encouraged to presume, with the utmost deference, to lay before your Royal Highness the following pages ; wherein I have endeavoured to give a concise, yet clear, account of the martial achievements of our ancestors, as well as of more recent transactions, in the Low Countries ; and have attempted, for the convenience of military men, to put that in-

formation into one volume, which, otherwise, could only be acquired by studying a variety of books, and by gleaning from the works of numerous authors.

I have the honour to be,

With the utmost respect
and most unfeigned gratitude,

SIR,

Your Royal Highness's
Most obedient, most faithful,
and most devoted
humble servant,
J. CARMICHAEL-SMYTH.

NUTWOOD, RIEGATE,
Jan. 25, 1825.

PREFACE.

EARLY in the year 1814, a British army had its head-quarters at Brussels; and the British government, in consequence of a convention with its allies, took charge of that frontier of the Netherlands opposed to France, from the sea to the Meuse, until final arrangements should be made, as to the ultimate disposal of these fine provinces; which, it had been decided upon, were not, under any circumstances, to revert to France. A period of twenty years had elapsed since a British soldier had been seen in the Low Countries. Not only every thing was new to us; but, from the circumstance of our having been shut out from the continent, during such a length of time, we were almost forgotten. It

PREFACE.

was the interest of the French to undervalue us as soldiers ; and our former triumphs in Flanders, which could not be denied, were attributed to the imbecility and weakness of the French generals of the *ancienne regime* ; not to the skill and talents of a King William or a Marlborough.*

The author of the following pages had, at the time alluded to, the honour of holding the important appointment of Commanding Engineer with the British army in the Low Countries. Called upon, from his official situation, suddenly, and without any further previous knowledge of Flanders than what he had acquired by general reading, to visit, examine, and report upon this interesting frontier, and to place the most important points in a state of defence, his duty naturally led him, more than perhaps any other officer, to ascertain not only what had been done on former occasions, but the relative situations of the contending armies, and other circumstances which must, at various periods, have influenced the selection of particular positions, or the site of different fortresses.

In the pursuit of this information, he ex-

perienced considerable difficulties from the want of some such work as he now offers to his brother officers and the public. There are plenty of historians and writers of memoirs relative to the different campaigns which have taken place in the Low Countries; but these works are, in general, not only very diffuse, but confined to the narrative of particular periods, or the history of individual fortresses. A connected view of the whole of the campaigns, in succession, and of the consequent political changes in the Netherlands, a country in which their ancestors, as well as they themselves, have acquired so much credit, cannot be uninteresting to British military readers. The British public, also, who are now more acquainted with military matters than formerly; and who, from the very circumstance of that additional knowledge, have lost the foolish jealousy and dislike to their army which was formerly entertained; and are now sensible that a good soldier must be a good citizen; and that he will be a better soldier in proportion as he is well-informed as a man; will not, it is hoped, turn from an Epitome of the Wars

in the Low Countries with frigid indifference. Could we ensure a state of constant peace and tranquillity, a contempt for military history might be pardonable; but, as from the inherent nature of man, the powerful will prey upon the weak, the ambitious will encroach upon his neighbour, some acquaintance with military subjects ought certainly to be cultivated by every British gentleman who aspires to a seat in the councils of the country, and is anxious to contribute his efforts to augment her prosperity.

The author of the following pages has the advantage of being tolerably well acquainted with the Low Countries, and with the different fortresses and positions referred to in his work; as also of having visited almost every field of battle he has described. He is not conscious that he has advanced a single fact or opinion, but upon positive conviction of its truth. As, however, it by no means follows that things will appear to others in the same point of view as to himself, he is far from pretending to assert that his opinions are correct—he only vouches for their honesty. He has undertaken this work, fully

conscious of its importance; and, if he should be found to have failed, he will, at any rate, derive consolation from the reflection of the poet—

“ *Quem si non tenuit, magnis tamen excidit ausis.*”

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CHRONOLOGICAL EPITOME

OF

THE WARS IN THE LOW COUNTRIES.

INTRODUCTION.

CHARLEMAGNE died in 814,—his empire, like that of Alexander, fell to pieces, after the death of the hero, whose genius and energy had created it. The kingdoms of France, of Germany, of Lorraine, of Italy, of Navarre, and of Burgundy, were formed from its ruins. These states have since undergone various changes. The kingdom of Burgundy, incorporated in 1032 with the Germanic empire, devolved afterwards to the crown of France, in 1361, as a dukedom, in the reign of that John who was taken prisoner by our Black Prince at Poitiers. John gave the Duchy of Burgundy as an appanage to a younger son, Philip the Hardy. Philip the Hardy was the founder of the second,

or French, house of Burgundy, which flourished for 114 years. During this period, partly by marriages, and partly by conquest, the Dukes of Burgundy considerably extended their possessions. The last Duke, Charles the Bold, was killed in battle, in 1477, near Nancy, by the Swiss, with whom he was at war. In addition to the Duchy of Burgundy, as also Franche Comté, which descended to him from his ancestor Philip the Hardy, Charles the Bold was in possession of the whole of the present kingdom of the Netherlands, the country generally called French Flanders, the province of Artois, now part of France, and of several towns and lordships upon the Somme and the Mozelle.

Charles the Bold left an only daughter, known in history by the name of Mary of Burgundy. Lewis the Eleventh, who then governed France, was anxious to have concluded a marriage between her and the Dauphin; Mary was, however, twenty years of age when her father was killed, and the Dauphin only eight; his offer was rejected, and Mary married Maximilian of Austria, who afterwards became Emperor of Germany. Lewis seized upon the Duchy of Burgundy as a fief, which, he stated, had reverted to the crown of France from a failure of heirs male. He also took possession of the province of Artois. Mary, however, carried to the house of Austria the rich and

populous provinces of the Low Countries, as also that of Franche Cômte.

It is necessary to keep in mind this connection between the Low Countries and the Dukes of Burgundy; as the Flemish, or Low Country armies are frequently called Bourguignons in the histories of that and even of later ages. The Low Countries were even at one time called the Burgundian Circle, and were placed under the protection of the Germanic empire by that name.

Maximilian and Mary of Burgundy had one son, Philip the Handsome; he married Johanna, the daughter of Ferdinand and Isabella of Spain. Philip and Johanna had two sons, the eldest of whom, Charles, born at Ghent in 1500, inherited the Low Countries from his father, Spain from his mother; and being afterwards elected Emperor of Germany, (upon the death of his grandfather Maximilian,) became the most powerful monarch in Europe since the days of Charlemagnë.

The reign of Charles the Fifth was a splendid period in the history of the Low Countries:—partial to his countrymen, amongst whom he had been educated; his ministers and his generals were principally from thence; by his influence, Adrian of Utrecht, who had been his preceptor, even ascended the papal throne.

Charles the Fifth, after an eventful reign of twenty years, resigned his crown in 1556, and re-

tired to a monastery. His son Philip became King of Spain, and succeeded to his authority in the Low Countries; his brother Ferdinand was elected Emperor of Germany.

Philip the Second never visited the Low Countries after he was King of Spain; his maxims of government were arbitrary in the extreme, and not suited to the free manners and customs of the nobility and gentry of the Netherlands, in which country he had only authority as Duke of Brabant. The reformation about this time gained considerable ground: Philip, as bigoted in his religious as he was tyrannical in his political principles, determined to stop its progress by coercion. He sent the Duke of Alva in 1567 to govern the Low Countries in his name, and supported his authority with a corps of Spanish troops.

The Duke of Alva commenced his administration with beheading Counts Egmont and Hornes, together with twenty-one of the principal gentlemen or Seigneurs of the Low Countries. These violent measures inflamed the evil; catholics as well as protestants united against the Spanish government. The Duke of Alva was recalled; he was, however, six years in authority, during which period he is supposed to have put to death 18,600 human beings by the executioner. The conduct of the Duke of Alva renders credible what we read of Nero and of Domitian; it shews what

unbridled power, influenced by religious fanaticism, is capable of doing. •

The war which, in consequence of these events, took place in the Low Countries, and which may be said to have commenced in 1568, with the battle fought at Winschote, in the province of Groningen, between the Counts Nassau and d'Ahremberg, was carried on with the greatest acrimony until 1609, a period of forty-one years; a truce for twelve years was then agreed upon at the Hague. In 1621, the period for the truce having expired, hostilities recommenced, and continued until the peace of Munster, in 1648, (after an additional period of twenty-seven years warfare,) put an end to them.

During this long war (particularly in the first period) acts of the most heroic nature were performed; the strongest passions of man were called into play, and, under their influence, deeds were achieved, which must ever excite admiration and wonder. A careful perusal of the accounts of these wars will furnish a variety of useful lessons both to the statesman and the soldier. The surprise of Breda by the Dutch; the defence of the same place against Spinola; the fording of the Scheldt between Bergenopzoom and Batz by the Spaniards; the siege and defence of Antwerp; the construction of the famous bridge over the Scheldt near Lillo, with a variety of other and

similar events, will always command a most lively interest.

The object, however, of the following sheets being to shew how the Low Countries have been defended against the armies of France, and to give an account of the steps taken by that power in her repeated invasions of those provinces; the details of the war alluded to do not enter into the plan of this work: they are more of a desultory character, and appear unconnected with the general defence of the Netherlands, and are therefore omitted as foreign to the purpose in view. The following slight notice of them appears, nevertheless, necessary. The Low Countries have been so often the seat of war that we are obliged to go a little farther back than that period from whence it is intended to commence a more detailed account of the military transactions, in order to understand the views and to trace the motives of the contending powers.

Philip the Second died in 1598, having previously resigned his power in the Low Countries to his daughter, the Infanta Isabella and her husband, the Archduke Albert. The new sovereigns did not succeed to a bed of roses. Philip's authority was completely at an end in the seven protestant provinces, of which Holland was the chief. In the catholic Netherlands, the exactions of the Spanish commanders, the arbitrary proceedings

of the successive governors, and the total disregard shewn to their privileges and customs by Philip, had alienated the minds of all men and shaken their fidelity. The catholic provinces had even joined in expelling Don John of Austria, Philip's natural brother, (whom he had appointed governor general after the recal of Alva,) in demolishing the citadels of Antwerp, Ghent, Utrecht, Lisle, Valenciennes, Aire, Bethune, and of Bapaume, constructed by the Spaniards, and in raising an army to prevent the return of the Spanish troops, who, at one time, had been compelled to leave the Low Countries. Alexander Farnese, Duke of Parma, succeeded Don John in the government. To splendid military talents he united consummate prudence and great perseverance; he governed the Low Countries from 1578 to 1592; to his measures alone was it owing that Philip retained any authority in these provinces. He died at Arras in 1592.

The Archduke Albert and the Infanta Isabella made their public entrée into Brussels, in the month of November, 1599; they applied themselves most sedulously, and with great success, to soothe all angry feelings, and by every means in their power to gain the affections of their new subjects in the catholic provinces. The war was carried on for some time longer against the protestant united states, but finding how very little

prospect there was of any ultimate success, the Archduke signed a truce with the Dutch, in 1609, which was to last twelve years.

The Archduke Albert died at Brussels, in 1621, a few months after the cessation of the truce; the Infanta Isabella, his widow, continued to administer the affairs of the Low Countries until her death, which took place in 1633; after that event Spain resumed her authority over these provinces.

Lewis XIII. declared war against Spain in 1635; the Dutch and French acted conjointly against the Spanish Netherlands, but with no great vigour, for several years. The French had been more successful against Spain on her own frontier, and were in possession of the provinces of Roussillon and of Catalonia. These they offered to exchange with Spain for Franche Cômte and the catholic Netherlands. Alarmed at the possibility of having such ambitious and enterprising neighbours, the Dutch hastened to treat with Spain without their ally. In 1648, the treaty of Munster was signed between the seven united provinces and the Spanish government, by which the former were at length acknowledged as a free and independent state.

Beyond their own limits, the Dutch were in possession of Breda, Bois-le-duc, Maestricht, Bergenopzoom, Axel, Hulst, together with their dependent territories; as also some smaller places,

all of which had been conquered from those provinces which supported the Spanish cause. These places they now had confirmed to them by the treaty of Munster; and being carefully fortified, they became the bulwarks of the new republic.

There was also another article in the treaty of Munster, which nothing but the necessity of their affairs could have induced the Spanish government to consent to; as it can hardly be supposed Spain could be so indifferent to the welfare of her subjects in the Netherlands.—The river Scheldt was not to be navigated by vessels beyond a certain very limited tonnage. The Dutch insisted upon this article, in the treaty, to favour the commerce of Amsterdam. Forts Lillo and Liefenshoek were subsequently built by them on the banks of the Scheldt, below Antwerp, to ensure its execution. As the mouth of the Scheldt and both its banks, as high as Lillo and Liefenshoek, belonged to Holland, her right to control the navigation of the river might be defended upon very specious grounds. Spain, at any rate, consented to this article in the treaty, which it is necessary to notice, as it became the subject of future discussion.

The war which Lewis XIII. had declared against Spain, in 1635, lasted twenty-four years; Lewis died in 1643. The war was, nevertheless, continued. The various commotions and intestine divisions which agitated France during that period

were of great assistance to the Spaniards. Cardinal Mazarin, however, who governed France during the minority of Lewis XIV., at length by *his superior talents and firmness, completely established the royal authority, and was enabled to* direct the undivided resources of that powerful kingdom against her external enemy. During the progress of this war, Cromwell assisted the French, and according to treaty, was put in possession of Dunkirk, in 1658. The French and Spaniards being, at length, equally tired, a suspension of arms was agreed upon, and a convention to that effect signed on the 8th May, 1659. Cardinal Mazarin and Don Louis de Haro met afterwards on the Isle of Pheasants, in the midst of the river Bidassoa, between the two kingdoms of France and Spain; and the treaty of the Pyrenees was signed on the 7th of November of the same year.

As from this period the military events which took place in the Low Countries assume a more regular shape, a knowledge of their details can be more easily acquired, and a connected view of the subject may be more practically useful, it has been determined to commence the following Epitome from the peace of the Pyrenees.

CHRONOLOGICAL EPITOME

OF

THE WARS IN THE LOW COUNTRIES.

1659.

By the peace of the Pyrenees, signed this year, a war which had been carried on, without any very decided results, between France and Spain, for twenty-four years, was terminated. In the Low Countries, France either acquired by the treaty (or was confirmed in the possession of) the towns of Hesdin, Arras, Bapaume, Lillers, Sens, Terouane, St. Pol; as also of Gravelines, Bourbourg, St. Venant; of Landrecy, and of Quesnoy; of Thionville, Montmedy, Damvillers, Ivry, Chavancy, and Marville; of Marienbourg, Philipville, and Avèsnès, withall their dependent villages and districts.

The inheritance of the Dukes of Burgundy, already curtailed of the seven united provinces, by the treaty of Munster; and now further de-

prived of so many populous towns and flourishing villages, appears to have required the energy of that family to prevent spoliation. The qualities of Charles the Bold, unlike the mantle of Elijah, seem not to have descended upon his successors.

France also kept from the Duke of Lorraine, who had embarked in this war as an ally of Spain, the town of Moyenvic, the duchy of Bar, and the Cômte of Clermont. The remainder of the duchy of Lorraine was restored to him. It is necessary to advert to these circumstances respecting the Duke of Lorraine, although not immediately connected with the transactions in the Low Countries, on account of the part taken by the house of Lorraine in the subsequent wars with France.

The principal article of the treaty was, however, the marriage agreed upon between Lewis XIV. and the Infanta of Spain, Maria Theresa. In consideration of the payment of 500,000 crowns of gold, Lewis was to renounce all claim in behalf of his wife, or her offspring, to the throne of Spain, or to any portion of the Spanish monarchy; in the event of the extinction of the heirs male of the reigning family. History teems with examples shewing the absurdity of such renunciations. In the present instance, the long war of the Succession offers another proof, and

that a pretty sanguinary one, of the way in which they are, and, in all human probability, ever will be attended to.

1660.

The marriage of Lewis XIV. with the Infanta, Maria Theresa, took place this year at St. Jean de Luz.

1661.

Cardinal Mazarin died early in this year. He had concluded the peace of the Pyrennees, as we have seen, with the Spaniards two years before; and had witnessed the marriage of Lewis XIV. with the Infanta, Maria Theresa, in the one immediately preceding his death. Lewis, who was 22 years of age when he lost his minister, assumed the reins of government himself. His reign may be said, in fact, only to have commenced from this period.

Lewis lived to the age of seventy-seven; and, if we reckon from the death of Mazarin, he swayed the sceptre of France fifty-five years. His ambition and desire to extend his kingdom, gave rise to four successive wars, which were severally terminated by the treaties of Aix-la-Cha-

pelle, of Nimeguen, of Ryswyk, and of Utrecht. The events of, each war will be described in the order they occurred.

Lewis made a new treaty this year with the *Duke of Lorraine, by which he agreed to restore the duchy of Bar, on condition of having Siergues, Saarbourg, Phalsbourg, and some other small places, given up to France; and also of receiving permission to make a grand road or military communication from Metz, through Lorraine into Alsace.*

1652.

Another and a most extraordinary treaty was negotiated this year by Lewis XIV. with the same Charles IV. Duke of Lorraine, and signed at Mount Martyr, near Paris, by which the Duke agreed to give to France the town of Marsal immediately, as a guarantee; and consented that Lewis should inherit at his death the whole of Lorraine and its dependencies, upon condition of declaring his son a prince of the blood in France, settling upon him a yearly pension to the amount of about £80,000; and causing him to be acknowledged as heir to the crown of France, in case of failure of the Bourbon line.

The origin of this treaty is to be traced to the

weakness and folly of the Duke. He had married the Princess of Cantecroix, by whom he had a son, born however previous to the marriage, and whilst his first wife was alive. This young man, called Charles Henry, Prince of Vaudemont, being illegitimate, could not succeed to the dukedom of Lorraine. In the hopes of procuring wealth and rank for this son, and dazzled by the possibility of the reversion of the crown of France, however remote or even improbable the chance of succeeding to it, he gave up his country to Lewis, and sacrificed the interest of his nephew, the legitimate representative of the house of Lorraine.

1663.

The Duke of Lorraine had no sooner signed the treaty of Mount Martyr than he repented. He revoked it officially; a new negotiation took place, and a new treaty was signed this year at Nomeny; but on the same terms as the one of Mount Martyr. French troops under Marshal La Ferté took possession of Marsal for Lewis.

It may not be here amiss to state that the Duke of Lorraine's nephew thus injuriously treated went to Vienna. He subsequently married the sister of the Emperor Leopold, and became one of the

most distinguished generals of that age. It was he who from his death-bed wrote the following beautiful and affecting letter to the emperor, which, although well-known and often quoted, will be always read with interest and pleasure.

“ Sire,

“ Aussitôt que j’ai reçu vos ordres, je suis parti d’Inspruck pour me rendre à Vienne ; mais je me trouve ici arrêté par les ordres d’un plus grand maître. Je pars, et je vais lui rendre compte d’une vie que j’aurois consacrée à votre service. Souvenez-vous, sire, que je quitte une femme qui vous touche ; des enfans auxquels je ne laisse que mon épée ; et mes sujets dans l’oppression.

CHARLES ———.”

1664.

Lewis XIV. sent this year six thousand French troops to assist the Dutch who were at war with the Bishop of Munster. According to the terms of the then existing alliance with Holland, he was obliged to send this auxiliary corps. They however appear to have done nothing, and to have been withdrawn next year. Voltaire says, “ *Jamais secours ne fut donné de si mauvaise grâce, ni reçu avec moins de reconnoissance.*”

1665.

Philip IV., King of Spain, died this year. It will be remembered that Lewis XIV. had been married to his daughter, Maria Theresa, after the peace of the Pyrenees. She and her brother Balthazar were the only children of Philip by his first wife. Charles II., who now became king of Spain, was the son of Philip by his second wife, and inherited the kingdom of Spain in consequence of his elder brother Balthazar's death, which took place previous to that of Philip. In many of the provinces of the Low Countries, such property as a father may be possessed of, at the time of his making a second marriage, cannot be alienated from the children of the first marriage. Lewis XIV., upon this principle, claimed, in behalf of his wife, all such towns and districts, in the Spanish Netherlands, as acknowledged, or were governed by, this custom; as also the province of Franche Cômte. A great deal was written and published by the French, and the Spanish lawyers and statesmen, on both sides of the question. Various negotiations were attempted, and amongst other arrangements it was suggested by that great statesman, Dewit, who, at that time, governed Holland, that the duchy of Luxembourg, Cambray, Douai, Aire, St. Omer, Bergues, and

Furnes, should be given to France, on condition that Lewis should renounce all claims he might hereafter have, arising from his wife, upon the Spanish monarchy. The remainder of the Spanish Netherlands he proposed to annex to Holland. It is curious that we should have seen this scheme, thus originally proposed by this great man, executed almost literally, in our own time, with the consent and approbation of all Europe.

1666.

Lewis assembled his army at Compiegne, and reviewed in person the different corps previous to hostilities. The several negotiations were broken off, or ended in nothing. Appealing to the sword, Lewis prepared to take possession of the provinces he claimed. It was upon this occasion that he caused the words “ultima ratio regum” to be engraved upon his guns.

The manifesto of Lewis was published upon the 18th May of this year; and every preparation having been previously made, he immediately acted upon it. He invaded the Low Countries with three corps. The first was under his own

personal command, assisted by Turenne. It consisted of 35,000 men and was directed upon Charleroi, which was immediately surrendered to the French, having been taken possession of on the 2d June. Ath was entered upon the 16th, and Tournai upon the 24th of the same month. Turenne then besieged Douai, if it may be called a siege, and which was surrendered to him on the 6th July. Lille was then attacked. It appears to have been the only place in the Spanish Netherlands in any tolerable state of defence, or provided with a garrison. It was taken after a siege of nine days and surrendered on the 27th August.

The second corps of the French army consisted of 8000 men, and was entrusted to Marshal D'Aumont. He moved upon Flanders, properly so called, and took Armentieres on the 28th May; Saint Vinox on the 6th; and Furnes on the 12th June. The Marshal then took possession of Courtrai on the 18th, and of Oudenarde on the 31st July.

The Marquis de Crequi commanded the third corps, which was only a small one of about 4000 men, and was pushed towards Luxembourg as a corps of observation.

To oppose the French invasion, Spain had in the Low Countries only about eight thousand men. They were partly Spanish, and partly Walloon troops, commanded by Count Marzin and

the Prince de Ligne. Not being able to oppose the enemy's progress or to meet him in the field, these generals retreated to the neighbourhood of Brussels. Their rear-guard only had a skirmish with the French.

After the surrender of Lille, Lewis returned to Paris, leaving Turenne in the command. Turenne took Alost on the 12th September, which closed the campaign.

1668.

Lewis in person invaded Franche Cômte in the months of January and February in this year. This province, it will be recollected, he also claimed, in right of his wife, as well as the several places he had taken possession of in the Low Countries. The Prince of Condé (whom the French call the grand Condé) commanded under him. Lewis met with as little opposition in Franche Cômte, and found the Spaniards as ill prepared for hostilities there, as in the Netherlands. He took Bezançon, the capital, in two days. Salm, Dole, and Grai, were surrendered in a few more. By the end of February he had quiet possession of the whole province.


The rapid conquest of so considerable a part of the Low Countries, in the preceding year, had

alarmed the Dutch and the British nations. An alliance was formed forthwith, to which the Swedes having also become a party, it was called the triple alliance; the object of which was to preserve the peace of Europe by stopping the further progress of the French arms.

It was agreed upon by those three powers that Lewis should either retain his conquests in the Low Countries, or, at his option, receive the duchy of Luxembourg, or the province of Franche Cômte from Spain, together with an addition to the French frontier in the Low Countries. An armistice took place, and Aix-la-Chapelle having been agreed upon as the place for the meeting of the plenipotentiaries, the peace was there signed on the second of May of this year. Lewis preferred retaining his conquests in the Low Countries, and Franche Cômte was restored to Spain. By the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle France had confirmed to her Charleroi, Binch, Ath, Douai, Tournai, Oudenarde, Lille, Armentieres, Courtrai, Bergues, and Furnes, with all their dependent territories.

Sir William Temple was the minister who negotiated with Dewit the triple alliance, and who succeeded in detaching him from the French interest, which that great man had at one time embraced, looking naturally to France as the enemy and rival of Spain, which power the Dutch nation

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continued to have in horror. *The ambition however of Lewis, his increasing strength, his avowed hostility towards Holland, together with the weakness and distance of Spain, by degrees overcame their dislike; and in the subsequent wars of Lewis XIV. in the Low Countries, Spain had no better ally than the Dutch nation.*

The Dutch struck a medal upon the occasion of the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, which ought to be described, as it was brought forward as one of the pretexts for the war which Lewis, in a few years, waged against them. On one side was a female representing the states of Holland trampling upon the figure of Discord. On the reverse was the Dutch or Belgic Lion holding a cannon between his paws, with the motto of “*sic fines nostrostutamur et undas,*” engraved on it. Underneath were the words “*Assertis legibus; emendatis sacris; adjutis defensis; conciliatis regibus; vindicatâ marium libertâté; stabilitâ orbis Europæ quiete.*”

There appears nothing, unquestionably, either in the medal, or the inscriptions to give offence to the most fastidious. When, however, any act, whether public or private, is determined upon, a pretext is never wanting,

The French commenced without delay to put their new acquisitions in the Low Countries in a state of defence. Very considerable sums were

laid out upon the fortifications, which were all new modelled and re-traced by Vauban, who began to distinguish himself about this time. The citadel of Lille was constructed nearly as it at present exists, and Vauban was appointed the governor.

1669.

By the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, Lewis had considerably augmented and strengthened the northern frontier of France. The war (which was terminated in two short campaigns, and had not lasted a complete year) had been one continued series of success. The neglected state which Spain had, so improvidently, suffered both her army and her fortifications in the Netherlands to fall into, was not sufficiently considered by the French, who were highly elated at the addition of territory they had gained, and participated fully, in the angry feelings, which Lewis soon shewed he entertained against the Dutch, as the chief movers of the triple alliance, which caused him to stop in the midst of his career, and to restore Franche Cômte to Spain. He appears to have determined, very soon after the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, to be revenged on the Dutch for the share they took in arresting his progress in the

Low Countries. His first step was to endeavour to dissolve the triple alliance. He also paid the most unremitting attention to his army, to its discipline and welfare. A new mode of exercise was introduced about this time by a General Martinet, whose name has rather descended to us as a term of reproach, used to designate a trifling officer attentive only to the duties of regimental parade. Martinet, however, appears to have been an officer of considerable merit. It was he who first brought the bayonet into general use, and in this, as well as in other respects, considerably improved the French army. The finances of France were also, by the industry and ability of Colbert, the minister of finance, improved and put in order. There had been considerable mismanagement in the collection, and the income of several years had been anticipated. In 1662, however, the improvement was such that the receipts had amounted to forty-five French millions more than the expenditure; and this overplus had augmented progressively every year. The revenue of France was now about four millions and a half sterling, and her expenses were not much more than one. Lewis had therefore a very considerable command of ready money to assist him in carrying his projects into execution.

1670.

Lewis applied a considerable sum of money in bribes and pensions to detach our unprincipled Charles II. and his corrupt court from the triple alliance. The sister of Charles, Henrietta, married to the Duke of Orleans; brother to Lewis, was sent over to England as if on a friendly visit to Charles, but charged with the secret offers of Lewis.

Charles II., by the treaty which he this year entered into with Lewis, undertook to send six thousand British troops to join the French army in their invasion of Holland; as also to cause his fleet to co-operate with that of France. He was to receive three French millions, or nearly £130,000 per annum, whilst the war lasted; and the islands of Walcheren, Goree, and Voorn, were to be his share of the conquest.

The French also succeeded in making an ally of Sweden, which power, in consideration of an annual subsidy of six hundred thousand rix-dollars, or about one hundred and twenty thousand pounds, engaged to send ten thousand infantry, and six thousand cavalry, into Pomerania, or the duchy of Bremen, to act against the Emperor or any state of the empire, which might attempt to succour the Dutch, whilst at war with Lewis.

It is not possible to reflect on the conduct of Charles II. or of the Swedes without the strongest indignation. The Swedes had not the slightest pretext for a quarrel with the Dutch. As to Charles, he not only had no cause of complaint ; but he wantonly plunged his country into a war against her best interests, and caused the blood and treasure of England to be expended in attempting to extend the already too formidable power of France. Instead of endeavouring to avert the storm which was collecting, and almost ready to fall upon the Dutch, most unmanfully, as well as most impolitically, he added his weight to the opposite scale.

Lewis, having thus dissolved the triple alliance, commenced his operations by occupying the province of Lorraine, which was taken possession of by a French corps commanded by Marshal Crequi. The Duke of Lorraine fled into Germany, and subsequently took an active part against France in the war which shortly took place. The occupation of Lorraine excited a considerable sensation in Europe, not only on account of its being an important acquisition to France ; but, also, as the possession of this province intercepted all communication between the Low Countries and Franche Cômte.

1671.

With a view to distract the attention of the Dutch and to ensure success to his meditated invasion of Holland, Lewis entered into alliances with the Elector of Cologne, and with the Prince Bishop of Munster, both of whom, in the expectation of a share of the spoils, engaged to co-operate with their troops ; and to attack the Dutch on their side of the Rhine. The Bishop of Osna-burg, and the Duke of Brunswic-Lunebourg also contributed to add to the numbers arrayed against Holland, and furnished their regiments for the service of France.

Spain, to the honour of her character and that of her monarch, Charles II., resisted every effort and offer of France to engage her to enter into the alliance against Holland. On the contrary, Charles, grateful for the assistance the Dutch had afforded him when Lewis, in 1667, had invaded the Spanish Netherlands, caused a treaty to be entered into, and which was signed at the Hague in December in this year, by which he bound himself to assist the Dutch with all his means, in case they were attacked by the French.

1672.

The Dutch were, fortunately, able to secure another ally before the storm burst upon them. Frederic-William, Elector of Brandenburg, agreed to march to their assistance with twenty thousand men, upon condition that one half of the expenses of this corps should be defrayed by Holland. This treaty was signed on the 26th April.

Lewis having now made all his preparations, and having been joined by six thousand British troops, under the command of the Duke of Monmouth, published his declaration of war against Holland on the 7th April; and immediately put his troops in motion. His army consisted of one hundred and thirty thousand men, provided with a full proportion of artillery. It was divided into three corps; severally commanded by Turenne, the Prince of Condé, and Count Chamilli, the king himself accompanying the one commanded by Turenne. The British contingent was attached to Turenne's corps. The Duke of Marlborough was a captain in the Duke of Monmouth's regiment; and now, for the first time, carried arms upon the continent.

The French army assembled at Charleroi, and moved immediately towards the Meuse, which

river they crost at Maseik, a small town in the rear of Maestricht, and which was taken possession of on the 15th May. This operation was very judicious and well-conceived, with a view to a rapid advance into Holland by the country between the Rhine and the Meuse; as the necessity of besieging Maestricht was thus obviated. A corps was left to blockade Maestricht, and the French pushed on; the different towns upon the Meuse and the Rhine, on each side of them, surrendering with very little opposition.

The Dutch army, which had been much neglected of late years, consisted of only fifty thousand men, three-fourths of whom were disseminated in the different fortresses of the republic. The Prince of Orange, (afterwards our King William,) then only twenty-two years of age, at the head of the remaining fourth, or about twelve thousand men, occupied the other side of the Yssel, prepared to oppose the passage. The French generals would, perhaps, have found this operation difficult; but, the uncommon dryness of the season had rendered the Rhine fordable, or very nearly so, at a place called Toll-huys; near to Fort Schink, a work constructed in the time of the Duke of Alva, by an active partisan of that name, at the junction of the Rhine with the Yssel. This ford was guarded by five hundred cavalry, and about two thousand infantry. These troops

did not do their duty so well as they ought to have done, and the French effected their passage, thus turning the Prince of Orange upon the Yssel. Lewis pushed on towards Utrecht, and met with no opposition in passing the Rhine again, which he was of course obliged to do in his advance to that city. The French crossed in several columns, upon bridges constructed with the craft seized on the river. They had, moreover, one bridge of their own made of light copper boats brought forward with the army, which had been built in France under the direction of General Martinet. (13, 52)

The Munster and other German auxiliaries of Lewis moved upon the Yssel, and took possession of Zwoll, Deventer, Zutphen and Doesberg.

On the 3d July Lewis XIV. held his court at Utrecht, and installed the Catholic Bishop in the Cathedral. This was, however, the limit of his conquest, and the only fruit he gathered from the invasion of Holland.

The Dutch, having cut the dikes, and effectually prevented the further progress of the French towards Amsterdam, sent to offer to negotiate for peace. Lewis, elated by his present success, proposed such overbearing and inadmissible terms as roused the spirit of the country to the most determined opposition. Dewit, who had advised and proposed to treat with the French, was put

to death by the populace; and the Prince of Orange, who had been a strenuous advocate for opposing them, was unanimously called to the Stadtholdership by the states, notwithstanding the former abolition of that dignity in the year 1667 by the republican party.

The Prince of Orange, by his activity and firmness, shewed that he deserved the confidence of his countrymen. He entered forthwith into negotiations with the English, the Imperial and the Spanish cabinets, for assistance. The corruption and imbecility then unfortunately prevailing in the unprincipled court of Charles II. prevented his application from being favourably received in London; and, although the feelings of the people of England compelled the government to send ambassadors, avowedly to treat of peace with the Dutch; yet, another treaty was this year made with Lewis, and signed on the 16th July, wherein Charles engaged not to enter into any negotiation with the Dutch without the concurrence of the French ministry. The Spanish and Imperial courts were more favourably disposed. Monterey, the governor of the Spanish Netherlands, was instructed to afford immediately the assistance of some Spanish regiments to the Prince of Orange, and negotiations for more effectual aid were commenced with both these powers.

The Elector of Brandenburg, in the mean

time, advancing with twenty thousand men, to the assistance of Holland; the French were obliged to detach Marshal Turenne at the head of 12,000 men to oppose him, in conjunction with their German auxiliaries. Turenne crossed the Rhine at Wesel. This considerable detachment of their best troops, added to the impolicy which they had adopted of garrisoning so many places, considerably reduced the disposable force of the French army in Holland. The Prince of Orange availed himself of these circumstances, and carrying the war into the enemy's own country, broke ground against Charleroi. This measure, although he raised the siege, not a little elevated the spirits of the Dutch, and added very considerably to his own reputation. It took place in December, at which time the French head-quarters were still at Utrecht, and Lewis thought himself master of the destinies of Holland.

The Duke of Luxembourg, who commanded the French garrison in Utrecht, made an attempt, during the winter, to surprise the Hague. His scheme failed, owing (as asserted by the French) to a sudden thaw. As a recompense to his troops for the privations they underwent upon this occasion, he gave up to plunder and devastation the large and populous villages of Bodegrave and Swammerdam. The cruelties and horrid enormities of which the French troops were guilty,

were equally disgraceful to themselves and to their general.

1673.

Montececuli, at the head of an imperial corps of 12,000 men, advanced, apparently to co-operate with the Elector of Brandenburg: but being prevented, by his instructions, from committing any act of hostility against the French, excepting they should invade the territory of the empire, he was, in the beginning of this year, of very little use to the Dutch. The French, reinforcing Turenne's corps, enabled him to advance towards Westphalia. The Elector of Brandenburg, in consequence, made peace with Lewis, being alarmed for his possessions in that province. The French restored to him the Duchy of Cleves, and some other smaller territories, which they had occupied, near the Rhine, upon his engaging not to interfere between them and the Dutch. This treaty was signed on the 16th June.

Holland thus lost the assistance she had expected from the Prussians. The Emperor, however, determined to take a more active part in the war, and a treaty was signed at the Hague on the 30th August, by which he promised to send thirty thousand men forthwith to the Rhine. The

Duke of Lorraine (whose territories we have seen were taken possession of by France in the beginning of the war) engaged to raise eighteen thousand men for the service of Holland, and Spain entered into a treaty, which was signed at the Hague the same day as the one with the Emperor, by which that power agreed to make common cause with the Dutch, and to declare war against France immediately.

Whilst these different negotiations were going on, the Prince of Condé, who had the command of the French troops in the Low Countries, suddenly invested Maestricht.—Lewis himself came from Paris to superintend the siege, bringing with him a considerable reinforcement. The place was taken in thirteen days; it surrendered on the 29th June. This siege is remarkable for being the first at which European armies made use of the zigzags, or the present mode of tracing approaches in attacking a fortified place. They were introduced by Vauban, who borrowed them from the Turks. It is generally believed that parallels were first employed at this siege; but this is a mistake, and Vauban's talents and skill do not require any erroneous statements to give them a false glare. Trenches, to contain the assailants, had been excavated parallel to the works of the fortress to be attacked, from the earliest times. Vauban's improvement consisted in tracing

the approach or communication from the parallel, so that it should not be enfiladed, and which the Turks had done long before. Montecceculi, in his *Memoires*, talking of the Turks, of whose military skill, as it existed in his time, he had very deservedly a high opinion, says, “ Il ne conduit point ses tranchées par la ligne la plus courte en les flanquant avec des redoutes de distance en distance ; mais, il les fait en lignes courbes, transversales, parallèles à l’endroit d’où il s’approche ; ainsi ils ne peuvent être enfilées de la place, ni endommagées par le canon.” There is another article in the Turkish system of discipline relative to sieges, as quoted by Montecceculi, which, in a modified degree, might be with advantage introduced into our service. Those who have witnessed the little labour performed by soldiers, the negligence, in general of, in other respects, good officers, when employed upon working parties, the time lost in relieving the detachments, and the hurry they are invariably in to be relieved, will perhaps agree that a medium between the two customs would be an improvement.

“ Il ne change point les gardes, ni les travaux—quand ils sont une fois entrés dans un poste, ils y demeurent jusqu’à la fin du siège —on leur apporte là leur nourriture, de l’eau, du bois, et leurs autres nécessités.”

The Prince of Orange, having been strengthened by a corps of Spanish troops, besieged and retook Naarden, on the 14th of September. Montecculi, having now received fresh orders, crossed the Rhine, at Coblentz, and, descending the river, formed his junction with the Prince of Orange, in the neighbourhood of Bonn, which place, the residence of the Elector of Cologne, was besieged and taken in fifteen days by the allied army.—Bonn surrendered on the 12th November. Turenne, who, it will be remembered, had been detached into Germany to oppose the Elector of Brandenburg, and who had crossed the Rhine at Wesel, in advancing towards the Prussian army, had been obliged to recross and to retreat when that army was reinforced by the Imperialists under Montecculi. His object had since been to prevent the Imperialists from crossing the Rhine, and he had advanced up the river so high as the valley of Alsace, between the Rhine and the Vosges, to oppose their passage, when Montecculi, by a rapid countermarch, descended the Rhine as far as Coblentz, and passed at the bridge of that city. The French besieged and took Trêves, in revenge for the Elector having allowed the Imperialists a passage through Coblentz.—Trêves was taken on the 15th November.

The presence of so large an army, as that of the Dutch, the Spaniards, and the Imperialists, now

amounted to, compelled the French to evacuate all their conquests in Holland. The Prince of Condé withdrew his garrisons, except those upon the Meuse at Grâve, Masseur, and Maestricht, and concentrating his forces, retreated into the Netherlands. The Imperialists recrossed the Rhine and took up their winter quarters in the Electorate of Cologne.

Previous to the evacuation of Holland, or rather of such of the provinces as they had military occupation of, the French raised very large pecuniary contributions. From that of Utrecht alone they drew rather more than one hundred and fifty thousand pounds, which shews that the system of plunder and of requisition adopted by the French government is of a much older date than the war of the revolution, as by many has been erroneously supposed to be the case.

1674.

Early in this year the feelings of the people of England, strongly expressed by the circumstance of the House of Commons refusing all supplies to Charles II. to carry on the war against the Dutch, compelled him to make peace with them. The six thousand British troops, acting with the French, ought unquestionably to have been with-

drawn. Charles, although repeatedly addressed on this subject by Parliament, suffered them, nevertheless, to remain, and even to recruit in England. They were attached to the corps of Turenne, and employed against the Imperialists.

The retreat of the French from Holland caused a change of sentiments and conduct on the part of the small German states, who had sided with the French at the commencement of the war. The Elector of Cologne, the Bishop of Munster, the Bishop of Osnaburg, and the Duke of Brunswick-Lunebourg, made peace with the Dutch this summer. The Elector of Brandenburg renewed his treaty, and agreed to furnish twenty thousand men to serve against France. The Empire declared war against France in the month of June.

The French had three armies in the field this year; that in the Low Countries was commanded by the Prince of Condé, the one upon the Rhine by Turenne, and the third, under Lewis's own immediate orders, was employed to take possession of Franche Comté.

It was the intention of the French government that their army in the Low Countries should act upon the defensive, whilst Lewis was occupied in Franche Comté. Condé, in consequence of this plan, concentrated his force between Mons and Charleroi. The Prince of Orange, at the head of the Dutch and Spanish troops, moved

against him, but not deeming it advisable to attack Condé on the strong ground he occupied, nor to undertake the siege of Charleroi, which at one time was in contemplation, in the neighbourhood of so considerable a French army, he fell back with a view of besieging Oudenarde;—Condé followed, and on the evening of the 11th August, near Seneffe, half way between Binch and Nivelles, he attacked in force, and with great vigour, the Prince of Orange's rear-guard, which he thought he had an opportunity of cutting off. This brought on the battle of Seneffe, one of the most severe and obstinate actions fought during this war; night put an end to the business; both sides claimed the victory. The actual loss on each side does indeed appear to have been much the same. The Prince of Condé, however, failed in his intention of cutting off the Prince of Orange's rear-guard, and so far, was certainly defeated in his proposed object. The real advantages of victory were, moreover, unquestionably gained by the Dutch, in the additional confidence infused into their councils, and those of their allies, by the conduct of the Prince of Orange. To all thinking men the idea of the conquest of Holland must now have appeared ridiculous. In two years from the period Lewis held his court at Utrecht the Dutch were able to meet him in the field, and to contend with his armies without any advantage of local situation.

The Prince of Orange continued his march, and invested Oudenarde.

Tournai and Oudenarde are both à cheval upon the Scheldt, and considerable inundations can be made at each of these places with very little trouble. The French had caused them to be formed to the utmost extent. As soon as the Dutch had commenced their approaches against Oudenarde, Vauban, who superintended the defence, ordered the sluices at Tournai to be suddenly opened, and a vast volume of additional water to be thus suddenly discharged upon Oudenarde. This manœuvre, frequently repeated, caused considerable inconvenience to the besiegers, and added much to the difficulties of the attack. The Prince of Condé having also advanced towards Oudenarde, the Dutch raised the siege. The Prince of Orange wished to have attacked Condé, but the commander of the German auxiliaries, Count Souches, not only would not consent to this measure, but actually withdrew his people from the combined Dutch and Spanish troops; so little authority had the Prince of Orange over these independent troops, in the Dutch service, that this extraordinary conduct of Count Souches does not appear to have been punished. The Prince of Orange detached a corps to besiege Huy, which was taken on the 2d December, and went himself with the rest of his disposable force to assist at the siege of Grève. The Prince of Condé sent considerable

reinforcements to Turenne, in Alsace, and put the rest of his army into winter-quarters.

Independent of the army which the Dutch had pushed forward in the commencement of this campaign, under the Prince of Orange, to oppose the Prince of Condé, to the neighbourhood of Mons, they had been able to afford another corps for the siege of Grâve, which operation had been commenced on the 23d July. The conduct of this siege had been entrusted to General Rabenhaupt. The Prince of Orange, with the reinforcements, arrived before Grâve on the 10th, and it surrendered on the 23d October.

Great merit is certainly due to Count Chamilly and the French garrison, for their very gallant defence, and for thus holding out for three months in a very ill-fortified place, without casemated cover, and without any prospect of being relieved. Grâve, however, though badly fortified, and without revêtements, is strong from its local situation on the banks of the Meuse, from the depth and width of its wet ditches, from the inundations which surround it, and from the impossibility of approaching it, excepting on the narrow space of the top of the dam or dike by the river side. General Rabenhaupt's attacks appear to have been too many and too desultory; had he concentrated his means, it is probable he would have succeeded sooner. The French garrison

very bravely continued in the covertway and the outworks thê whole of the siege; their wounded only were allowed to enter the town. They had 174 officers killed and wounded, and about 2400 men, being about two-thirds of the officers, and more than one-half of the soldiers of which the garrison was originally composed.

It had been the intention of the allies that the Imperialists, the Prussians, and the Lorraine troops, should pass the Rhine at Strasbourg, and either drive the French out of Lorraine or oppose Lewis in his invasion of Franche Comté. The Elector of Brandenburg claiming the chief command, Montecceuli had, in consequence, withdrawn from this army. It was very late in the year before the Prussians were put in motion, which afforded an opportunity to Turenne to cross the Rhine twice at Philipsbourg, and to surprise and beat, first, the Lorraine troops, and, subsequently, the Imperialists, before they had assembled the whole of their respective corps, or had been joined by their allies. When, however, the Prussians came up and crossed the Rhine, at Strasbourgh, which was not until the 14th October, Turenne retreated towards Lorraine, and left Upper and Lower Alsâce in possession of the Germans. The Imperialists and Prussians quietly took up their winter-quarters in Alsâce, and the Elector of Brandenburg sent for the Electress and his family to Colmar;

where he established his court for the winter. The perfect security of the allies, from their having their left upon the mountains of the Vosges, their right upon the Rhine, and their enemy in front of them, apparently as quiet in winter-quarters as themselves, inspired Turenne with the idea of marching round the Vosges, thus turning his enemy, and suddenly attacking him from the rear. Every thing depended upon the secrecy and promptitude of his movements. He assembled his army in the depth of winter, and marching with the utmost rapidity, he entered Als ce at Betfort, and drove every thing down the valley before him. The Germans, although infinitely more numerous than Turenne's corps, being surprised, and beat in detail, were compelled to cross the Rhine at Strasbourg, in the short space of six weeks from the time Turenne commenced his operations. This, unquestionably, may be reckoned one of the ablest and best executed enterprises in modern warfare.

Thus ended this campaign. In Flanders the French had lost Huy and Gr ve; upon the Rhine they had been eminently successful in repelling the Germans, and they had taken possession of Franche Comt  from the Spaniards with little or no opposition.

1675.

The French had three armies again in the field this year: the one in Flanders, which Lewis joined in person early in May, was employed upon the Meuse. The French expected that the Prince of Orange would follow up his success at Grève, of the preceding campaign, and besiege Maestricht. As great assistance for such an operation might be expected to be drawn from Liege, they persuaded Baron de Viersat, the governor of the citadel, for the Prince Bishop, to admit fifteen hundred French infantry, which were immediately furnished from Maestricht, to secure the neutrality and independence of Liege. Lewis besieged and took Dinant, at that time a dependency of Liege, and into which place an Imperial general, Spork, had thrown himself with a small body of troops of the empire. Spork defended Dinant eight days; it surrendered on the 29th May. Huy was subsequently attacked and taken on the 6th June. Lewis crossed the Meuse and invested Limbourg; it was defended for the Spaniards by the Prince of Nassau-Siegen. The fortifications have been since destroyed; but it was tolerably strong, and had a small citadel situated on a precipitous rock. It was taken after eleven days

siege, and surrendered on the 21st June. Lewis returned to Paris after these sieges and left the command of the army in Flanders with Condé, having previously detached considerable reinforcements to Turenne in Alsace.

The second army of France was the one employed in Alsace, and commanded by Turenne. The Swedes having, in compliance with their treaty with France, of 1670, invaded the Prussian territories, the Elector of Brandenburg had withdrawn with his army from the Imperialists, and marched to defend his own dominions. The Emperor, however, in addition to the troops of Lorraine, and a proportion of those of the empire, had sent a considerable body of the Imperial army towards Strasbourg, and given the undivided command to Montecceuli. Turenne had, consequently, fully as efficient an enemy to oppose. To prevent Montecceuli passing into Alsace, by the bridge of Strasbourg, Turenne caused a bridge of boats to be constructed with great secrecy and rapidity at Offenheim, twelve miles above Strasbourg, and conducting the French army across it on the 7th June, he seized upon Wilstadt, in front of Strasbourg, thus cutting off all communication between Strasbourg and the Imperialists. Montecceuli occupied the line of the Renchen (which, descending from the neighbouring hills, crosses the valley of the Rhine and flows into that river).

Turenne, with infinite pains, turned the position of the Renchen by following that river into the mountains, cutting paths through the woods, filling up the quagmires, and constructing bridges over the ravines caused by the mountain-torrents. The French, having thus got upon his left flank, Montececuli fell back to strong ground in his rear. In reconnoitring this new position of the Imperialists, Turenne was killed by a cannon shot, near the village of Saspach, on the 27th July.

The two lieutenant-generals with Turenne, Count Lorge and the Marquis de Vaubrun, seem to have had a joint command or authority, and to have differed as to the measures to be pursued. They conducted, however, the French army back across the Rhine, pursued by the Imperialists, and a sharp action took place at Altenheim, (where they passed the river,) and where the Marquis de Vaubrun was killed. Montececuli crossed the Rhine at Strasbourg, and undertook the sieges of Hagenau and Sauverne. Lewis ordered the Prince of Condé to leave the Low Countries and to proceed to Alsace, as soon as he heard of Turenne's death. Upon the advance of Condé with considerable reinforcements, Montecceculi raised the sieges of Hagenau and of Sauverne, and retreated across the Rhine, which ended the campaign upon this frontier.

The Prince of Orange availed himself of the

absence of Condé, and the diminution of the French army in Flanders, to besiege Binch, which surrendered to him on the last day of August. Condé, with whom Lewis had left the command upon his return to Paris after the capture of Dinant, Huy, and Limbourg, (as related in the account of the transactions in the early part of this year,) had with great ability watched the Prince of Orange, carefully avoiding a general action, which if lost, would have enabled the Dutch to have besieged either Maestricht or Charleroi at their leisure; he, nevertheless, regulated his movements so as to be ready to throw succours into whatever place they might invest.

The third French army employed in the field this year was entrusted to Marshal Crequi. It was opposed to that of the Empire, consisting of the contingents of several of the German princes, amounting to twenty thousand men, commanded by the Duke of Lunenburg, who crossed the Rhine at Coblentz, and advanced up the Moselle to endeavour to retake Trêves, which, it will be remembered, the French had seized upon in the year 1673. Marshal Crequi, advancing towards Trêves to endeavour to compel the Germans to raise the siege, was surprised and completely defeated at Consarbruck by Duke George-William of Brunswic, who commanded the corps employed to cover the operation. Crequi himself got into

Trèves with only four officers. The place surrendered on the 6th September.

Charles, the fourth Duke of Lorraine, died this year, little lamented or respected. He was succeeded, not in his dominions, but in the hopes of recovering them, by his gallant nephew, Charles, the fifth Duke of Lorraine, a most distinguished general, as has already been stated, in the service of the emperor.

1676.

Lewis joined his army in Flanders early this year. The Prince of Condé, owing to his advanced age and infirmities, had given up the command of the troops in Alsace, which was now entrusted to Marshal Luxembourg. A third corps, but of no great force, under Marshal Crequi, was assembled between the Sambre and the Meuse to act according to circumstances.

In Flanders the town of Condé was besieged, and taken in six days, by Lewis in person. The outworks were carried by an open attack, and the garrison surrendered at discretion.

Bouchain was next invested; Lewis gave the direction of the siege to his brother, Monsieur, the Duke of Orleans, and took under his own immediate orders, the covering army, assisted by

Marshal Schomberg. The Prince of Orange, at the head of the Dutch and Spanish army, advanced to endeavour to relieve Bouchain. His force was considerably inferior to that of the French, and Lewis might have attacked him with advantage if he had been more active and decided in his arrangements. The opportunity was, however, lost. The Prince of Orange encamped under the protection of Valenciennes, and finding he was not able to relieve Bouchain, threw reinforcements into Cambray.—Bouchain surrendered on the 11th May. Lewis returned to Paris after the capture of Bouchain, having previously sent from the Low Countries a considerable body to the assistance of Marshal Luxembourg in Alsace. Marshal Schomberg, with whom Lewis left the command of the army in the Low Countries, detached Marshal Humieres to invest Aire, whilst he himself kept the field to oppose the Prince of Orange. The recovery of Maestricht was a favourite object with the Dutch, and preparations for that siege had been made for some time. The Prince of Orange, when he fell back from the neighbourhood of Bouchain, invested Maestricht, and had commenced his operation. The Spaniards were anxious to relieve Aire:—the want of one undivided authority (the rock upon which so often the operations of allied armies have been wrecked) was the cause, in this instance, (as in so many

others) of failure. The Spanish regiments marched from the camp before Maestricht to relieve Aire, but which was surrendered previous to their arrival.—Aire capitulated on the last day of July. The Prince of Orange, with a diminished force, was unable to press the siege at Maestricht, or so completely to invest it as to prevent Marshal Schomberg from throwing in reinforcements; in consequence of which he was obliged to raise the siege on the 27th August.

Marshal Crequi, with his corps between the Sambre and Meuse, suddenly attacked and took possession of the town and castle of Bouillon. Bouillon, at that time, belonged to the Prince Bishop of Liege, in whose citadel of Liege, it will be remembered, the French had been allowed the preceding year to quarter 1500 infantry, to prevent the allies from drawing that assistance (it was supposed they otherwise might do) from Liege towards the siege of Maestricht. The French were, therefore, not only at peace, but on an amicable footing with the Prince Bishop, when they thus suddenly took possession of his town and castle of Bouillon. Previous to the investment of Maestricht by the Prince of Orange, the French garrison, in the citadel of Liege, blew up the fortifications, and withdrew into Maestricht.

The young Duke of Lorraine had succeeded Montecceuli in the command of the Imperial army

on the Rhine. Montececuli retired about the same time that Condé withdrew from the French army, and for the same reasons, his age and increasing infirmities. The Duke of Lorraine invested Philipsbourg, which being on the German side of the Rhine, had frequently afforded the French a tête-de-pont upon the Rhine, and a passage into Germany. He closely pressed it upon the German side, and having passed the Rhine with the troops with which he meant to cover the siege, he occupied the line of the Lauter, upon the banks of which he carefully entrenched himself. The Duke of Luxembourg, expecting that the Imperialists would have advanced up the valley of Alsace, had taken up his ground between Hagenau and Saverne to oppose them. He was, however, thus out-manœuvred by the Duke of Lorraine, and compelled to remain a quiet spectator of the siege of Philipsbourg, which, after having been very gallantly defended by the French garrison, under Dufay, was surrendered to the Imperialists on the 17th September.

During the operations of this campaign negotiations for peace were commenced at Nimeguen, under the mediation of England: Sir William Temple and three other commissioners were sent on the part of Charles II. It does not appear, however, that any of the parties, excepting the Dutch, were sincere in their wishes for peace.

The Dutch, having got rid of the enemy out of their own country, were now defending the Spanish Netherlands, and as neither the exertions nor the disposable means of Spain were commensurate with those of her allies, the principal burthen had fallen upon the Dutch. The French, gratified at the facility with which they had acquired possession of some very important places in the Spanish Netherlands, now evidently intended to make their principal efforts, and were anxious for an extension of frontier on that side. By the surrender of Philipsbourg, and the recapture of Trêves, the Imperialists were in hopes they would be able to penetrate into Lorraine. Under these circumstances, added to the notorious partiality of the mediator for Lewis, and the corrupt influence of the French monarch with the English ministry, the congress at Nimeguen made but very little progress.

1677.

The French made great exertions during the winter to enable them to open this campaign early. Lewis left Paris at the end of February for the Low Countries. Valenciennes was immediately invested, and was taken on the 17th March. Its speedy surrender, without at all de-

tracting from the ability or the gallantry shewn by the French army, must however be stated to have been principally owing to the negligence and inattention of the garrison. The approaches had been conducted in the usual manner by Vau-ban. It was proposed to carry by assault an advanced outwork, the possession of which was judged necessary for the further operations. The troops ordered for this service carried the work, followed the enemy into a ravelin which commanded it, and from thence into the body of the place; they immediately threw themselves into some houses which they loop-holed and barricaded; Lewis ordered them to be supported, and the place was taken.

The French, after the fall of Valenciennes, divided their army; Lewis marched himself to Cambray, and sent his brother, the Duke of Orleans, to besiege St. Omer. The fortifications of Cambray consisted of merely a wall flanked by towers without outworks; the wall was breached, and the place surrendered. The citadel was afterwards attacked. The operations here were obliged to be more regular, and the garrison, which consisted of 2000 men, did not surrender before the outworks were in possession of the French, and a practicable breach had been made in the body of the place.—It was taken on the 17th April, after a siege of twelve days. The citadel of Cambray

was pretty much in the same state in which we have seen it in modern times, the French having done very little since to the fortifications of Cambray excepting surrounding the body of the place with a bastioned line of outworks.

The Duke of Orleans at the same time besieged St. Omer. The Prince of Orange, having assembled his army, advanced to its relief. The Duke of Orleans quitting the siege, and having been, very opportunely, joined by Marshal Luxembourg, (with a corps which Lewis detached from his own army from before Cambray to reinforce the Duke,) attacked and defeated the Prince of Orange on the 11th April, at the foot of the hill on which Cassel is situated. The French returned to the siege, and St. Omer was taken on the 20th April. The garrison, which consisted of about 1500 men, were allowed by the capitulation, to retreat to Ghent.

After the surrender of St. Omer and of the citadel of Cambray, Lewis, accompanied by his brother, returned to Paris. The command of the army in the Low Countries was left with Marshal the Duke of Luxembourg.

The Prince of Orange dispersed his troops as if to occupy his winter-quarters, in the hopes of inducing the Duke of Luxembourg to do the same. As soon as the French had taken up their cantonments he suddenly invested Charleroi. The Duke

of Luxembourg, however, re-assembling his troops and moving towards Charleroi, the Prince of Orange raised the siege on the 11th August.

St. Guilain (which, according to the system upon which Mons was fortified at that time, was the key to the inundations, which constitute the principal defence of that important place,) was taken by the French during the winter without much trouble, owing to the severity of the frost and the negligence of the garrison in not keeping the ice in their ditches properly broken. The garrison consisted of nearly 1100 Spanish troops. They surrendered on the 11th December. The Duke of Villa Hermosa, governor of Mons, advanced to their assistance, but too late.

Upon the Rhine the Imperialists endeavoured to penetrate into Lorraine and Alsace in two corps. The Duke of Lorraine, at the head of the principal army, moved by Trêves, passed the Sarre, and advanced to Metz. Marshal Crequi commanded the French army employed to oppose him. With very great ability and wonderful perseverance he continued in presence of the Duke for nearly three months, cutting off his convoys and detachments, and without risking a general action compelled him at length to give up the idea of penetrating into Lorraine, and forced him to retreat towards Strasbourg. The Prince of Saxe Eisenach, who commanded the Imperial corps destined to invade

Alsace, was still more unfortunate. He was obliged to enter into a capitulation with the Baron de Monclar (charged with the defence of Alsace), on the 24th September, by which it was agreed that his corps should recross the Rhine and retreat to Radstadt. The Duke of Lorraine, thus deprived of all hopes of the reinforcements he expected to obtain in Alsace from a junction with the corps of the Prince of Saxe Eisenach, retreated also across the Rhine by the bridge at Strasbourg. The rear-guard of the Imperialists had an affair with the French at Kokersberg, near Strasbourg, on the 7th October, in which they had the disadvantage. Crequi afterwards crossed the Rhine, by a bridge of boats, considerably higher than Strasbourg, and besieged Freybourg, in the Brisgau, which surrendered on the 14th November. This town was merely surrounded by a wall, and was taken in five days. Its position, as a check upon the supplies the Imperialists might have drawn from the Brisgau, during the winter, made its capture of consequence, and gave great *éclat* to Marshal Crequi at the termination of the campaign.

This campaign of Marshal Crequi's may be fairly put in comparison with that of Turenne, in the winter of 1674, when he compelled the Prussians and the Imperialists to retreat out of Alsace, although the results were not so brilliant. The

name of Crequi ought unquestionably to stand high in the list of French generals who have been eminently useful to their country.

The successes of Lewis in Flanders had so alarmed the people of England that the House of Commons addressed Charles II. on the 30th March, to beg he would endeavour to preserve the Spanish Netherlands, and they promised to support him in case of a rupture with France. On the 23d May they again addressed him, and stated that they would grant no supplies until he entered into an offensive and defensive alliance with Holland.

In this temper and disposition, the marriage of the Prince of Orange with the Princess Mary, which took place early in November, gave universal satisfaction throughout the country.

1678.

The French, by their activity, had great advantage over the Dutch and Spanish commanders in the Low Countries, who could neither assemble their troops nor undertake any operation until the object had been fully discussed in a council of generals, as well as the measures approved of by a committee from the States. Lewis was again early in Flanders this year. Ghent was suddenly

invested, and surrendered on the 9th March; the citadel capitulated on the 12th. The garrison was not sufficiently strong to defend a place of such a considerable extent as Ghent; but the citadel was the same that we have seen in modern times, and certainly was susceptible of a much better defence.

The French then besieged Ypres, which surrendered on the 25th March, after a siege of seven days. The various outworks which at present surround Ypres have been added since, but the body of the place existed pretty much as at present. There was moreover a small citadel for the garrison to retire to, and (as at present) there were great facilities for making inundations. The defence, therefore, must be considered as very disgraceful.

Calvo, commanding the French garrison at Maestricht, sent a party which surprised and took possession, on the 4th May, of the small town and castle of Leuve, on the Gette. Leuve is considered a strong post on account of the water and marshes by which it is surrounded. The French troops were provided with portable boats made of willow, and covered with waxed linen. It is a wonder that boats of this description, being so portable and convenient, have not more frequently been made use of in warfare.

Lewis returned to Paris after the surrender of

Ypres. The Duke of Luxembourg, with whom he left the command, moved the French army towards Mons, and took up a position near the abbey of St. Denys. The French being, moreover, masters of St. Guilain, they seemed to have adopted all the preliminary measures for putting themselves in possession of Mons.

The Prince of Orange at the head of the Dutch and Spanish army, advanced towards Mons, and thinking he had a favourable opportunity, attacked the Duke of Luxembourg on the afternoon of the 14th August, and compelled him to move from his ground with considerable loss. The French writers, angry at the check which the Duke of Luxembourg thus experienced, have abused the Prince of Orange for making this attack, alleging that he must have known of the signature of the treaty of peace; which, in fact, took place on the 10th August, at Nimeguen. The treaty of peace, however, although dated on the 10th, was not actually signed until midnight between the 10th and the 11th. Intelligence, therefore, of this event could hardly be sent off to the Prince of Orange before the forenoon of the 11th. Whoever has travelled in that marshy and sandy country, from Nimeguen to Bois-le-duc, from Bois-le-duc to Breda, from Breda to Antwerp, and considers, moreover, that at that time there were no post-horses on any part of the road, and no pavé be-

tween Antwerp and Breda, will easily give credit to the assertion of the Prince of Orange, that he only received communication of the peace on the night of the 14th. That he was aware of the existence of negotiations was unquestionably true ; but the French were equally aware of them, and Lewis did not hesitate to attack Ghent or Ypres because he had plénipotentiaires at Nimeguen. No armistice had been agreed upon, and, in fact, the very events of the war as they occurred caused the demands of the different negotiators to rise or fall according to circumstances. If the Duke of Luxembourg had had an opportunity he would then have gladly seized upon Mons ; nor would he have been prevented by his knowledge of a pending negotiation. The defeat of Luxembourg and dispersion of the French army in the Low Countries would have had the happiest effect in the terms the Dutch were likely to make at Nimeguen ; and the Prince of Orange appears, not only to have been perfectly justifiable in making the attack, but had he neglected any opportunity of striking a blow (in consequence of the negotiations) his conduct would have been highly blameable.

The news of the capture of Ghent and Ypres by the French, in the commencement of this year, caused such a sensation in England, that Charles the Second was compelled to send the Duke of

Monmouth, with three thousand men, to Ostend, to assist the Spaniards. Parliament voted an army of thirty thousand men. By the repeated applications of the House of Commons, Charles was also, at last, induced to recall the British regiments from the French service. These gallant troops had served Lewis most honourably and faithfully the whole of the war. In the private memoirs of the day, the battalions of Monmouth, Douglas, and Hamilton are repeatedly noticed for their courage and skill. Lewis, angry at their being recalled, dismissed them without pay, clothing, honours, rewards, or thanks. The French historians themselves confess they were sent back to England “*en assez mauvais état.*”

Marshal Crequi had continued to command the French army on the Upper Rhine this year. The Imperialists proposed to retake Freyburg, and to penetrate into Upper Alsace by the bridge at Rhinsfeld. Crequi beat their advanced guard near Rhinsfeld, on the 6th July; crossed the Rhine, and following the Duke of Lorraine down the valley of the Rhine, on the German side, came up with his rear-guard at Gegembach, where he defeated it on the 23d July. He attacked and took Fort Kehl, and burnt considerable part of the bridge at Strasbourg on the 27th of the same month.

By the peace of Nimeguen the French restored

Maestricht to the Dutch. They also gave back to Spain, Chârleroi, Binch, Ath, Oudenarde, and Courtray, which had been ceded to them by the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle. Spain, however, yielded to Lewis (besides Franche Cômte), Valenciennes, Bouchain, Condé, Cambray, Catteau-Cambresis, Aire, St. Omer, Ypres, Warwick, Warneton, Poperingue, Bailleul, Cassel, Bavai, and Maubeuge. It is pretty evident, therefore, that France very considerably augmented her possessions and strengthened her frontier in the Low Countries, by the peace of Nimeguen.

1679.

The emperor did not make peace with France until this year. The French kept Freybourg, and the Imperialists Philipsbourg. The *uti possidetis* was the principle adopted pretty nearly with the Imperialists, who granted nothing to the French but a right of communicating from Brisach, across the Rhine, to Freybourg; the insulated possession of which does not appear to have offered any military or political advantage to Lewis.

The Duke of Lorraine did not get back his territories. They were offered by France; but, upon such revolting and humiliating terms, that this prince preferred protesting against the treaty alto-

gether, and waiting for a more favourable opportunity to recover his possessions.

Thus ended the second war of Lewis the Fourteenth. France continued in possession of Lorraine; and had acquired, with the consent of all Europe, Franche Cômte and a considerable additional territory in the Low Countries.

1680.

The French turned their attention, as soon as the peace of Nimeguen was concluded, to the security of their new acquisitions; and no time was lost in constructing such fortifications as appeared necessary. The point where the Yser (which discharges itself into the sea at Nieuport) intersects the canal from Ypres to Furnes, was selected for a fort, Fort Knock; which gave to them the command of the water communications between these three places. Lines were constructed from Dunkirk, by Furnes, to Fort Knock; and from thence to the Lys, so as to cover the communication between Ypres and Menin. Menin was regularly fortified — the citadel of Tournai completed — Charlemont, upon the Meuse, put in order — Maubeuge built as it at present exists — Philipville very considerably strengthened. All these works were carried on with great activity, inde-

pendent of the fortifications at Fribourgli, and very extensive works in Alsace, and upon the Vosges.

Lewis appointed three sovereign courts this year, (from whose decrees there was to be no appeal,) to inquire into and investigate as to what towns, villages, baronies, or other possessions held of those places, the sovereignties of which had been severally transferred to him by the peace of Nimeguen. These courts were assembled at Besançon, for Franche Comté; at Brissac, upon the Rhine, for Alsace; and at Metz, upon the Moselle, for the Low Countries. Whatever villages or territories were adjudged to Lewis by these courts, were immediately taken possession of by French troops. The Elector Palatine; the Elector of Trêves; the Duke of Wirtemberg; the King of Sweden, in his capacity as Duke of Deux Ponts; all lost considerable territories and domains. From the Spanish Netherlands, Lewis claimed the town of Alost and its dependencies; and affirmed, that feudál homage was due to him from the King of Spain, for the town and province of Luxembourg.

1681.

The French took possession this year of the Comté of Chiny, in the Low Countries, in conse-

quence of a decree of their court at Metz. The Comté of Chiny, adjoining the province of Luxembourg, contained thirteen towns, besides villages. One of the French officers employed to take possession, having applied to a peasant for information about the limits or boundaries of the province, was answered with some humour, “qu’on disoit à Metz, qu’il comprenoit la moitié du monde; et que l’autre en dépendoit.”

Another acquisition, and one of much greater consequence, was also made by Lewis this year, without firing a shot. He caused Strasbourg to be suddenly invested by his troops; and partly by surprise, partly by threats, and partly by bribery, the magistrates of that place were induced to admit a French garrison. This town the French have constantly kept possession of ever since. Lewis made a sort of triumphal entry into Strasbourg on the 23d October. He appointed the Count of Chamilly (who had defended Grave so well in 1674) to the government, a proof that he did not intend readily to resign it.

1682.

The French continued to carry on their fortifications in the Low Countries with vigour; and to pay the greatest attention to the improvement of

their army. Companies of cadets were formed for the instruction of young men destined for the service. Companies of miners were now also for the first time regularly instructed and embodied.

1683.

The aggressions of Lewis in the Spanish Netherlands induced the king of Spain to declare war against France on the 26th October this year. The French, who had a considerable corps assembled, under canvass, near Ath, commanded by Marshal Humieres, immediately invested Courtrai, which was surrendered on the 6th November. Marshal Humieres then besieged Dixmude, which was taken possession of on the 10th of the same month. Both these places were badly provided and garrisoned; and were taken consequently with great facility. Dixmude, however, might have been better defended.

1684.

Lewis undertook the siege of Luxembourg early in this year. The besieging corps was under the command of Marshal Crequi—the covering army, under that of Lewis himself, assisted by Marshal

Schomberg. This was the Marshal Schomberg who was afterwards killed at the battle of the Boyne; having subsequently left the French service (when Lewis repealed the edict of Nantz), and entered into that of the Prince of Orange, afterwards our King William; and whom he accompanied in his expedition to England. Vauban had charge of the siege; having no less than sixty engineer officers employed upon this duty. The difficulty of besieging Luxembourg arises, principally, from the rocky nature of the soil on which it is built, and the consequent inconvenience in obtaining cover. The French derived great assistance from their new establishment of miners. Shells also, which were a recent invention, contributed to shorten the siege. The place was, however, well defended by the governor, Prince Ernest Ferdinand de Croy. The siege of Luxembourg was commenced on the 8th May, and it was not taken possession of before the 4th June. The French had eight of their engineers killed, and nineteen wounded, at this siege.

After the capture of Luxembourg, the French army, under Marshal Crequi, advanced on the Moselle, and compelled the Elector of Trèves to permit the demolition of the fortifications of his capital. The outworks were levelled, and the towers reduced to the height of the wall, by the French troops; thus merely leaving an enceinte,

capable of defending the place against any desultory attack.

These usurpations on the part of France caused universal alarm, and excited great indignation throughout Europe. The peculiar situation of each of the leading states prevented, however, an immediate appeal to the sword. The emperor, already engaged in an arduous war with the Turks, (who had besieged Vienna in the preceding year,) could ill spare money or troops to make head against the French. The finances of Spain incapacitated her from carrying on a war with vigour for any length of time, at a distance from her own country. Whatever might have been the opinions of the people of England, the wishes and the politics of Charles the Second were confessedly favourable to Lewis. The Prince of Orange and the Dutch were the most interested in preventing the encroachments of the French, and sufficiently anxious to interpose; but being the only power prepared for war, they did not judge the present moment favourable for a renewal of hostilities.

Under these circumstances, negotiations took place. The different powers could not agree as to the articles of a definitive treaty of peace. A truce only, for twenty years, was therefore concluded. The congress was held at Ratisbon; and the truce is called the truce of Ratisbon.

By the articles of the truce, Spain permitted

France to keep possession of Luxembourg and its dependencies. Courtrai and Dixmude were restored to Spain.

The emperor and the empire sanctioned Lewis's continuing to garrison Strasbourg and Fort Kehl. Some trifling territories were restored to the Elector of Trêves and the Duke of Wirtemberg.

By the truce of Ratisbon, the French thus maintained themselves in possession of two most important fortresses, those of Luxembourg and Strasbourg. Dixmude, which they restored, was of very little use to them, either for offensive or defensive operations; and previous to their evacuation of Courtrai, they destroyed the fortifications.

1685.

Charles the Second, of England, died this year, in the month of February.

On the 22d October, Lewis the Fourteenth repealed the edict of Nantz. This was the most impolitic measure of his reign, (to say nothing of its cruelty or inhumanity,) and deprived France of thousands of her most industrious inhabitants. It hastened the revolution in England. Indeed it may be said to have materially contributed towards it.

1686.

On the 9th July, this year, the several states of, and the powers connected with, Germany, entered into an agreement at Augsburg for the preservation of the tranquillity of Germany; and engaged to afford each other reciprocal assistance against the encroachments of France. This association of the Germanic body is called the League of Augsburg. The emperor, both in his capacity as the head of the empire and as Arch-Duke of Austria; the King of Spain, as possessor of the Burgundian circle; the King of Sweden, for his German territories; the Elector of Bavaria; the circle of Franconia; the house of Saxony; and the states of the circle of the Upper Rhine were all parties to this treaty.

1687.

No military or political event of consequence. The French very busily employed in strengthening the fortifications, both of Luxembourg and of Strasbourg. They expended annually, during the peace, from three to four hundred thousand pounds upon the fortifications of their new acquisitions in the Low Countries and upon the Rhine. They this year laid out £600,000—an immense

sum, if we consider the difference of the value of money, and the judicious economy with which the French carry on all their public works.

1688.

The truce of Ratisbon had hardly lasted four years, when Lewis XIV. renewed the war, and commenced hostilities by invading Germany. In the manifesto he published upon the occasion, he alleged the formation of the league of Augsburg as a proof of the hostile feeling existing against him in Germany; and of the emperor's intention to carry on a vigorous war as soon as the peace, he expected shortly to conclude with the Turks, would enable him to direct his undivided efforts against France.

The French commenced their movements in the month of September. The siege of Philipsbourg was the first operation. The army consisted of 80,000 men, and was under the command of the Dauphin, assisted by Marshal Duras. The direction of the siege was entrusted to Vauban.

This siege is remarkable for being the first at which ricochet firing was tried. Vauban established ricochet batteries on the left side of the Rhine, which enfiladed two of the fronts he attacked. There were three approaches carried on

at the same time. The place was defended for twenty days by Count Stahremberg, with a garrison of only 2000 men. The French had 1800 men killed and wounded. They had ten of their engineers killed, and fourteen wounded, at this siege.

As soon as Philipsbourg was taken, the Dauphin invested Mannheim and Frankenthal at the same time. Mannheim, situated at the point where the Neckar flows into the Rhine, is strong by its situation, as well as by its fortifications. The garrison was inadequate, however, to its defence; and an enfilading ricochet battery having dismounted five or six guns almost immediately, at the commencement of the siege, the place surrendered. Frankenthal was given up as soon as the guns destined for its attack were in battery.

Whilst these sieges were carrying on, detached corps were sent to invade the Electorates of Trêves, Mayence, and of Cologne. The Germans, not expecting that Lewis would have broken the truce of Ratisbon, which was so favourable to his interests, were surprised; and almost all the fortified places belonging to the Electorates of Trêves and of Mayence were taken possession of by the French, without any difficulty. Trêves, Spire, Worms, Mayence, were occupied by French garrisons. Coblenz and Ehrenbrützen were the only places belonging to the Elector of Trêves which

he was able to keep. These were fortunately preserved by the opportune arrival of some Saxon regiments. Marshal Boufflers, who commanded the French corps employed in these operations, bombarded Coblenz, but was unable to gain possession.

The Elector of Cologne voluntarily admitted a French garrison into Bonn, as also into all the towns and fortresses of his electorate.

As soon as Mannheim had surrendered, the French pushed another corps across the Rhine, and took possession of Heidelberg, and almost of all the towns, fortresses, and castles in the Palatinate.

Whilst the French were thus occupied upon the Rhine, the Prince of Orange embarked with about 15,000 Dutch troops for England. He landed on the 5th November, at Torbay — the revolution took place—James II. fled to France—the Prince of Orange and the Princess Mary ascended the throne, and the reign of King William and Queen Mary commenced.

Lewis declared war against the Dutch on the 3d December.

1689.

Lewis had received James II. in his exile with every kindness and friendship. He now sent him

to Ireland, (the greater part of which country refused to acknowledge the authority of King William,) convoyed by a squadron of French men of war, and with the assistance of 7000 French troops. England, in consequence, declared war on the 17th May.

Early in this year several British regiments were sent to Holland by King William, to replace those Dutch corps he found it necessary for some time to keep in England. These regiments were now reinforced, upon the declaration of war, and formed a small auxiliary army, ordered to co-operate with the Dutch, the command of which was given to the Earl of Marlborough.

The conquests of the preceding year, made by the French in Germany, caused every state and principality of that country to fly to arms. Three armies were formed. The first, composed of the contingents of the circles, of the Dutch troops, of such disposable Spanish battalions as were in the Spanish Netherlands, and of the British corps under Marlborough, was commanded by the Prince of Waldeck, and assembled on the Sambre. The second army was under the orders of the Elector of Brandenburg, and consisted of the Prussians and of the troops of the principalities of the North of Germany—it was destined to attack Bonn, and to drive the French out of the Electorate of Cologne. The third army, formed of the Imperialists

and the troops from the southern parts of Germany, was entrusted to the Duke of Lorraine, and was meant to act upon the upper Rhine. To oppose these armies the French found it necessary to concentrate their forces, and to evacuate the greater part of their conquests. They withdrew entirely from the Palatinate on the other side of the Rhine, and from a great part of the Electorate of Trêves. In order, however, to render it difficult for the German armies to subsist in the provinces thus evacuated, posterity will hardly believe that the French burnt and destroyed every town, village, house, farm, and cottage. Oppenheim, Spire, Worms, Heidelberg, Mannheim, Ladenbourg, Frankenthal, were plundered and burnt. A scene of horror and devastation took place, equal only to what we can imagine to have been the case in the Roman provinces, when suffering under an irruption of the barbarians.

The Prince of Waldeck's army, on the Sambre, was opposed by a French corps under Marshal Humieres. An action took place much to the disadvantage of the French near the town of Walcourt, on the 27th August. A patrol or reconnoitring party of the Prince of Waldeck's, consisting of about 1500 men, having been cut off by Marshal Humieres from their own army, threw themselves into Walcourt, which was a

walled town. Marshal Humieres imprudently ordered the place to be carried by assault. The Prince of Waldeck came to the assistance of his detachment, and attacking the French with vigour, drove them back with considerable loss. The British troops particularly distinguished themselves.

The Elector of Brandenburg's army besieged Bonn, which was taken on the 12th October. The Duke of Lorraine attacked Mayence, and which, although well defended, surrendered on the 8th September.

Thus ended the campaign of 1689. The French had been obliged to abandon their conquests with nearly the same rapidity they had acquired them. The German armies were assembled on the Rhine and were impatient to revenge the wanton and cruel injuries inflicted on their country.

1690.

Charles V. Duke of Lorraine, died in the spring of this year. His elegant and affecting letter to the emperor is mentioned in the account of the transactions of the year 1663. His character is given as follows by Marshal Berwick, in his *Memoirs* :

“ C'étoit un Prince éminent par sa prudence,
“ sa piété, et sa valeur; aussi habile qu'expéri-
“ menté dans le commandement des armées;
“ également incapable d'être enflé par la prospé-
“ rité, comme d'être abattu par l'adversité;
“ toujours juste, toujours généreux, toujours
“ affable; à la vérité, il avoit quelquefois des
“ mouvemens vifs de colère; mais dans l'instant
“ la raison prenoit le dessus, et il en faisoit ses
“ excuses. Sa droiture et sa probité ont paru,
“ lorsque, sans considérer ce qui pouvoit lui être
“ personnellement avantageux, il s'opposa en
“ 1688 à la guerre que l'Empereur méditoit
“ contre la France, quoique ce fût l'unique
“ moyen pour être rétabli dans ses états. Il
“ représenta fortement qu'il falloit préférer le
“ bien général de la chrétienté à des inimitiés
“ particulières; et que si l'on vouloit employer
“ toutes ses forces en Hongrie, il oseroit presque
“ répondre de chasser les Turcs d'Europe en peu
“ de campagnes. Son avis ne fut point suivi;
“ mais il n'est pas moins louable.”

In consequence of his defeat at Walcourt Lewis had removed Marshal Humieres from the command of the French army in Flanders, and entrusted it to Marshal Luxembourg. The Prince of Waldeck at the head of the allied army, (but which did not consist this year of more than 32,000 men, in consequence of the exertions

King William was obliged to make in Ireland,) was upon the Sambre; having his head-quarters at Trazigny. In this position he proposed to await the arrival of the Elector of Brandenburg with the Prussian army, which was to co-operate with him in his future movements. The French, who had a second corps upon the Moselle, to oppose the Elector of Brandenburg in the event of his acting in that quarter, suddenly reinforced Marshal Luxembourg from their Moselle army. Luxembourg passed the Sambre about half-way between Charleroi and Namur, and advanced towards the Prince of Waldeck. The allies occupied a position not very happily chosen. Their front was almost a prolongation of the line since occupied by the Prussians under Blucher on the 16th June, 1815. Their left was near St. Amand; and their right towards Heppignies; the village of Fleurus was in their front, but unoccupied. The French availed themselves of this error, and took possession immediately of Fleurus. They deployed their army to the right and left of Fleurus parallel to the allies, and made demonstrations of an attack in front along the whole line. Luxembourg himself, in the mean time, at the head of the best of his troops, passed rapidly through the village of Ligny, and even went so far as the chaussée between Namur and Brussels to enable him to make, unperceived, a sufficient circuit to get upon the rear of the left flank of the

allies. This movement was decisive of the day. The Prince of Waldeck fell back to Charleroi in confusion; having lost a considerable number of prisoners; as well as of killed and wounded. The Dutch infantry behaved remarkably well in this battle; and with great firmness covered the retreat of the army.

The French did not follow up their success at Fleurus. On the contrary, the allies receiving considerable reinforcements of British, Dutch, and Hanoverian troops; as also the contingent of the Prince Bishop of Liege, Marshal Luxembourg was compelled to act upon the defensive during the rest of the campaign; and the French obtained no advantage by their victory.

Nothing of consequence was done this year by the army of the Elector of Brandenburg, which took Bonn the preceding campaign. They merely continued to occupy the electorate of Trêves. It had been proposed that this corps should have acted in Flanders in co-operation with that of the Prince of Waldeck; but the variety of conflicting opinions and interests, inseparable from the constitution of all allied bodies, and the impossibility of getting them to move with precision and activity, gave the French great advantages over the allies, both in projecting and executing.

The Emperor had given the command of his army on the upper Rhine to the Elector of

Bavaria since the death of the Duke of Lorraine. The Dauphin, assisted by Marshal Duras, commanded the French force as in the preceding year. He crossed the Rhine at Fort Louis, (a new tête-de-pont on the Rhine, about half way between Strasbourg and the Lauter, and which the French had constructed during the peace,) intending to penetrate into Wirtemberg; but being opposed by the Elector of Bavaria, at the head of the Imperialists and Saxon troops, nothing of any consequence took place.

1691.

The possession of Mons had, for a number of years, been much coveted by the French government. It will be recollected that in the year 1677, previous to the peace of Nimeguen, the French had taken St. Guislain, a very important step towards the capture of Mons; as the facility of keeping up the greater part of the inundations, which contribute so much to its defence, depended, in those days, on the possession of St. Guislain. When they evacuated this post, at the peace, they destroyed the fortifications. It was now suddenly re-occupied; and Mons invested by the French, under the command of Lewis in person,

assisted by Marshal Luxembourg. The French attacked from the heights of Bertaimont. The garrison derived no assistance from the inundations of the Haine, as the enemy were in possession of St. Guislain ; and those which they could have made, by the assistance of the rivulet the Trouille, they were deprived of by the activity and ability of the French, who turned its course from flowing through Mons, and conducted the water away between their parallels. The Prince of Bergues, at the head of 5000 men, defended the place. This garrison was not sufficient for a fortress of the size and extent of Mons ; having moreover a troublesome and numerous population to restrain. The siege only lasted three weeks. The Prince of Bergues capitulated on the 9th April, and marched out with the remainder of his garrison, consisting of 280 officers and 3500 men, to join the allied army at Halle. Lewis returned to Paris, immediately after the surrender, and left the command of his army with Marshal Luxembourg.

The state of affairs in Ireland having permitted King William to absent himself from that country, he came over to the continent early in this year ; to assume the command of the allied army in Flanders. A council of the principal military persons of the allies was assembled at the Hague, to deliberate on the opera-

tions of the campaign ; when they received intelligence of the French having invested Mons. King William immediately assembled such corps as he was able to collect forthwith, at Halle ; in front of which he took up pretty nearly the same position as was assigned to Prince Frederick of Orange, and Sir Charles Colville's division, on the 17th June, 1815; the very great inferiority of his force preventing his advancing to the relief of Mons. The French, anxious to get possession of Mons before the allied army should be able to move towards them in force, pressed the siege with every exertion ; and granted more favourable terms to the Prince of Bergues than they otherwise would have done.

As soon as the allied army had received all its reinforcements, and was completely organized and assembled, King William advanced from Halle towards the French. Nothing, however, took place, neither party being willing to risk a general action without some apparent advantage over his adversary, and which did not offer. King William quitted the army early in September, leaving the Prince of Waldeck in the command. On its march from Leuze towards the valley of the Dender, Marshal Luxembourg had an opportunity of attacking part of the cavalry forming the rear-guard of the allied army, on the 18th September. The French cavalry were successful, but

the whole of the allied rear-guard coming up to the assistance of the squadrons attacked, the French were obliged to retreat. The allies lost about 1500 men, and the French only 400 in this affair.

Marshal Boufflers was detached with a separate corps of French troops, upon the Meuse. He advanced to Liege, which he invested on the 4th June, and endeavoured by a continued bombardment to induce the garrison to surrender before the allied army could relieve them. King William, however, sending a sufficient force, under Count Tilly, reinforced both the garrisons of Liege and of Huy, and compelled Boufflers to retreat up the Meuse to Dinant.

1692.

Maximilian Emanuel, Elector of Bavaria, was this year appointed Governor General of the Spanish Netherlands by the King of Spain. The expenses and heavy losses to which the possession of these distant provinces had so constantly subjected Spain, caused the court of Madrid to rejoice at the opportunity of appointing a governor who was disposed to undertake their defence with both troops and finances of his own.

The new governor could not, however, prevent

the French from making great exertions in Flanders for this campaign. Marshal Boufflers invested Namur early in May. Lewis came himself to superintend the siege, which commenced on the 25th of the same month. Another army, to cover the operations, was commanded by Marshal Luxembourg. The two corps together consisted of 120,000 men.

The Mehaigne river, which rises some miles to the left of the chaussée from Namur to Brussels, crosses that chaussée about ten miles from Namur, and runs into the Meuse near Huy. This was the line of defence occupied by Marshal Luxembourg, and a better could not have been selected. King William, at the head of the allied army, and which amounted to 97,000 men, advanced to the Mehaigne, but did not judge it advisable to attack Marshal Luxembourg's position. The French, in the mean time, pressed the siege with their accustomed activity.

The strength of Namur consists in its citadel, situated on very strong ground at the junction of the Sambre and the Meuse; the town built on the low ground at the foot of the citadel, and with the Sambre between them, is protected by the citadel on that side only. Those fronts of Namur which face towards the other side of the valley of the Sambre are seen into by the opposite heights, and an enemy in possession of those

heights can approach the town from them, and also (under their protection) carry on another attack up the valley of the Meuse. The French carried on two approaches as described, to which they added a third (on the other side of the Meuse), to afford a reverse and an enfilading fire upon the fronts attacked. The town capitulated and was taken possession of on the 5th June, after seven days of open trenches.

The citadel of Namur, against which the French now broke ground, was, unquestionably, very strong. The first obstacle was an advanced irregular entrenchment, stretching across the peninsula, formed by the junction of the Sambre and the Meuse, and at the extreme point of which the citadel was built. This advanced line was carried by assault. A new fort called Fort William, built by Coehorn, detached and in advance of the citadel, was the next work to be attacked. It was a curious circumstance that Coehorn should himself have the command of this fort. Vauban conducted the French approaches. A parallel was constructed against this fort entirely around it, so as to cut it off completely from the citadel in the rear, and Coehorn was obliged to capitulate. The safety of the communication to the rear, both for receiving reinforcements and for withdrawing the garrison, had certainly been strangely overlooked in the construction of this advanced work-

A bastioned line across the isthmus, having a hornwork within it, (both with good revetements,) and a high wall with towers, further supported by an old castle of very substantial masonry, formed the remainder of the fortifications. These works were, however, very close to each other, and there was but little casemated cover. The citadel was surrendered on the 30th June, after a siege of 27 days. The attack cost the French about 3000 men killed and wounded; they had nine engineers killed and nine wounded.

Lewis returned to Paris immediately after the surrender of the citadel of Namur, and left his army, as before, under the orders of Marshal Luxembourg.

King William retreated from the neighbourhood of the Mehaigne, and occupied nearly his former ground in front of Halle, close to the village of Tubize, upon the same. Marshal Luxembourg followed him at some little distance, and encamped at Steenkirk, upon the same rivulet, about half way between Enghien and Braine-le-comte, and about nine miles from the allied army.

Under these circumstances King William proposed to attack the French, and he was in hopes of being able to surprise them, from his having discovered that a secretary of the Elector of Bavaria, with his army, was a spy in the pay of Marshal Luxembourg, and who was in the habits

of giving constant information of the plans and intentions of the allies. •

This man was compelled to write to Marshal Luxembourg that the allied army meant to send out a strong foraging party the next day, and to support their foragers with infantry. When, therefore, the French piquets and advanced guards sent in to report the appearance of King William's columns, Marshal Luxembourg at first paid little attention to the circumstance, relying upon the information he had received from the spy. It was about two o'clock in the afternoon before King William had completed his arrangements, when he ordered his left, consisting of the Dutch, Danish, and English infantry, commanded by the Duke of Wirtemberg, to assault the French right. The attack was conducted with great impetuosity, and Marshal Berwick (who was with the French army) candidly avows that if that attempt had been supported, or if the left and centre of Marshal Luxembourg had been engaged at the same time, the day would have been lost. The very intricate nature of the country prevented, however, the other columns from sustaining the Duke of Wirtemberg, or freely communicating with him or with each other; and the cavalry of the allied army was by some mistake entangled and mixed with the infantry, amongst copsewood, where it was worse than useless. The allies lost

3000 men in killed and wounded, the greater part of which was from the British infantry. From their left and centre the French were enabled to send considerable reinforcements to their right. At dusk King William withdrew without being followed. The French lost about the same numbers. This affair is called the battle of Steenkirk, and took place on the 3d August. Marshal Luxembourg, a few days afterwards, moved towards Courtrai, upon the Lys, interposing the Scheldt between the allies and his army. King William marched to Grammont, upon the Dender, which he selected as a central point, from whence he was about equi-distant from Courtrai, Tournai, Mons, and Namur, having his communication, by the Dender, with Ghent, Bruges, and Ostend. Both armies remained in these positions until towards the end of September, when they went into winter-quarters. The French cantoned their army between Condé, Leuze, and Tournay.

Marshal Luxembourg went to Paris, leaving the command of the French army in Flanders with Marshal Boufflers. This latter drew out of their cantonments a small corps, and suddenly invested Charleroi, on the 16th October; but the Elector of Bavaria, re-assembling the allied forces, marched to its relief. Boufflers raised the siege, and retreated to Philipville.

The British government had formed an ill-di-

gested plan this year for taking Dunkirk, and some regiments were ordered from England, and landed at Ostend for this purpose. King William sent a considerable reinforcement to their assistance from his camp at Grammont, under General Tolmash, who took possession of Furnes. Dixmude was also taken by the English, commanded by General Ramsay. Upon reconnoitring Dunkirk the scheme was abandoned; but Furnes and Dixmude were garrisoned, and their fortifications repaired and strengthened.

The battle of Steenkirk (which has been described in the transactions of this year) is remarkable for being the last battle in Europe in which any bodies of infantry were armed with pikes. The matchlocks and the pikes were now generally superseded by the firelock and the bayonet.

1693.

Marshal Boufflers took Furnes on the 6th January, having merely blockaded it for a few days. It was very badly defended by Count Horn, a Dutch General, who surrendered with a garrison of nearly 4000 Dutch and British troops.

The French assembled a larger army this year in the Low Countries than any they had yet had in those provinces. It was divided into two corps;

one under the immediate command of the King, assisted by the Dauphin and Marshal Boufflers; the other under the orders of Marshal Luxembourg. These armies encamped near Mons, from whence they moved to the neighbourhood of Gemblours, when, after waiting a few days, Lewis returned to Versailles, sending the Dauphin with part of the army into Germany, and leaving Marshal Luxembourg at the head of the remainder in Flanders. The united French armies afforded a disposable force of 120,000 men under arms. King William, at the head of the allied troops, had taken up a position near Louvain to oppose the advance of the French towards Brussels. His army consisted of only 50,000 men. Marshal Berwick thinks that the unaccountable dispersion of the French forces and the sudden return of Lewis to Versailles saved King William from destruction. If a smaller army is inevitably to be beaten by a larger one, this reasoning of Berwick's is to be admitted. But the ground in the rear of Louvain is perhaps as strong as any in the Low Countries; and if King William had remained in position, with his right upon the Dyle, and his left upon the canal between Louvain and Malines, he would not easily have been dislodged. Berwick says, expressing his regret upon the occasion with a most pardonable feeling of suppressed indignation: "*La retraite du Roi*

“ étoit incompréhensible. Ne pouvant y avoir
“ de bonnes raisons, et même n'en ayant jamais
“ pu apprendre, ni des ministres, ni des généraux,
“ il faut conclure que Dieu ne vouloit pas l'exé-
“ cution de tous ces beaux projets.”

The Dauphin having marched for Germany with his corps, Marshal Luxembourg approached the allied army, which had advanced from Louvain and had taken up a position upon a small rivulet (near the village of Mildert) which runs into the great Geete, not far from Tirlemont. Luxembourg found King William too advantageously posted and entrenched to be attacked. He however cut off a body of cavalry at Tirlemont coming to join the allied army. Not being able to bring King William to action, with any prospect of advantage, the French moved towards the Meuse. Marshal Luxembourg remained himself in position at Vignamont between the Meuse and the Meuse, whilst he detached Marshal Villeroy to besiege Huy. Huy was taken on the 14th July. Villeroy burnt and plundered the town and destroyed the bridge across the Meuse. The inhabitants having assisted the garrison in the defence, was the reason alleged for these acts of cruelty.

King William advanced a few miles beyond Tirlemont towards the Meuse. He crossed the two Geetes, and placed his right at the village of Neerwinden, and his left upon a small marshy

rivulet which runs to the swamps about Leuw, and so on to the little Geete. Marshal Luxembourg left Vignamont to attack the allied army. His great superiority made him anxious to bring them to an engagement. The distance from Vignamont to Neerwinden is about twenty-two miles, and being all cross-roads and what the French call chemins-de-terre, the French cavalry only, with which Luxembourg pushed on, were able to come in presence of the allied army with daylight. It was dusk before the infantry was brought up. They lay upon their arms during the night. The next day (the 29th July) the attack took place.

King William's left was pretty secure. To strengthen his right, he entrenched the village of Neerwinden. He caused, moreover, a continued parapet to be thrown up from Neerwinden along his front, during the night. In this situation he awaited the enemy's attack. Marshal Luxembourg after having carefully reconnoitred the position of the allied army, made a great display of cavalry in front of the left and centre of the allies, whilst he directed every effort to be made with the best of his infantry to gain possession of the village of Neerwinden. Six brigades attacked this village at the same time. It was most obstinately defended. The French were repulsed with great loss. Marshal Luxembourg, however,

renewing the attack with fresh troops at length got possession of Neerwinden. He immediately introduced his cavalry, who, passing through the village, formed upon the right of the position of the allied army, and in the rear of their entrenchments. The victory could not now be much longer doubtful. It was the completest the French ever gained during the whole of their wars in Flanders.

King William had 65 battalions, and 150 squadrons at the battle. He lost nearly 20,000 men, in killed, wounded, and prisoners. The French had 96 battalions, and 206 squadrons engaged. They had 8000 men killed and wounded. This is generally called the battle of Landen, as that is the nearest town to the scene of action.

Marshal Luxembourg did not follow up the allies, or profit of his victory. He even fell back towards the Meuse, for the convenience of the supplies and forage he drew, for his army, from the principality of Liege. King William, by great exertions, was soon again at the head of a respectable force. By diminishing the strength of his garrisons, and by collecting reinforcements from the different allies, he was enabled to keep the field. He remained in the neighbourhood of Brussels to prevent any attack which Marshal Luxembourg might have been induced to make upon that place.

In September the French invested Charleroi. Marshal Luxembourg encamped near Fleurus to cover the siege. Marshal Villeroi commanded the corps appointed for this duty; and Vauban directed the operation.

The Marquis de Villadarias, General of the Spanish artillery, commanded in Charleroi. His defence was most gallant and respectable. He lost three thousand men out of 4500, the force of his garrison at the commencement of the siege, before he surrendered. The French were twenty-six days employed in front of Charleroi. It capitulated on the 11th October. It was attacked on two sides; on the northern and eastern fronts. The northern was only, however, secondary to the eastern attack which was the real one. This attack is remarkable for its seeming boldness in hazarding a parallel at the foot of the enemy's glacis with a deep and broad sheet of water between the troops in that parallel and their supports. Vauban, however, had constructed Charleroi himself, and was well aware of the real as well as the apparent strength of each front. Such a mass of fire was concentrated on this point that the garrison were unable to attempt a sortie; and the slope of the ground, from the covertway towards the sheet of water alluded to, was such, that troops in the covertway could not fire at the French approaches without completely

exposing themselves to the overwhelming fire from the besieger's works on the other side of the valley which contained the water.

Charleroi being taken, the French went into winter-quarters, and shortly afterwards the allied troops did the same.

1694.

The Dauphin commanded the French army in the Low Countries this year, assisted by Marshal Luxembourg. It was assembled near Mons, from whence the Dauphin advanced, by Fleurus, to St. Tron towards the allied army, which, under the orders of King William, was encamped near Louvain. The allied force was equal to that of the French in this campaign. Upon the advance of King William towards the Dauphin, the latter retreated and took up a position behind the Saare, which runs through Tongres, and joins the Meuse at Maastricht. The French shortly after fell further back, and occupied their old position at Vignamont, between the Meuse and the Meuse, where they entrenched themselves. The summer passed away in these movements.

In the month of August King William seeing little appearance of the French leaving their entrenched camp at Vignamont, and where they

were too strong to be attacked, determined to make a sudden movement to his right to endeavour to surprise Courtray, and to carry the war into French Flanders. With this view he marched to Sombrière on the 18th August. The French got intelligence of this movement on the evening of that day, and, penetrating his scheme, immediately broke up their camp at Vignamont, crossed the Sambre at Namur, keeping that river (as far as Merbes) between them and the allied army, so as to mask their operation; and continuing their march by Mons and Condé, and from thence (by the left side of the Scheldt) to Tournai, contrived to arrive, with their cavalry, and the head of the column, at Espierres, upon the Scheldt, in time to oppose the passage of the allies.

King William marched leisurely from Sombrière to Nivelles, from thence to Soignies, to Chievres, and towards Espierres. The whole distance is not more than 48 miles. It unfortunately, however, occupied him four days, which afforded the French sufficient time to make the rapid movement already described. Owing to the circuit they made, the French troops could not have marched less than 28 miles each day, and such an exertion, for four consecutive days, and through cross-roads, speaks highly of the zeal and good will of their army.

The Dauphin, having been reinforced by General

La Valette with nine battalions, which had been left for the protection of French Flanders, threw up entrenchments at Espièrres, and afterwards, lower down the Scheldt, at Avelghem, to prevent the passage of the allies. King William moved still lower down, and crossed at Oudenarde, which was garrisoned by the Spaniards. Having passed the Scheldt, he countermarched, and advanced in the country between the Scheldt and the Lys, up those rivers, toward Courtrai.

The French occupied Courtrai in force, having Menin strongly fortified in their rear, and their lines again, in the rear of Menin, from the Lys to the Yperlee, sufficiently provided with troops. Although King William had passed the Scheldt, yet it was evident, under these circumstances, that any attempt to penetrate into French Flanders would be very hazardous. He therefore gave up the idea, and crossing the Lys lower down than Courtrai (half way between that town and Deynse) he advanced to Rousselaar. From thence he put strong garrisons into Dixmude upon the Yperlee, and Deynse upon the Lys, and gave directions that both these places should be made as strong as possible. He then withdrew his army into winter-quarters.

Whilst these operations were carrying on upon the Lys and the Scheldt, a corps, from the allied army, had been detached, under the command of

the Duke of Holstein, to the Meuse, to besiege Huy. Huy was taken after a siege of nine days on the 28th September.

1695.

The command of the French army in the Low Countries was, this year, given to Marshal Ville-roi, in consequence of the death of Marshal Luxembourg. The character of the latter is so beautifully given by Berwick, that, I am confident, every reader of feeling will be obliged to me for transcribing it in this place.

“Cet hiver, mourut le Maréchal Duc de Luxembourg, universellement regretté des gens de guerre. Jamais homme n'eut plus de courage, de vivacité, de prudence, et d'habileté; jamais homme n'eut plus la confiance des troupes qui étoient à ses ordres; mais l'inaction dans laquelle on l'avait vu rester après plusieurs de ses victoires, l'a fait soupçonner de n'avoir point eu envie de finir la guerre, ne croyant pas pouvoir faire la même figure à la cour, qu'à la tête de cent mille hommes. Quand il étoit question d'ennemis, nul général plus brillant que lui; mais du moment que l'action étoit finie, il vouloit prendre ses aises, et paraissait s'occuper plus de ses plaisirs, que des opérations de la campagne. Sa figure étoit aussi ex-

traordinaire, que son humeur et sa conversation étaient agréables. Sa grande familiarité lui avait attiré l'amitié des officiers; et son indulgence à ne point trop se soucier d'empêcher la maraude, l'avait fait adorer des soldats; qui de leur côté se piquoient d'être toujours à leur devoir, quand il avait besoin de leurs bras."

It must, however, be observed, that on this occasion Berwick has allowed his esteem for the talents of his friend to influence his judgment. The cruel and wanton destruction of Swammerdam and Bodegrave, in Holland, (which places Marshal Luxembourg gave up to the unbridled fury of his soldiers,) must ever cause his memory to be detested, and his name ranked amongst those bad men who have made an improper and disgraceful use of their authority. "Point trop se soucier d'empêcher la maraude" is but a poor apology for the destruction of property he caused, and the ruin and misery he entailed on several thousands of innocent people.

Marshal Villeroi assembled part of his army for the defence of French Flanders behind the lines between the Lys and the Ypres, (and which were called the lines of Commines, from their right terminating near that town, on the Lys;) and he directed Marshal Boufflers to extend upon his right, and to occupy additional lines which were now constructed from the Lys to the Scheldt.

Tournai, Menin, Ypres, Fort Knock, and Furnes, may be considered as the redoubts of this line of entrenchment. The lines from the Scheldt to the Lys could not have been less than eight miles in length; those of Commines, from the Lys to Ypres, at least six more, and from Ypres to Furnes, by Fort Knock, may fairly be estimated at twenty miles. Remains of these prodigious works are still to be seen; they could not have been formed but by the assistance of a laborious and condensed population. Our modern military people are too apt to sneer at these continued lines, extending across whole provinces, so often constructed in the Low Countries; and the common saying, that all lines, from the great wall in China downwards, have been forced, is often repeated in derision. But let it be remembered, that the great men of the times of which we are writing, were at least as anxious and interested in obtaining successful results as we can possibly be. Let them, also, have credit for the same proportion of talent and of common sense as their descendants. It is not to be supposed that they undertook these extensive works without an adequate object. These lines covered and protected the country in their rear; they permitted the free circulation of convoys and detachments; they masked the movements of their own armies; and, in an open country, like Flanders, divided (as it then was) into

various and contending provinces, they occasionally afforded a frontier which nature had denied. In modern days we have seen the great captain of the age await, behind his lines of Torres Vedras, the proper moment to advance.

King William marched from Oudenarde, where he had assembled the allied army, and crossing the Lys at Deynse, advanced to Rousselaar. His object was, by this appearance of threatening the lines at Commynes, to prevent Villeroi from reinforcing the garrison of Namur, or throwing any obstacle in the way of the attack of that place, for the siege of which he had made every preparation.

After remaining some little time at Rousselaar, King William marched towards Namur, and invested the place on the 3d July. Marshal Boufflers, at the head of several regiments of dragoons, quitted the lines between the Scheldt and the Lys, and threw himself into Namur before all communication was completely cut off.

Prince Vaudemont was left at Deynse, at the head of thirty battalions and sixty squadrons, by King William, to watch the motions of the French under Villeroi; and a respectable garrison was put into Dixmude previous to the march to Namur.

The French determined to attack Vaudemont, and (with a view to a surprise) they marched by

night. They had reached Arselle, a village within a mile and a half of Deynze, and had taken an advanced guard of two battalions prisoners, when Villeroi ordered a halt. Vaudemont fell back to Ghent. It is impossible to say what were the motives which induced Marshal Villeroi to stop in the midst of the operation. The capture or dispersion of this considerable detachment of the allied army would have had the best effects on the campaign, and in all probability prevented the continuing of the siege of Namur.

Villeroi, subsequently, took Deynze, in which there were two battalions, and afterwards Dixmude, in which King William had left eight battalions under the command of a Danish general, Ellenberger. Both these places were shamefully surrendered without any resistance. The commandant of Deynze was most deservedly broke, with infamy, by a general court-martial; and General Ellenberger was beheaded at Ghent by sentence of the same court.

King William in the mean while continuing to carry on the siege of Namur, Marshal Villeroi determined to bombard Brussels, with a view to induce the allied army to abandon that operation. Having prepared their batteries, the French commenced their attack on the 13th August, and kept up for forty-eight hours a continual fire of shells and of red hot shot upon the town. The conse-

quences were dreadful; the destruction of a very considerable part of that beautiful city, and the miseries of war brought home to peaceful and unoffending citizens, women, and children.

Villeroi having received considerable reinforcements from the French army in Germany whilst in front of Brussels, marched from thence, with the whole of his army collected, by the chaussée, towards Namur, to endeavour to compel King William to raise the siege; his army consisted of 90,000 men. The Prince of Vaudemont, with his corps, joined King William, who was enabled with this assistance to continue the siege, and to afford a covering army to oppose to Villeroi. Prince Vaudemont was directed to take up a position near Masey, upon the Orneau, a river which rises a little beyond Gemblours, and runs into the Sambre. Villeroi, having reconnoitred this situation, which was carefully entrenched, abandoned all idea of attacking it. He remained at Gemblours until Namur surrendered, when the French army crossed the Sambre at Charleroi, and went into cantonments in the neighbourhood of Mons.

Namur, as has been already stated, was invested on the 3d July; it surrendered the 5th September. The garrison consisted of 14,000 good troops, commanded by Marshal Boufflers. During the three years the French had been in possession of

Namur they had considerably augmented the fortifications on the high ground on the opposite side of the valley of the Sambre to that on which the citadel is situated; they constructed a series of detached lunettes flanking each other, and having casemated reduits within them. These works still exist, a proof of the activity of the French, and of the solidity of the construction of their works of defence. But this scheme was of too gigantic a nature. The citadel of Namur, with its advanced works, was already an entrenched camp. To have maintained the opposite heights would have been, in fact, forming another; and an army (and that not an inconsiderable one) must have been required for their defence. The citadel of Namur, admirably situated at the junction of the Sambre and the Meuse, and commanding the navigation of both, is all that can ever be required, with the addition of such an enceinte to the town as will prevent it from being plundered. To attempt to make Namur a place of arms and a fortress, could only be a useless expenditure of money and labour.

The siege was pretty much a repetition of the operations of the French in 1692. The town was first taken, and the citadel afterwards. The approaches to the town were carried on against the front in which gate St. Nicholas is situated; and the admirers of Sterne will remember that it was

here Captain Shandy received his wound in his groin. Gate St. Nicholas still exists; and it is impossible to pass through it without thinking of the gallant and gentle captain, or of his honest and faithful corporal.

This was the proudest moment of King William's military career. In his long, faithful, and honourable services against the invaders of his native country, he had been eminently successful, if we look at the result; having driven them from the walls of Amsterdam to the citadel of Namur. But, for all that, he cannot be said to have been a fortunate general. In many battles he was not successful, and many sieges he was obliged to raise. He was peculiarly persevering and prudent. His reverses must therefore be attributed to the nature of the Dutch government, which gave but very limited authority to the Stadtholder at the head of the army in the field.—Every operation was to be discussed; and the approbation of the committee of the states, as well as a majority of the council of war, to be obtained, before any enterprise could be undertaken. Add to this, an army composed of so many different nations, and with such jarring interests and jealousies, and we are rather inclined to wonder that any success should have been obtained, than to feel disposed to say he did but little.

It is worth remarking, that the Governor of the

Bank of England was killed at the siege of Namur. He had come to the army on some business relative to the remittances for the troops, when going too near the enemy, a chance shot struck him.

1696.

Little was done by either party in the Low Countries this year. A plot had been formed in England for the restoration of James II. A number of French troops were marched to the coast, in readiness to have been transported to England, to give their assistance. Twenty battalions of Dutch and British troops were, in consequence, brought over from the continent. This crippled the army of the allies, and detained King William in England until the middle of May.

The French had established considerable magazines at Givêt, upon the Meuse, for the use of their army during the approaching campaign. Early in March, the Duke of Holstein, who commanded the allies in the neighbourhood of Namur, detached Lord Athlone and General Coehorn with thirty battalions up the Meuse. They closely invested both Dinant and Givêt; and, by means of shells, destroyed and burnt every thing the French had collected at both these places, and returned unmolested to Namur.

1697.

The French, having made peace in Italy, reinforced their army in Flanders, this year, to the utmost; and formed three corps, under the respective commands of Marshal Villeroi, Marshal Boufflers, and Marshal Catinat. The three armies had, between them, one hundred and thirty-three battalions, and three hundred and fifty squadrons. They commenced their operations with the siege of Ath, which was allotted to Marshal Catinat's corps. ●The place was taken after fourteen days of open trenches. It was but poorly defended. Vauban, who had built the fortress, conducted the attack. It surrendered on the 5th June.

Villeroi and Boufflers had determined to advance conjointly, and besiege Brussels. With a view to this object, they descended, after the capture of Ath, the beautiful valley of the Dender, as far as Ninôve; but King William, at the head of the allied army, keeping between them and Brussels, the French did not quit the banks of that river.

Plenipotentiaries on the part of the different powers engaged in hostilities had been, for some time, assembled at a chateau of King William's, at Rÿswÿk, near the Hague. Peace was concluded and signed on the 20th September, be-

tween England, Spain, Holland, and France ; and, on the 30th October, between France and the Emperor and the Empire. The following were the terms, as far as the Low Countries are concerned—

1. France restored the town and province of Luxembourg, the Comté de Chini, Charleroi, Mons, Ath, and Courtrai, to Spain.

2. Dinant to be restored to the Bishop of Liege.

3. France to keep Strasbourg ; but to give up Fort Kehl, on the German side of the Rhine, to the emperor ; and to destroy the fortifications constructed on the island, between Strasbourg and Fort Kehl.

4. Fribourg and Philipsbourg to be restored to the emperor.

5. The Duke of Lorraine, son to that duke whose name has been repeatedly mentioned in the former pages of this work, and whose character is so beautifully drawn by Marshal Berwick, recovered the territories of Lorraine.

1698.

Peace.

1699.

Peace.

1700.

Charles II. King of Spain, died on the 1st November of this year; he had no children. Previous to his death the claims of three candidates to the succession of the crown of Spain agitated all Europe. After his death those of two of them plunged her in a long and sanguinary war.

Lewis XIV. had married the elder sister of Charles (the Infanta Maria Theresa). The Dauphin, therefore, was as much the natural heir to the crown of Spain, in right of his mother, as he was to that of France, from his father. To prevent, however, the possibility of the union of the kingdoms of France and Spain, Maria Theresa had renounced, at the time of her marriage with Lewis, all claim in behalf of herself and her descendants to the crown of Spain, should her brother die without issue. Keeping in view the principle of her renunciation, (the prevention of the union of the kingdoms of France and Spain,) Charles II. had made a will, in which, overlooking the Dauphin and the Dauphin's eldest son, he had named that prince's second son, the Duke d'Anjou, as his successor in the Spanish monarchy.

The second claim was made for the Electoral Prince of Bavaria, who was descended from the

second sister of the King of Spain. If the renunciations of the elder sister, Maria Theresa, were valid, the Electoral Prince, who was the grandson of the second sister, was unquestionably the next heir; but this young prince dying at the age of six years old, at Brussels, this line became extinct, and of course there was an end of the second claim.

The third claimant was the Emperor of Germany, Leopold. His alleged rights were founded upon his descent from his mother, daughter of Philip III. of Spain, and aunt to the late king. If the descendants of the Infanta Maria Theresa were to be put on one side on account of her renunciations, (as already explained,) the Emperor Leopold, after the death of the young Prince of Bavaria, was the next in succession. The emperor had two sons, the Archdukes Joseph and Charles. Joseph was already King of the Romans, and would therefore succeed his father as Emperor of Germany, as well as in his hereditary dominions.

Under these circumstances, the emperor proposed his second son, the Archduke Charles, to be King of Spain, and gave up his own rights in his favour.

Looking forward with great uneasiness to the possibility of the Spanish Netherlands falling into the hands of a French prince, at the death of the

King of Spain, King William had arranged a plan for dividing the Spanish monarchy; and a treaty between the English, the Dutch, and Lewis XIV. had been agreed upon, which was signed in the spring of this year, by which, in consideration of the Dauphin receiving the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily, as also some additional territory to France on the Spanish frontier, and the province of Lorraine, (for which last the Milanese was to be dismembered from the Spanish monarchy and given to the Duke of Lorraine,) Lewis engaged to permit the Archduke Charles to succeed to the crown of Spain and the provinces of the Netherlands.

The news of this treaty, and the idea of the Spanish monarchy being thus divided and allotted by foreign powers, filled Spain with indignation. The will of their king naming the Duke d'Anjou as his successor to the whole of the Spanish monarchy gave general approbation; being the second son of the dauphin, the possibility of the union of the crowns of France and Spain appeared a very remote contingency, and no opposition on the part of the other powers of Europe was consequently expected.

Lewis preferred the interest of his grandson, the Duke d'Anjou, and the possession of that influence he might expect to retain over the councils of the united Spanish monarchy, to the increase of terri-

tory and the immediate advantages France would have gained by adhering to the treaty of partition. The Duke d'Anjou was acknowledged as King of Spain under the name of Philip V. and left Versailles for Madrid on the 4th December.

1701.

Lewis XIV. on the 3d February, caused an official declaration to be sent to his grandson, at Madrid, stating that his accession to the crown of Spain would not prevent him or his heirs male from inheriting that of France should his elder brother leave no issue. This uncalled-for proceeding was, to say the least of it, very imprudent, and did not contribute to allay the apprehensions of the rest of Europe at the gigantic power now under the control or influence of the French monarch.

The Elector of Bavaria was continued in his appointment of Governor General of the Spanish Netherlands by the new king, and, in consequence of instructions he received, to obey whatever orders Lewis XIV. might think proper to give him, (for the security of that part of his grandson's dominions); he admitted French troops on the 6th February into Nieuport, Oudenarde, Ath, Mons, Charleroi, Namur, and Luxembourg. The French

took prisoners 22 battalions of Dutch infantry, which (conjointly with the Spanish and Bavarian troops) had been employed to garrison those places (since the peace of Ryswyk).

The Emperor did not content himself with merely protesting against the accession of the Duke d'Anjou to the Spanish monarchy, (which he claimed for the Archduke Charles, as already explained,) but he prepared to take immediate possession of the Italian provinces by force. England acknowledged Philip V.; and King William even wrote to him a complimentary letter on his accession. He however joined the Dutch in calling upon Lewis to withdraw the French troops from the towns in the Spanish Netherlands, and offered to negotiate on the subject of the barrier to be conceded to the Dutch in future. The Dutch alone claimed the complete execution of the treaty of partition; but upon Lewis offering to release their troops, if they acknowledged the Duke d'Anjou as King of Spain, they were induced so to do. The Dutch troops were in consequence permitted to return to Holland, whilst those of France remained in possession of the seven fortresses already mentioned.

Holland, uneasy at the neighbourhood of the French army, (the numbers of which Lewis continued daily to augment,) claimed the assistance she was entitled to, under existing treaties, from

Great Britain. King William, with the approbation of Parliament, drew ten thousand troops from Ireland, and three thousand from Scotland. They were sent to Holland and encamped in the neighbourhood of Breda. The Duke of Marlborough was appointed in June to command this auxiliary corps, and was also named minister plenipotentiary to the States-general.

Lewis certainly committed a great mistake in releasing the Dutch battalions. As an author of that day says, he did trop, and trop peu. Having gone so far, he might as well have detained them until he had some security besides words, for Holland not interfering with the Duke d'Anjou in his taking possession of the Spanish monarchy.

James II. died on the 16th September this year at St. Germain's. Lewis XIV. immediately acknowledged his son as King of England. This was another unfortunate event for France, as it was the cause of England joining her enemies, and subsequently declaring war against her. It seems pretty clear that the majority, in parliament, were averse to go to war to prevent the accession of Philip V. to the Spanish monarchy. The danger was distant and problematical. Had Lewis refrained from pouring his troops into the Spanish Netherlands, made a reasonable arrangement with the Dutch respecting a barrier, and not have acknowledged James's son as King of England, the

long war which followed would, in all probability, have been avoided. At any rate England and Holland would not have interposed, and the Emperor, without money, without fleets, and with great part of the empire against him, could have given very little trouble to the Spanish and French monarchies.

The Electors of Bavaria and of Cologne, the Dukes of Brunswic-Wolfenbüttel and of Saxe-Gotha joined the French and entered into treaties of alliance with Lewis this year. The Elector of Cologne even admitted French garrisons into the fortresses of his Electorate, and into the citadel of Liege. The Dutch, however, took possession of Cologne.

The French continued to reinforce their army in the Spanish Netherlands. Their troops were employed conjointly with considerable bodies of peasantry, in constructing a line of entrenchment, which was continued with very little interruption from the Scheldt below Antwerp to the Mehaigne shortly before it runs into the Meuse. These lines had a deep ditch and a corresponding respectable profile, and cannot be estimated at less than seventy miles in length—a prodigious work, and which renders credible the amazing excavations and embankments performed by the Roman armies under Cæsar. The French and Spanish troops occupied, beyond this line, Liege, Ste-

phenswaert, Ruremonde, and Venloo, all upon the Meuse. Mæstricht was the only place upon that river in possession of the allies.

The Emperor, the Dutch, and England, agreed to attack the French in the Spanish Netherlands conjointly, and entered into a treaty at the Hague to that effect. The King of Denmark joined the allies, and undertook to furnish a corps of 4000 cavalry and 8000 infantry. The King of Prussia also, by a treaty concluded this autumn, placed 5000 men at their disposal, having previously, by another agreement with the Emperor, furnished him with ten thousand Prussian troops. War seemed now inevitable, and the different powers were occupied in their respective preparations accordingly.

1702.

The Emperor, England, and Holland, declared war against France in the month of May. The empire followed the example of its chief on the 30th September, although it does not appear exactly how the Germanic body was interested in the claim of the Archduke Charles to the throne of Spain. The Electors of Bavaria and of Cologne protested against this proceeding. They had previously engaged themselves to Lewis by separate treaties as already explained.

King William died in the month of March. Marshal Berwick says of him in his Memoirs, “ Quelque raison que j’aie pour ne point aimer la mémoire de ce Prince, je ne puis lui refuser la qualité de grand homme; et, s’il n’avoit pas été usurpateur, celle de grand roi.” This reflection speaks highly in favour of the candour and liberality of Berwick; but it also redounds not a little to the credit of the character of King William, that it should force unwilling praise even from his enemies. “ If I lament thee, sure thy worth was great.” He experienced latterly great ingratitude and unkindness in England; and was much hurt at being compelled to part with his Dutch guard, a cruel and unmannerly insult.

Hostilities commenced by a division of the Dutch army, consisting of 18,000 men, under Count Nassau Saarbruck, besieging Keiserwaard, a small fortress on the right bank of the Rhine, between Dusseldorp and Duysburg, belonging to the Elector of Cologne, and garrisoned by French troops. The remainder of the Dutch army under Lord Athlone, (the General Deginkle who had gained the battle of Ahgrim, in Ireland,) assembled in the neighbourhood of Cleves. A corps under Count Tilly was at Xantem in advance of Cleves.

Marshal Boufflers, who commanded the French army in the Low Countries, crossed the Meuse,

and, marching down that river, endeavoured to cut off Count Tilly's corps at Xantem, and he detached Count Tallard, with eighteen battalions and thirty squadrons, to attempt to throw succours into Keiserwaart.

Count Tilly, getting information of the advance of the French, retreated, and fell back upon Lord Athlone. In his other project, Marshal Boufflers was not more successful ; for, although the Dutch had only invested Keiserwaart on the right side of the Rhine, and Count Tallard was consequently enabled to reinforce the garrison across the river, and even to establish batteries on the left of the Rhine so as to enfilade the trenches and approaches of the Dutch ; yet Keiserwaart was obliged to surrender on the 16th June.

The French army received considerable reinforcements, whilst these operations were going on, and Lewis sent his grandson, (the Dauphin's eldest son,) the Duke de Bourgogne, to command in the Low Countries ; Boufflers remaining under his orders.

The French formed a scheme to attack Lord Athlone's corps near Cleves. Boufflers marched on the 11th June, at the head of thirty-seven battalions and fifty-seven squadrons. Count Tallard approached by another road, having ten battalions and thirty squadrons ; and nine Spanish battalions and eleven squadrons, under Count

Caraman, were also put in movement for the same purpose.

Lord Athlone, whose army consisted only of twenty-seven battalions and sixty-two squadrons, was very nearly cut off. He attempted to fall back upon Grâve; but the French advanced-guard gaining the flank of his column, he retreated to Nimeguen. The French pursued him to the glaxis, and lost a number of men from the cannonade opened upon them from that fortress.

The French having plundered the open country between Grâve, Nimeguen, and Cleves, and exhausted all its resources, fell back and encamped at Goch, upon the Niers; a river of some consequence, flowing between the Rhine and the Meuse, and running into the latter, some miles higher than Grâve. The right of the French was at Goch; their left at Gennep, (the point where the Niers joins the Meuse;) and the river Niers in their front.

The Duke of Marlborough, to whom the command of the Dutch and allied troops had been entrusted, as well as that of the British, arrived, early in July, at Nimeguen. He assembled the whole of his army in that neighbourhood, (including the British regiments from their camp at Breda,) and found himself at the head of sixty-five battalions, one hundred and thirty squadrons, and a respectable train of artillery. The French,

behind the Niers, had sixty-six battalions and one hundred and fourteen squadrons. Marlborough crossed the Meuse on the 26th July, by his right, at Grâve; and thus (turning the French) compelled them to a retrograde movement. They fell back to Ruremonde, where they also crossed the Meuse, by their left; and, leaving the banks of the river, took up a position near a small town called Bréy.

The immediate valley of the Meuse is fertile and well cultivated; but the country to the left of this valley, towards the sources of the Dommel, and indeed almost all the province of North Brabant, is a cold wet sand, very thinly inhabited, and affording but little resources to an army.

The Duke of Marlborough, after he had crossed the Meuse, quitted its banks and advanced through the country as described, by Geldorp and by Gravensbroek, as far as Kleine Brugel, in front of Bréy. By remaining on the borders of the valley of the Meuse, and entrenching themselves in the best position that neighbourhood afforded, the French would not only have covered their places upon the Meuse, (from whence they could have drawn their supplies,) but have also protected Brabant; as the Duke of Marlborough could never have advanced towards Louvain or Brussels, leaving the French army in his rear. These reasons for this line of conduct were, however, overlooked; and Marshal Boufflers moved the

French army from Br y, by Lonoven and B ringhen, to Rythoven, near Eyndoven. His object was to get upon the line of communication between the allied army and Boisleduc, (from whence they were obliged to draw their bread,) and be enabled, at the same time, to receive his own convoys without any molestation from Brussels. The Duke of Marlborough, by this injudicious movement of Boufflers, found himself between the French and the Meuse. He put himself in position at Helchteren, covered by the rivulet of B ringhen. Considerable reinforcements, already upon their march, reached him, (merely by taking a larger circuit,) so that his army was augmented to ninety-two battalions and one hundred and fifty squadrons; and he was enabled to supply his wants from Maestricht. The French came in front of the allies at Helchteren; but, finding them too strongly posted, withdrew, after a sharp cannonade. The Duke of Marlborough determined to avail himself, without delay, of his superiority, and of the situation the enemy had fortunately placed him in, to besiege the fortresses upon the Meuse, occupied by the French; instead of attempting to follow their army across North Brabant. He detached the Prince of Nassau Saarbruck, with General Coehorn, to attack Venloo; and moved the army to Assch, to cover the siege.

Venloo is situated on the right of the Meuse;

communicating by a bridge of boats with a small fort on the left side, called Fort St. Michael. The allies invested the fort and the town at the same time; and the approaches were carried on from both sides of the Meuse. The fort was taken by assault, by Lord Cutts and the British grenadiers; and a few days afterwards, on the 23d September, there being a practicable breach, the town capitulated; and the garrison, consisting of six battalions, were conducted to Antwerp.

The duke next caused Ruremonde and Stephenswaart to be attacked at the same time.—Stephenswaart, situated on an island in the Meuse, is a regular fort, constructed as a sort of citadel to the island, on which there are eleven or twelve small redoubts. Stephenswaart, and its dependent works (occupied,) affords great facilities for passing the Meuse in any number of columns, and upon any front required. It surrendered, on the 2d October, to the Dutch General Schultz; having been garrisoned with four hundred men.

Ruremonde is a considerable town at the junction of the Roer with the Meuse, on the right bank of both rivers. It was surrounded by a wall, with towers; and, beyond that, a second enceinte of bastions and curtains, with a good wet ditch. It was attacked with great vigour. The garrison, which consisted of four battalions, surrendered on the 7th October, after a siege of nine days

This defence was not a very good one ; but great part of the town having been destroyed by the besiegers' fire, the inhabitants became very clamorous for a surrender ; and the garrison was not sufficiently strong to contain them, as also to make a protracted defence.

The allies now undertook the siege of Liege.

Liege is a very large and handsome city upon the Meuse. The river here makes an elbow. Across the tongue of land within the elbow of the river, a line of enclosed redoubts had been constructed, connected with each other. There was a second fortification, consisting of two regular fronts, with a deep ditch and good revêtement, in the rear of the line of redoubts ; and a large building, (which had formerly been a convent,) surrounded by a loopholed wall, and traced so as to afford a flanking fire, (in front of which was a ditch,) formed a citadel to these advanced lines. This was called the Chartreuse. In its rear were the suburbs of the town, filling up all the remainder of the ground within the elbow. On the other side of the river, extending up the side of the hill, at whose base the Meuse runs, stands the city of Liege, which was surrounded by a good high wall of solid masonry, traced in the bastion shape. The citadel, a regular pentagonal fort, with a good scarp, was constructed on the summit of the hill, on the side and at the foot of which the city had

been built. This was the state of Liege, as to its defences, when the allied army came before it.

Lieutenant General Violaine, with twelve battalions, commanded for Lewis, in Liege. The citadel and the works at the Chartreuse were well provided with artillery and ammunition. The defence, however, was not such as might have been expected.

The French allotted eight battalions to the citadel and four for the garrison of the Chartreuse. The town was not occupied; it was not susceptible of much defence, nor had the French sufficient troops to attempt to hold the town, the citadel, and the Chartreuse. The town was therefore abandoned.

The trenches against the citadel, from the only side on which it can be approached, were commenced on the 18th October; twelve mortars and forty-four heavy guns were placed in battery, and opened their fire on the 21st. On the 23d the breach being practicable, the citadel was taken by assault by the British and Prussian grenadiers.

Batteries were established against the works of the Chartreuse, the garrison of which capitulated on the 29th October, and were conducted to Antwerp.

From the description of the defences of Liege it is evident that the works of the Chartreuse were

to be considered only as part of the general system, and as connected with the defence of Liege if attacked on that front, not as an independent post which could be held when Liege and the citadel were in possession of an enemy. As the French withdrew from the defence of the town, it is conceived that they should have concentrated all their means at the citadel. The 400 men given to the Chartreuse appear to have been so many men thrown away, as the maintaining of the Chartreuse could not prevent the allies from taking possession of Liege; it in no way contributed to strengthen the citadel, and as a post left to itself it was not susceptible of a protracted defence.

Marshal Boufflers attempted to draw the Duke of Marlborough from the Meuse by causing a diversion to be made in Dutch Flanders. The Marquis of Bedmar, commanding the Spanish troops in Flanders, was reinforced by the French general d'Husson, from Marshal Boufflers' army, and they together invested Hulst. The governor cutting the dikes, and inundating the surrounding country, the French and Spanish troops were, however, obliged to withdraw with the loss of 500 men.

Thus ended the first campaign of the war of the Succession. In little more than three months the Duke of Marlborough, by his judicious movements,

not only compelled the French to retreat from Nimeguen to within the lines they had constructed for the defence of the Spanish Netherlands, but, moreover, besieged and took Venloo, Ruremonde, Stephenswaart, and Liege, by which means the free use of the Meuse, and an uninterrupted communication between Maestricht and Holland was obtained ; no slight advantage with a view to further operations in the Low Countries.

1703.

After the separation of the States of Holland from the Spanish Netherlands, the Spanish government had executed a canal from Venloo on the Meuse, to Rhynberg on the Rhine, with a view to the convenience of trade between Germany and the Netherlands, without the intervention of the Dutch. Rhynberg, which belonged to the electorate of Cologne, had been carefully fortified, and from its local situation at one end of this canal, more consequence was attached to the possession of it than it otherwise appears to have merited. In common with the other fortresses of the Elector of Cologne, it had received a French garrison. A Prussian corps had blockaded it for some time. The French surrendered themselves prisoners of war on the 15th February.

The Duke of Marlborough commenced this campaign with the siege of Bonn. He was anxious to deprive the French of this their only remaining stronghold on the Lower Rhine. Whilst the French were in possession of Bonn, he could not act with that vigour he proposed towards the frontier, being obliged to employ a considerable force in protecting the country in his rear, from the depredations and requisitions of that garrison. The siege of Bonn was therefore undertaken by a part of his army, consisting of forty battalions and sixty squadrons, whilst the remainder assembled near Maestricht.

Bonn is situated on the left bank of the Rhine, having a tête-de-pont on the right side, consisting of three regular fronts. Having completely invested the place on both sides of the Rhine, the allies carried on three approaches at the same time.—Bonn surrendered on the 16th May. The trenches had been opened on the night of the 3d.

Lewis XIV. being displeased with the result of the preceding campaign, sent Marshal Villeroi to command the French army in the Low Countries instead of Marshal Boufflers. The latter, however, continued with the army, and served under Villeroi.

Villeroi assembled the French army early in May, near Tirlemont. He attacked Tongres on

the 9th May. It was surrounded merely by a wall, which was immediately breached, and the two battalions, which composed the garrison, were obliged to surrender. The Dutch general, Overkerque, who commanded in Brabant, whilst Marlborough (with the principal part of the army) was occupied at the siege of Bonn, assembled the allied troops, under his orders, near Maestricht. He put his right at the village of Lonaken, and his left close to Maestricht. He had, in position, forty battalions and sixty squadrons. Villeroi had sixty-three battalions and a hundred and one squadrons. He advanced at their head to dislodge General Overkerque, but, after carefully reconnoitring the ground, he found him too advantageously posted, and in consequence, he retreated to Tongres without risking an attack.

The Duke of Marlborough joined Overkerque after the surrender of Bonn. Their united armies consisted of sixty-five battalions and one hundred and twenty squadrons. He immediately moved from the position near Maestricht, in quest of Marshal Villeroi, who was encamped near Tongres. The river Saare runs from Tongres into the Meuse at Maestricht. Marlborough crossed the Saare near Maestricht, thus turning the French, who were upon the left of the Saare, with their right upon Tongres. The French changed their front, and prepared to dispute the passage of the

Saare; Marlborough, endeavouring to outflank them, moved up the Saare by his left; the French made a similar movement by their right. It must have been a most interesting sight to have witnessed the movements of the two armies, separated by a trifling stream, and thus marching, occasionally, within sight of each other. The French, arriving at the sources of the Saare, placed their right upon the Melaigne, their left behind the Saare, and occupied the village of Tourine, (between the two,) in force. They also threw up several redoubts to cover their front. Marlborough, not judging it advisable to attack the French in this position, redescended the Saare, which he crossed between Tongres and Maestricht. He moved to Bilsen, thus appearing to intend to march towards Antwerp. Villeroi immediately left the Saare and hastened to Diest, interposing his army, by this movement, between that of their allies and their apparent object.

Independent of the army under his own immediate command, Villeroi had forty battalions and twenty-seven squadrons of French and Spanish troops in the neighbourhood of Ostend, Antwerp, and Ghent, commanded by the Marquis of Bedmar, a Spanish general. The Duke of Marlborough had also about thirty battalions and as many squadrons, between Breda and Sluys, for

the protection of Dutch Flanders, which were entrusted to the Dutch general, Obdam.

During the operations upon the Saare, the Duke of Marlborough had directed that the Pays de Waes, between Antwerp and Ghent, should be invaded by the corps he had in Flanders, with a view to induce the Marquis of Bedmar to call upon Villeroi for reinforcements. General Coehorn had, in consequence, made an irruption from the Dutch country on the left of the Scheldt, (with some success,) into the Pays de Waes, and General Obdam advanced from Lillo, on the right bank, as far as Eckeren, to threaten the Marquis of Bedmar, (who was encamped near Antwerp,) and to prevent his opposing himself to Coehorn's movements.

General Obdam, occupying his ground very carelessly, the Marquis of Bedmar formed a plan to cut him off, and having communicated with Marshal Villeroi upon the subject, his scheme was not only approved of, but Marshal Boufflers was detached, from the army at Diest, with thirty squadrons of dragoons and thirty companies of grenadiers, to co-operate in the attack.

General Obdam's corps consisted of thirteen battalions and twenty-six squadrons. He was encamped with his right at Eckeren, and his left near Donk. The French and Spanish troops

made a circuit, and turning his left, got completely to his rear, and occupied the villages of Cappel, Muysbroek, Houven, and Ordenen, the last of which is situated close to the Scheldt. The retreat of General Obdam upon Lillo was apparently cut off. The Dutch army countermarched, and thus fronted their enemy, who was advancing upon them from their rear. Whilst these operations were going on, four Spanish battalions, detached from Antwerp, (who had marched by the side of the Scheldt, having their advance concealed by the dam,) made their appearance at Wilmersdouw, on the left and in the rear of General Obdam's corps, according to its new front. The confusion now appears to have been very great. General Obdam made his escape, with a few followers, to Breda. General Schulembourg (on whom the command devolved) collected the best of the troops, and after a most obstinate resistance on the part of the French, carried the village of Ordenen by the bayonet, and thus opened a retreat upon Lillo. The Dutch lost 2500 men in killed, wounded, and prisoners. The French and Spaniards about the same. This affair is called the battle of Eckeren. Both sides claimed the victory. The French, however, from their having surprised their enemy, and forced him to retreat, have unquestionably the strongest claims to be

esteemed the conquerors. Had they kept possession of the village of Orderen the results would have been very decidedly in their favour. There were twenty-eight battalions and forty-eight squadrons, partly French and partly Spanish, employed in this business.

The Duke of Marlborough advanced from Bilsen to Hasselt, upon the Demer, and from thence to Beringhen. Villeroi, weakened by the detachment he had sent to co-operate in the attack upon General Obdam, at Eckeren, retreated within the lines; which, it will be remembered, the French threw up from the Scheldt to the Meuse, the first year of the war. He encamped near Aerschot, within the lines. Being subsequently joined by Marshal Boufflers and some additional battalions from the Marquis de Bedmar's corps, Villeroi came without the lines and encamped at St. Job in t'Goer, a short distance from Antwerp, and near the present chaussée between Antwerp and Breda. The Duke of Marlborough, who had made a parallel movement to that of Villeroi's, and who had been also reinforced, (with the remains of General Obdam's corps and other troops from Breda,) came in sight of Villeroi, at St. Job. The French again retreated within their lines near Antwerp. They pushed eighteen battalions across the Scheldt; upon which river they may be said to

have been *à cheval*, ready to defend the Pays de Waes or their lines in front of Antwerp, according to circumstances.

The Duke of Marlborough determined to return to the Meuse. Villeroi moved in the same direction within his lines. The duke encamped at Vignamont, to cover the siege of Huy, which place was invested on the 15th, and taken on the 25th August. The French garrison were made prisoners of war. Villeroi remained during the siege with his right at Waseige upon the Mehaigne, and his left at the village of St. Joseph. After the capture of Huy, the Duke of Marlborough advanced to Hannût, within four or five miles of the French position, and frequently reconnoitred it. Deeming it, however, too strong to be attacked, he retreated to St. Tron, in the neighbourhood of which place he encamped, and detached twenty-five battalions and forty squadrons across the Meuse, to besiege Limbourg.

It may not be irrelevant to observe, that Ramilies, the future scene of the Duke of Marlborough's glory, is very near to Waseige, and was within the position now occupied by the French army.

Limbourg was invested on the 8th September. The French Lieutenant-General Count Regnac commanded the garrison. The Prince of Hesse-Cassel was at the head of the besieging corps. The fortifications of Limbourg had been destroyed

by the French previous to their evacuating it, at the peace of Ryswyk. The present defences were only earth-works. The batteries were opened on the 26th, and the place surrendered on the 27th September.

The allied army, as well as that of the French, continued assembled until the end of October, when they both retired into cantonments.

Two reflections occur upon considering with attention the operations of this campaign. The first is, the little spirit of enterprize shewn by the French; and the second, the variety of positions occupied occasionally by either army, in which they deemed themselves, and were considered by their adversaries, as secure from an attack. With respect to the first, it cannot be attributed to want of soldier-like feeling in the French army. Their uniform gallantry makes that supposition impossible. They were ready and willing to do what they were desired. Neither had their chiefs, at that time, any reason to dread Marlborough's talents. By skilful movements he had changed the scene of warfare from the frontiers of Holland and the narrow country between the Rhine and the Meuse, to the Spanish Netherlands and the plains of Brabant; but he had not gained those victories which gave him subsequently such a preponderating influence. On the contrary, his generals were, at present, by no means suspected of too

implicit an obedience. He had not always a majority in the council of war. General Schu- lembourg was at the head of a party decidedly hostile to him. We can, therefore, only look for an explanation of the conduct of the French army, to the foolish vanity and weakness of Lewis XIV. who attempted to direct their operations from his cabinet at the Tuilleries. He hampered Boufflers the last year, and Villeroi this, with instructions, *ad infinitum*, which caused a constant reference to Paris, and cramped the movements of the army accordingly.

The second reflection (relative to the positions) offers a wider field for discussion. The ground occupied by Overkerque, near Maestricht, would now, as then, be deemed very excellent. But to a hasty observer, the advantages of the position between the Saare and the Mehaigne, of that between Wascige and St. Joseph, and of the camp at Vignamont near Huy, would appear problematical. These great men, however, thought otherwise; and we are likely to profit more, by searching for the reasons of their opinions, than by hastily criticising their judgments. The soil of Flanders is easily moved; and they seem, in general, (and with truth,) to have deemed that a favourable position to receive an enemy, when they could get their flanks tolerably secured from being turned, and a few redoubts thrown up in their front.

When armies are of pretty nearly the same strength, the one which should be thus situated would, in fact, (as experience has shewn,) have very great advantages over the assailing corps. The redoubts, reinforced and supplied from the rear, would cause an immense loss and discouragement to the army which attacked. The troops in position would have only to wait with patience for the favourable moment to advance, to completely discomfit an already exhausted enemy.

1704.

The campaign of the preceding year in Germany had been detrimental to the interests of the allies. The army of the Elector of Bavaria, united to that of France, had been very successful against the Imperialists. Instead, therefore, of invading the Spanish Netherlands, it was decided that the allied army, under the Duke of Marlborough, should march to the assistance of the emperor. This determination was founded upon the soundest principles of military policy. If the French and Bavarians had been suffered to crush the Emperor, France would have been enabled to direct, subsequently, such an accumulated force against the allies, in the Low Countries, as it would have been difficult to withstand. There was no pros-

pect of any immediate advantages to be gained in carrying the war into the Spanish Netherlands. A campaign of sieges (the successful result of which would not make a very great impression upon France) was all that could be expected. It was also calculated that the temporary absence of the Duke of Marlborough's army would not endanger the safety of Holland. All the places on the Meuse, and on the Lower Rhine, were in possession of the allies. If a sufficient corps was, therefore, appointed to watch the operations of the French army in the Low Countries, the invasion of Holland appeared out of the question. Under these circumstances, and for these reasons, the march of Marlborough to the assistance of the Imperialists was agreed upon. The secret of this intended march was wonderfully well kept. Marlborough left Maestricht on the 16th May, and joined the Imperial army under Prince Lewis of Baden, near the Danube, on the 22d June. Their united armies amounted to ninety-six battalions and two hundred and two squadrons, with fifty pieces of artillery.

Many intelligent officers have compared the march of Napoleon from his camp at Boulogne, to Ulm, in 1805, to this one of the Duke of Marlborough's; but a little consideration will convince any reflecting person, that the difficulties to be overcome were very different in the two cases.

Napoleon had merely to issue his orders. The Duke of Marlborough had not only to obtain the approbation of the English ministers but the consent of the States of Holland, and of the different German courts, whose troops were serving with his army. Napoleon had no enemy to oppose his movement. The Duke of Marlborough had to deceive the French marshals commanding respectively in the Low Countries, on the Moselle, and on the Upper Rhine; either of whom would have been able to throw considerable difficulties in the way of the operation, had he been aware of the object in view. This march of the Duke of Marlborough's, independent of the brilliant results which followed it, must always be looked upon as a singular proof of his talents and of his decision. The rapid advance of the Duke of Wellington, from the frontiers of Portugal, in 1812, to Vittoria, is the only modern operation of this nature which occurs, as at all to be compared with the march in question.

The Duke of Marlborough's movement was from Maestricht to Bonn; from thence to Coblenz, where he passed the Rhine. He crossed the Main above Mayence; and the Neckar between Mannheim and Heidelberg. He passed the Neckar again at Mandelsheim in advancing towards the Danube. Prince Eugene met him at Mandelsheim on the 10th June; and on the 12th.

Prince Lewis of Baden advanced to Groote Hey-pach, a village near Schorndoff, (where the Duke of Marlborough halted for a few days to close up his columns and collect his troops,) and where the three Generals consulted as to their ulterior operations.

The combined French and Bavarian army under the command of the Elector, and of Marshal Marsin was reckoned at eighty-eight battalions, and one hundred and sixty squadrons, provided with one hundred and twenty pieces of artillery. It occupied an entrenched camp at Dillengen, upon the Danube, between Ulm and Donauwert, having considerable corps detached at each of these places. The object of the Elector appears to have been to prevent the passage of that river; and, on its banks, to await the arrival of an additional French army, under Marshal Tallard, the assistance of which he had been promised.

The Duke of Marlborough and the Prince of Baden agreed to advance upon the Danube with their united force; and to detach Prince Eugene with a considerable corps towards Philipsbourg, upon the Rhine, to oppose the expected French reinforcements in their passage of that river.

In consequence of this arrangement, the Duke of Marlborough's army advanced towards the Danube, and joined that of the Prince of Baden, on the 22d June, at Westersbetten. On the 2d

July they attacked the French and Bavarian corps at Donauwört.

Donauwert is a small town situated on the left bank of the Danube, at its confluence with the Verner, surrounded by a wall with towers, and a wet ditch. It is completely commanded by a hill called Schellenberg, which had been occupied as a post repeatedly in former wars. The French and Bavarian corps at Donauwert, were commanded by a Bavarian General, Count Arco. He had placed his troops on the Schellenberg; the fortifications of which he was busy in improving, when the army of the Duke of Marlborough and the Prince of Baden came before him. The English and Dutch had principally the honour of the attack. The entrenchments on the Schellenberg were carried by assault after an obstinate resistance. A considerable body of the French and Bavarians escaped into Donauwert, which they evacuated in a few days.

The Elector of Bavaria, after the success of the allies at Schellenberg, withdrew his army from the entrenched camp at Dillengen, and, abandoning the defence of the Danube, concentrated his force near Ausburg in its rear.

Augsburg is situated at the junction of the Wertag with the Lech. The two rivers form a tongue of land of a considerable extent, three-fourths of which they surround. The only front

on which an enemy could approach, the Elector occupied with an entrenched camp, to which the town and citadel of Augsburg acted as a keep. It is evident that in this situation the French and Bavarian army were in security.

The allies endeavoured to detach the Elector of Bavaria from his connection with France by representing to him the inevitable miseries he brought upon his own country, by allowing it to be the seat of war. Relying, however, upon the promised assistance from France, the Elector continued firm to his engagements. The allies, in consequence, determined to besiege his different fortresses. They commenced with that of Ingolstadt. Prince Lewis of Baden undertook the direction of the siege, whilst the Duke of Marlborough agreed to command the covering army.

Lewis XIV. in the mean while made great exertions to succour his ally. Forty-two battalions and sixty squadrons of select troops were put under the command of Marshal Tallard. This officer had, in the spring of the year, conducted with great skill a considerable convoy, and some additional battalions to Ulm, through the Black Forest. He was now appointed to take charge of the reinforcements forwarded from France. He crossed the Rhine above Strasbourg, and advancing on the 10th July by Fribourg, he was enabled to join the Elector of Bavaria on the 3d

August at Augsburg. Prince Eugene finding he could not prevent Marshal Tallard from crossing the Rhine, and from moving towards Augsburg, hastened with his corps, which consisted of twenty battalions and sixty squadrons, to join the Duke of Marlborough's army. He halted his corps at Munster, a small village on the left bank of the Danube, between Dillingen and Donauwert.

The Elector of Bavaria, after the junction of Marshal Tallard, determined to leave the neighbourhood of Augsburg, and to recross the Danube, with a view to draw the allied army from his own country. He crossed the Danube on the 10th August at Lawingen, and descending the river, put his right at Blenheim close to the Danube, and his left at a village called Lutzingen. As the French and Bavarians were thus within a few miles of Prince Eugene's corps at Munster, the Prince sent his infantry to Schellenberg, to be in security in that post, and remained only with his cavalry, watching the operations of the enemy.

The Duke of Marlborough, in the mean while, made a similar movement to that of the French and Bavarian army. He crossed the Danube at Merxheim, and advancing rapidly up the river, joined Prince Eugene's corps at Munster. The allied army was placed opposite to that of the French and Bavarians, having its left at Munster upon the

Danube, and its right beyond a village called Ajpershoffen. The Prince of Baden, with a detached corps, continued the siege of Ingolstadt.

The army of the Duke of Marlborough and Prince Eugene consisted of sixty-six battalions, one hundred and seventy-eight squadrons, and fifty-two pieces of artillery ; that of the French and Bavarians amounted to ninety-two battalions, and one hundred and sixty squadrons, with one hundred pieces of artillery. The advantages of number were, therefore, on the side of the French ; that of position was also. Their right was at Blenheim, upon the Danube, and their left at the village of Lutzingen, as has been already stated. Along their front ran a deep and marshy rivulet. Their superiority of artillery enabled them to place guns on all the commanding heights from whence they could be brought to bear upon an advancing enemy. It required good troops to attack such a position.

On the morning of the 13th August the allied army advanced to the attack. The French occupied in force the villages of Blenheim on their right, Oberklau in their front, and Lutzingen on their left. It would appear that they disposed of too much of their infantry in these villages, and that the position, generally, was too weakly held in consequence. They did not dispute the passage of the rivulet, in their front, with infantry ; but

contented themselves with a cannonade, and the charges made by their cavalry on the different corps of the allies after they had crossed. The allied armies moved across the rivulet in a line of columns, composed alternately of infantry and cavalry, so that the two arms were able to afford each other mutual aid. The French and Bavarian cavalry, and their infantry, (not in the villages,) gave way, and were pursued off the field. The Duke of Marlborough, who commanded on the left, ordered Blenheim not to be attacked, but merely blockaded, and the pursuit to be vigorously continued, it being evident that the troops left there must surrender when deprived of their cavalry and artillery. At the close of the day twenty-seven French battalions laid down their arms in Blenheim.

On the right it was late before Prince Eugene carried the village of Lutzingen. The enemy were driven out of that of Oberklau earlier in the day; the attack in front by the Imperialists having been seconded by one which was made, upon the right flank of the village, by a detachment from the corps of Marlborough which had passed the rivulet nearer to Blenheim.

The victory was most complete. It was one of the severest blows the French monarchy ever received. The French lost thirty thousand men

in killed, wounded, and prisoners. Amongst the latter was Marshal Tallard.

The Elector of Bavaria collected the French and Bavarian troops at Ulm. He left nine battalions for the defence of this place, and with the remainder proceeded through the Black Forest by hasty marches to the Rhine.

Bavaria, thus deprived of the presence of the Elector, submitted quietly to the Imperialists. The Electress retired to Munich, and, with the consent of the Elector, entered into a treaty with the Emperor, by which she agreed to disband the few remaining Bavarian regiments, and to open the gates of Ingolstadt and the other fortresses of Bavaria to the Imperial troops, upon condition of being allowed to remain with the electoral family unmolested at Munich until a general peace.

The Duke of Marlborough's army commenced its march towards Flanders on the 31st August. They crossed the Neckar at Mondlesheim, being only eighty-two days since they had before passed the same river and at the same village, on their advance towards the Danube. They did not however return immediately, nor by the same route. From Mondlesheim the Duke of Marlborough marched to Philipsbourg, where he crossed the Rhine on the 7th September, and occupied a position to cover the siege of Landau, which place

the Imperialists, under Prince Lewis of Baden, invested on the 16th of the same month.

Whilst Prince Lewis of Baden was occupied in the siege of Landau, the Duke of Marlborough advanced with part only of the covering army, leaving the remainder under the orders of Prince Eugene, as far as the Moselle, and took possession of Trêves, which was but feebly garrisoned by the French. He directed a considerable number of men to be employed in putting its fortifications in order forthwith, and left a sufficient corps for its defence. He moreover caused Traerbach, also on the Moselle, to be invested and besieged by the Prince of Hesse-Cassel. Traerbach was taken on the 20th December.

Landau surrendered on the 25th November. The defence was very creditable to the French garrison, and their governor Laubaine. The siege however had not been pressed with proper vigour. There was not only a paucity of means with the Imperial army, but a want of energy and exertion, attributed to the bad and slow arrangements of the Prince of Baden. A short time before the surrender of Landau, the cavalry of the Duke of Marlborough's army marched for Holland. The infantry embarked on the Rhine at Mayence, and were conveyed there by water.

During the absence of the Duke of Marlborough with his army upon the Danube, nothing of any

consequence took place in the Low Countries. The Dutch general Count Nassau Overkerque commanded the allied troops. The French army had been very much reduced. The uncertainty of the object of the Duke of Marlborough's march had caused the French government to reinforce their armies both on the Moselle and upon the Upper Rhine from the corps in Flanders. Overkerque availed himself of these circumstances to advance and to bombard Namur on the 26th July, in hopes that the inhabitants would compel the garrison, which was very inadequate to its defence, to surrender; but without success. The Dutch general Spaer, who commanded in Dutch Flanders, took and destroyed a small fort, called Fort Isabella, close to Sluys, which was employed as a sort of watch-tower upon the Sluys. He also bombarded Bruges on the 4th July. These were the only military events which took place in the Low Countries this year.

Thus ended the campaign of 1704—a year which will be ever memorable in the British military annals.

1705.

The Duke of Marlborough proposed to invade France this year by the Moselle, on which river he was already in possession of Traerbach and

of Trêves. The latter place, in consequence, was made his dépôt. An Imperial army, under Prince Lewis of Baden, was to have been assembled in the neighbourhood of Mayence, to advance upon the Saare, and to co-operate with the duke.

Overkerque was left with thirty battalions and thirty squadrons in the neighbourhood of Maestricht, to protect the Dutch frontier. The Duke of Marlborough's army crossed the Meuse near Maestricht on the 15th May, and were assembled on the right bank of the Moselle near Trêves on the 3d June. Marshal Villars, who commanded the French forces upon the Moselle, placed his army at Sierk upon that river, having Thionville in his rear, Luxembourg on his left, and Saare-Louis on his right; to either of which places he could thus afford protection, should the Duke of Marlborough propose to besiege them. His position was moreover in itself very good, and not easily to be forced.

The Duke of Marlborough came in sight of Villars's army. He had with him only the British and Dutch, together with the Hessians and the troops of Lunebourg. The Imperialists, the Prussians, the Palatines, and the Wurtembergers had not yet joined. There appeared no prospect of any co-operation on the part of the Prince of Baden. Under these circumstances, and the French generals in the Low Countries

availing themselves of his absence to advance upon the Meuse, the Duke of Marlborough gave up his plan of penetrating into France by the Moselle. He quitted Trêves on the 19th June, and returned with his army to Maestricht on the 1st July.

The French, Spanish, and Bavarian troops formed an army in the Low Countries, consisting of one hundred and nineteen battalions, and one hundred and sixty squadrons. The Elector of Bavaria and Marshal Villeroi commanded them. Whilst the Duke of Marlborough was upon the Moselle, these generals had quitted their lines, and advanced to Vignamont; from whence they detached a corps to besiege Huy. Huy was invested on the 28th May, and surrendered on the 10th June. After the capture of Huy, the French army descended the Meuse, took possession of Liege, (which was not defended,) and invested the citadel on the 18th June. On the return, however, of Marlborough from the Moselle, they sent back their battering-guns to Namur; left Liege on the 27th June, and retreated within their lines in the first week of July.

The corps which Marlborough had brought back from the Moselle, united to that which had been left with Overkerque, gave him an army of ninety-two battalions and one hundred and sixty squadrons. The first operation Marlborough determined upon was to retake Huy. General

Schultz was detached with ten battalions and ten squadrons for this purpose. Huy was taken possession of on the 12th July, after a defence of six days.

Marlborough now undertook to force the French lines, and to carry the war into the Spanish Netherlands. That part of the lines immediately in front of him from Leew on the little Gette to the Meuse, was not less than thirty-two miles in length. Villeroi had his head-quarters within his lines at Meerdorp, between the source of the little Gette and the Mehaigne; his infantry was scattered along the lines, and the cavalry, in reserve, by brigades, in the rear. The Mehaigne (the source of which was at some considerable distance within the French lines) intersected them near Meerdorp in its course to the Meuse.

The Duke of Marlborough crossed the Mehaigne from his camp at Vignamont, and approached the French lines. Villeroi, of course, now expected that the attack would be made upon that part of his lines between the Meuse and the Mehaigne, and prepared his arrangements accordingly. Marlborough, however, having caused previously twelve bridges to be laid over the Mehaigne, that his columns might not meet with any interruption, moved rapidly on the night of the 17th July, towards Leew; and at day-light on the morning of the 18th, got possession, with very little difficulty, of

the villages of Wanghe, Neer-heyllissem, Neer-hespen, and Oosmael, all upon the little Gette, and having bridges over that river. The French entrenchments, or lines, to which the little Gette acted as a ditch, were soon escaladed ; and considerable numbers of soldiers and peasants were set to work, to level sufficient spaces for the introduction of the cavalry and the artillery. Before mid-day of the 18th July the whole of Marlborough's army was within these lines.

The present chaussée between Liege and Tirlemont intersects the very spot where this transaction took place.

As soon as the Duke of Marlborough had a sufficient force within the lines, he took possession of Tirlemont. He placed his right at Tirlemont, and his left towards that part of the lines he had forced. The French fought with great gallantry, but they were beat in detail. They lost two thousand prisoners, and at least twice as many in killed and wounded.

The French re-assembled their army behind the Dyle. They placed their left at Louvain, and their right close to the forest of Soignies, at a village called Neerysche.

Marlborough followed them the next day. On the 19th July he encamped in front of Louvain.

On the night of the 29th July Marlborough attempted to cross the Dyle on the right of the

French position. The advanced guards of his columns effected a passage at Corbeeck, and near Neeryschen. But they were ultimately repulsed, as was also another corps which attempted the passage higher up the river at St. Joris Weert.

The Duke now determined to make a greater circuit, to turn the position of the enemy, and to cross the Dyle at its source. He fell back, from in front of Louvain, to Meldert, (not far from Tirlemont;) he left Meldert on the 15th August, and marching by Corbaix, Genappe, and Braine-la-leud, he found himself at Hulpe between the Lâsne, (one of the parent streams of the Dyle,) and the rivulet the Ysche, on the 17th August. In this march the Duke of Marlborough's army crossed the future field of Waterloo: at the village of Waterloo, at the entrance of the forest of Soignies, the French had a piquet of a battalion of infantry and a regiment of cavalry, which were driven in.

The Elector of Bavaria and Marshal Villeroi, finding their position on the Dyle thus turned, put themselves behind the Ysche, a small rivulet which rises in the forest of Soignies, and runs into the Dyle near Neerysche. The Duke of Marlborough had made all his arrangements for attacking the enemy in this new position. By mid-day on the 18th August he had formed his army in presence of that of the French with that view.

There never was an operation which promised a more complete success—the obstacle of the rivulet was very trifling—the French army was dispirited—their lines had been forced—their position upon the Dyle was now turned. General Schu-lembourg, however, one of the Dutch generals, insisted upon the question of the propriety of the attack being submitted to a council of war. Overkerque, who commanded the Dutch troops, supported the proposition of the Duke of Marlborough; namely, to attack immediately. Time was however lost in the discussion; and the Deputies of the States of Holland who accompanied the army, and without whose consent no important step could be taken, decided upon retiring.

It is wonderful how any man could keep his temper, or remain another day in the nominal command of an army over whose operations he had so little real controul. But the equanimity of the Duke of Marlborough was extraordinary. No other man could (perhaps) have conducted an army composed of such heterogeneous materials, and governed by such conflicting interests, to victory. In the early part of the campaign of this year he was disappointed; and his plan for invading France by the Moselle was thwarted, owing to the failure of the engagements entered into by the allies. This was an event in the course of things, and on which he might have

probably calculated more or less. But, after having conducted his army to the very spot he wished ; after having, by a judicious operation, turned his enemy's flank, and forced him from a good position to one where he deemed it advisable to attack him ; to be called upon by an inferior officer to explain his plans and intentions ; be compelled to listen to his remarks and objections ; and then to have this, a purely professional question, and of which gens-de-robe could know nothing, decided against him by gens-de-robe, required patience the most extraordinary.

The object of his march being thus defeated, Marlborough fell back on the 19th to Wâvre on the Dyle. From thence he moved, for the convenience of forage, to Pervez-le-Marchez. From Pervez-le-Marchez he detached the Dutch general Dedem with a small corps to besiege Leew. Leew was of some local importance, as being the left flank of the French lines from the Gette to the Meuse. Leew was taken on the 5th September, after a few days resistance. Whilst the allied army continued at Pervez-le-Marchez, the Duke of Marlborough caused that proportion of the French lines extending from Leew to the Mc-haigne to be levelled.

The French continued behind the Dyle, and they constructed a new line of entrenchments from the junction of the Demer and the Dyle,

below Louvain, to the river Nethe above Lier. The Duke of Marlborough advanced to Ærschot, within a few miles of this new line. He left garrisons at Deist and Hasselt upon the Demer, as also at Tongres upon the Saare. On the 28th September he conducted the army to Herenthals, where it remained until the 20th October. On the allied army leaving Herenthals, the Elector of Bavaria and Marshal Villeroi came without their lines, from the neighbourhood of Lier, at the head of some squadrons of cavalry, and attempted to cut off the rear-guard. They took some baggage, and a few bât-horses.

From Herenthals the Duke marched to Brêcht, and from thence to Calmthout.

From Calmthout Marlborough detached Count Noyelles on the 24th October, to besiege Santvliet, a small fort on the right bank of the Scheldt, between Lillo and Bergenopzoom, and which was surrendered in five days. The army now went into cantonments in the neighbourhood of Breda, and the Duke of Marlborough returned to England, first visiting Vienna, Berlin, and the Hague.

1706.

The Duke of Marlborough assembled his army on the 20th May near Looz, between Tongres

and St. Tron. He had seventy-four battalions and one hundred and twenty-three squadrons. His right was at Looz, and his left at the village of Corswaarem up the Saare, and near to its source.

The French army had been considerably reinforced during the winter. Villeroi crossed the Dyle at Louvain at the head of seventy-six battalions and one hundred and forty squadrons, (making a total of 80,000 men,) on the 19th May, and advanced to Tirlemont. Under the impression that it was the Duke of Marlborough's intention to besiege Namur, he hastened from Tirlemont to put himself between the allied army and that place. He advanced up the great Gette to Jodoigne. He placed his right at the village of Franquée upon the Mehaigne, his left at that of Autreglise, on one of the small rivulets which form the Gette, and he occupied the villages of Ramilies and Offuz in his centre. His left, and nearly one half of his front was protected by the rivulet in question, which rises between Ramilies and Offuz, and runs past Autreglise.

The Duke of Marlborough advanced in eight columns from his camp between Looz and Corswaarem, on the morning of the 23d May. He halted at Meerdorp to reconnoitre the enemy, who was moving into his position. He formed his army parallel to that of the French, with his right at Foulz, and his left on the Mehaigne. After

a heavy cannonade on both sides, for some time, the Duke caused a false attack to be made upon the French left at Autreglise, whilst his real effort was directed against their right. He gained possession of the village of Franquée upon the Mehaigne, upon which their right rested; and of another village called Tavier, which they had also occupied in the rear of Franquée. Having thus forced the enemy's right, he brought additional cavalry from his own right, and under the protection of the fire from the two villages before-named, which he filled with infantry, he drove back the French cavalry, and formed on the right and in the rear of the French line. The battle was now won. The village of Ramilies, attacked in flank, in rear, and in front, was soon carried. Villeroi attempted to form his troops, so as to cover his retreat, with their left at Autreglise and their right at Bommal, at right angles to the original position. The confusion was, however, too great. Marlborough pursued as far as Meldert, half way to Louvain, and about twelve miles from the field of battle. The French lost fifty pieces of artillery, all their baggage, one hundred and twenty colours or standards, seven thousand prisoners, and between eight and nine thousand men killed and wounded. Their army was completely defeated and disorganized.

This memorable field is within a couple of miles

of the present chaussée between Louvain and Namur.

All the French military writers have attributed the loss of this battle to the injudicious position selected by Villeroi, which, they assert, compelled one half of his army to remain unengaged, whilst the Duke of Marlborough was enabled to bring the greater part of his force to bear upon the other half. They find fault with Villeroi for not having strengthened his right with troops from his left, when he found the Duke of Marlborough made his serious attack upon the villages of Franquée and Tavier, and that he had brought the cavalry from his right to follow up the blow.

If any unprejudiced military man will however take the trouble of going over the ground, he will not perhaps agree as to the justice of these remarks. The position is an excellent one, and had been selected with great care. As it is close to Meerdorp, which was the French head-quarters during a great part of the last campaign, when they were within their lines, its merits must have been often canvassed, and the principal officers of the French army have been well acquainted with it. Neither of its flanks were to be turned, without making a great circuit. Had Marlborough delayed his attack for a few days, and given to Villeroi sufficient time to construct four or five redoubts on

that part of his front from Ramilies to Franquée, the battle would, in all probability, not have taken place.

The battle was won easily, owing to the village of Franquée being badly defended. The French infantry did not defend Franquée as they ought to have done. The French troops in the village of Tavier, in its rear, were also dislodged without much difficulty. The defence of Tavier was entrusted to five regiments of dragoons. We have kept the name in our modern armies, but the dragoon (as he was then trained and appointed) has been done away with. These dragoons were provided with muskets and bayonets, and acted as infantry or cavalry, as occasion required them. They however formed very unsteady battalions of infantry, and did not compensate by any increased efficiency as cavalry. On the contrary, they lost the velocity and activity so essentially necessary to that arm. Upon the present occasion, being cut off from their horses, (which had been left without the village of Tavier,) these dragoons were all killed or taken.

The French cavalry of their right, consisting of the King's household and the Bavarian cuirassiers, behaved incomparably well, and charged repeatedly Marlborough's cavalry; as also the heads of the columns he introduced between Franquée and Ramilies within their line. The previous posses-

sion of the villages of Franquée and Tavier made however all such desultory attacks unavailing.

It was, no doubt, the good conduct of the French cavalry engaged, that has made the French writers wish that Villeroi had brought the cavalry of his left to their assistance. But Marlborough had not desisted from his attacks upon Autreglise. Villeroi was liable to be forced upon this point, which required his attention as well as his right. Franquée was taken possession of, and the fate of the day decided irrevocably before Villeroi could have made such a movement, had the propriety of it occurred to him ; and, in the original formation of his army, it was as requisite that there should be a reserve of cavalry in the rear of his left as of his right, for fear of the allies penetrating by Autreglise, or descending the Gette with a view to pass that stream lower down. Upon the whole, it would not appear that the position was badly chosen, or injudiciously occupied. The attack was made with great impetuosity ; and Marlborough followed up his success upon the French right so quickly, that not only no attempt could be made to regain the villages of Franquée and Tavier ; but Villeroi could not even succeed in forming the troops of his left so as to front Marlborough's advance from the right, as already explained.

Marlborough took possession of Louvain on the

24th May, the day after the battle. The army past the Dyle on the 25th, a little below Louvain, upon bridges thrown over for that purpose, and encamped at Bethlem, a village a couple of miles beyond Louvain to the right of the Malines Chas-sée. The French evacuated Brussels, and passing the Dender, retreated towards Ghent. Marlborough marched to Vilvordes, (where he crossed the canal between Brussels and Malines,) and advanced on the 27th May to the village of Grimberghen, on his route towards Alost, where he proposed to pass the Dender in pursuit of the enemy. From Grimberghen he detached four battalions and some cavalry (under his brother General Churchill) to take possession of Brussels. He continued his march by Alost towards Ghent. The French evacuated Ghent, and retreated to Courtrai. Marlborough advanced to Merlebeke upon the Scheldt, close to Ghent, from whence he sent General Cadogan to take possession of Ghent. From Merlebecke he advanced up the Lys to Deynse, where he crossed that river, and (on the 6th June) put his left at the village of Arsele, and his right at that of Caneghem. His army remained encamped in this position until the 18th June, under the command of Overkerque, whilst Marlborough himself went to the Hague to hasten the preparations of the battering-train and stores requisite for the siege of Ostend. He

returned to the army at Arsele on the 18th June, and immediately marched to Rousselaars preparatory to this operation. During the period the army was encamped at Arsele, the French and Spanish garrisons at Oudenarde and at Antwerp gave up those places. There were twelve battalions at the former and three at the latter fortress, partly French and partly Spanish troops. The French retreated from Courtrai to Mons, where they established their head quarters. Their army was divided and placed in Mons, Tournai, Lille, Menin, and Ipres. Reinforcements were drawn from the Upper Rhine and the Moselle, as well as from the interior of France. Marshal Villeroy was recalled from the command in the Low Countries, which was entrusted to the Duke de Vendôme. Marlborough confided the siege of Ostend to Marshal Overkerque, who had thirty-five battalions and twenty-four squadrons allotted to him for the purpose. His battering-train consisted of fifty twenty-four pounders, and twenty-four mortars. He invested the place on the 28th June. On the 3d July he was enabled to open his batteries. On the 6th the governor capitulated; and on the 8th the allies took possession of Ostend. The Spaniards were conducted to Mons, and the French to Dunkirk. Six French battalions, two Spanish, two Walloon, and a dismounted squadron of dragoons, composed the garrison.

The approaches were conducted from the westward, the only front of Ostend then, as now, which can be attacked, on account of the inundations.

As soon as Ostend was taken possession of, Marlborough made arrangements to besiege Menin. He moved from Rousselaare, where he had remained during the siege of Ostend, to cover that operation, and, crossing the Lys, at Courtrai, placed his left at Pont d'Espierres, upon the Scheldt, and his right at the small town of Mouscron. The direction of the siege of Menin he entrusted to General Zaliſche, with thirty-two battalions and twenty-five squadrons, and a battering train of seventy-two guns and forty-four mortars. The garrison consisted of twelve battalions and four squadrons of dragoons. The approaches were made from the Werwick side up the Lys. The trenches were opened on the 8th August, and on the 25th of the same month the garrison marched out by capitulation, and were conducted to Douai.

The Scheldt and its dependent streams were now open to the allies, for the facility of bringing up the requisite supplies and stores for their army; with the exception of the Dender. Ath, the highest point at which the Dender is navigable, and Dendermond, where it joins the Scheldt, were still in possession of the French.

The Duke of Marlborough determined to make himself master of both. Dendermond had been for some time blockaded. Its garrison consisted of four battalions ; namely, two French, one Spanish, and one Walloon ; and two hundred dismounted dragoons. Its great strength consisted in its inundations. Trenches were opened against it on the Brussels side, the only front in which it can be approached, on the 1st September. The place capitulated on the 5th of the same month.

The siege of Ath required greater preparations, more particularly as the Duke of Vendôme had reassembled the French army. He was encamped near Lille, at the head of seventy-three battalions and one hundred and fifty-five squadrons.

On the 9th September the Duke of Marlborough's army moved across the Scheldt from their camp near Pont d'Espierres ; and advanced to Grand Mets, a village upon the Dender, in the rear of Leuze, where he encamped to cover the siege of Ath. Marshal Overkerque directed the conduct of the siege, having thirty-eight battalions and twenty-six squadrons under his command for the operation.

The trenches were opened on the night of the 22d September. Fifty-two guns, besides mortars, were placed in battery. On the 2d October the place surrendered.

Ath was approached from the Mons side, be-

tween the Dender and the rivulet called the Cambron.

During the siege of Ath, the Duke de Vendôme moved with the French army from the neighbourhood of Lille to a position behind the Scheldt, between Condé and Tournai. He, however, gave the besiegers no trouble. He contented himself with reinforcing the garrisons of Mons and Charleroi.

After the capture of Ath, Marlborough assembled his army at Cambron, in front of Ath, and advanced as far as Lens, as if he intended to attack Mons. On the 6th November the army however broke up and went into winter-quarters. The British occupied Ghent. Marshal Overkerque was appointed to command the allied army during the winter, and had his head-quarters at Brussels. The Duke of Marlborough went to the Hague, and from thence to England.

Thus ended this eventful campaign.—In a military point of view there seems no good reason why the allies should have so easily acquired possession of the fortresses of the Low Countries after the battle of Ramilies. Antwerp, Oudenarde, and the citadel of Ghent, ought to have been defended. The French troops were however too much divided, and no one place was entrusted to them alone. The Spanish and Walloon regiments were not particularly attached to the

service of Philip ; on the contrary, many of their officers of rank, and the greatest proportion of the men, entered into that of the Austrian claimant, Charles. The inhabitants in general of the Low Countries were more favorable to a renewal of their connection with the House of Austria, than desirous that their country should be transferred to the French branch of Spain. These circumstances, doubtless, influenced the speedy surrender of the different fortresses. The French battalions, acting with lukewarm allies, and having moreover a numerous population to contain, could not make those defences of which the places were susceptible, and which it is only justice to them to suppose they would have done, under other circumstances. Antwerp had twelve battalions for its garrison. Six of them, however, being Spanish, and the population not being disposed to incur the horrors of a siege for the honour of belonging to Philip, sufficiently account for its being so easily surrendered to the allies.

1707.

After their defeat at Ramilies, the French constructed a connected line of redoubts from Mons to the Sambre. Behind this line and the Sambre, the garrisons of Mons, Charleroi, and Namur,

could communicate, and troops or supplies be forwarded from one to the other, as occasion might require. On the other side of Mons, the Haine and the Scheldt afforded a natural barrier and the same advantages from Mons to Condé, and from thence to Tournai.

The French army was considerably reinforced during the winter, and great exertions had been made to give to France a numerical superiority in the Low Countries. The Duke de Vendôme's army was augmented to one hundred and twenty-three battalions, and one hundred and eighty-seven squadrons. Vendôme advanced from behind his lines, as described. and encamped between Mons and Charleroi, with his right upon the Pieton, the small stream that runs into the Sambre at Charleroi.

The Duke of Marlborough assembled his army at Anderlecht, a small village in front of Brussels, on the 21st May. It was composed of ninety-nine battalions, and of one hundred and sixty-sevensquadrons. Marlborough advanced to Halle, and from thence to Soignies, with a view of attacking the French army. Vendôme moved from his right and encamped near Fleurus. Marlborough wished to have made a corresponding movement from Soignies by Braine-le-Comte to Nivelles, and from thence to Genappe, so as to have interposed his army between that of the

enemy and Brussels or Louvain. The river Senne runs between Braine-le-Comte and Nivelles in its course towards Brussels. At about an equal distance from each, on the Senne, is the village of Ronquieres, where there is a bridge. Vendôme had occupied the village of Ronquieres. Marlborough in consequence made a considerable circuit. He retreated to Brussels, and, crossing the Dyle at Louvain, re-advanced as far as Meldert towards the French, and where he encamped on the 31st May.

It appears rather extraordinary that the passage of such a trifling stream as the Senne should have occasioned any difficulty, more particularly as Marlborough's army was provided with a large bridge establishment. But the country between Braine-le-Comte and Nivelles is very much wooded, and the ground a good deal undulated. Marlborough, unquestionably, did not wish to commit himself in attempting to force the passage of the Senne at Ronquieres, during which operation Vendôme's whole army might have come upon him suddenly.

Marlborough, having made the circuit, as described, left Meldert on the 10th June, and advanced against Vendôme's army, which had been moved to a position between Genappe and Nivelles. He threw bridges over the Dyle at Florival, between Louvain and Wavre, and advanced by Wavre to Genappe. The French, however,

retreated, and took a new position, with their left at Seneffe and their right at Capelle-à-Herlaymont. The Duke moved to Nivelles, with a view to attack the left of the French. Vendôme fell back to Castiau-les-Thieusies, near Mons, with his advanced guard at St. Denys, at which place King William had had his last affair with Marshal Luxembourg. From Castiau-les-Thieusies Vendôme marched to Cambron, in front of Ath, where he entrenched his camp. This camp was however abandoned, upon the advance of Marlborough from Nivelles. The French marched from Cambron to the Scheldt, near Tournai, and encamped at Fontenoy, little aware of the future celebrity of the village now occupied by one of their divisions. Vendôme's army suffered considerably by desertion and by sickness in these harassing marches and retreats.

From Cambron Marlborough conducted his army over the Dender below Ath, and, marching across the country between the Dender and the Scheldt, passed the latter river at Pont d'Espierres, and resumed the encampment he had so frequently occupied during the preceding campaign, with his left upon the Scheldt, in the rear of Pont d'Espierres, and his right at Moacron, towards the Lys. The Duke de Vendôme remained in his position near Tournai, which he carefully strengthened.

On the 4th October Marlborough left the army

for the Hague; and a few days afterwards the different corps went into their winter-cantonments.

The advantages of this short campaign may be said to have been on the side of the French. It is true that not only nothing decisive took place, but that a single shot was hardly fired on either side. It was however an advantage to have checked the career of conquest. Marlborough gained nothing in this campaign. The French government obtained time to make their arrangements, and the French army to recover confidence.

The object of the Duke de Vendôme's march to the plains of Fleurus, in the commencement of the campaign, does not appear quite clear. His subsequent conduct shews that he wished to avoid a battle, which, indeed, it was his policy not to hazard. If, however, Marlborough had risked the march by Ronquieres, and been successful in passing rapidly the Senne, either by force or by stratagem, a battle would have been inevitable. As it was, by occupying Marlborough's army, he certainly prevented the siege of Mons, and was, therefore, in so far, successful.

This year the French lost Marshal Vauban. His character and services are thus portrayed by Fontenelle, nor, from every account, is the picture overcharged:—

“ Un sens droit et étendu qui s'attachoit au

“ vrai, par une espèce de sympathie, et sentoit le
“ faux sans le discuter, lui épargnoit les longs
“ circuits par où les autres marchent.

“ Il a fait travailler à trois cens places an-
“ ciennes, en a fait trente-trois neuves, a conduit
“ cinquante-trois sièges, et s’est trouvé à cent
“ quarante actions de vigueur.

“ Il a eu la gloire de ne laisser, en mourant,
“ qu’une fortune médiocre.

“ C’étoit un Romain, qu’il sembloit que notre
“ siècle eut dérobé aux plus heureux tems de la
“ République.”

1708.

Louis XIV. being pleased with the result of the preceding campaign, made still greater exertions this year in Flanders. He sent his grandson, the Duke de Bourgogne, to command the army, Vendôme remaining, however, under him; and he augmented it to one hundred and thirty-nine battalions and two hundred and four squadrons. The Elector of Bavaria was removed from the Low Countries, and appointed to command the French army on the Upper Rhine. His continued want of success appears to have deprived him, about this time, of the confidence of the French government; as he was not even made acquainted with the plan for the campaign of this

year. It was the intention of the French to act upon the defensive upon the Upper Rhine, and to reinforce the army in Flanders with a considerable corps from thence, should it be found practicable.

Marlborough assembled his army on the 26th May, in front of Halle, in the same position as in the preceding year. He had one hundred and twelve battalions and one hundred and eighty squadrons.

Parliament had refused to augment the army in the Low Countries by an additional 10,000 men, which Marlborough asked for. A spirit of party unfortunately began to prevail in the English councils. The inconsistency of keeping an army upon the continent, and yet not augmenting it, so as to be able to reap the fruits of its victories and exertions; the obvious impolicy of half measures; the risk of losing the Spanish Netherlands as fast as they had been gained; and the certainty that peace was only to be acquired by success, seem to have been overlooked by those who opposed the augmentation of the army. That truism of Catiline's, in his speech to his soldiers, "*Nemo nisi victor pace bellum mutavit*," cannot be too strongly impressed upon the minds of all statesmen.

Under these circumstances Marlborough applied to the Emperor, and persuaded the Imperial

court to act upon the defensive upon the Rhine ; and to send Prince Eugene with 25,000 men to co-operate with him in the Low Countries. Considerable difficulties attended this arrangement. The Elector of Hanover, who was generalissimo of the army of the empire, and who was to command in person upon the Rhine, objected. Marlborough went to Hanover previous to the opening of the campaign. Every obstacle being removed by his abilities and address, and the promise of this reinforcement being obtained, he returned to Brussels, and took the command of his army, which was encamped in front of Halle, towards the end of May, as already stated.

The Duke of Bourgogne reviewed his army on the heights of the Mont Palisel, close to Mons, and immediately advanced on the Chaussée, towards Soignies, as if he intended to attack Marlborough in his position, in front of Halle. From in front of Soignies he, however, moved, by his right, and, marching behind Nivelles, encamped in front of Genappe, thus threatening to advance behind the Dyle towards Louvain. Marlborough fell back from Halle, and marching by the rear of Brussels, encamped, in front of Terbach, near Louvain, with his left upon the Dyle, over which he threw several bridges, to enable him to move according to circumstances. The French kept their right at Genappe, but moved forward their

left to Braine-la-leud, which they occupied, thus fronting towards Marlborough.

The two armies remained in their respective positions for several weeks. In the meantime, at Lille and Tournai, preparations were making, by order of the French government, for the siege of Menin. It was the intention of the Duke de Bourgogne to place his army between the Lys and the Scheldt, fronting towards Oudenarde, which place he proposed to blockade, whilst the siege of Menin was to be carried on in his rear.

With a view to these operations the French army removed from Braine-la-leud; crossed the Senne at Tubize, and marched to Alost, where they passed the Dender. From Alost they advanced to the Scheldt, over which they threw bridges at Gâvre, half way between Ghent and Oudenarde. Being thus on the left bank of the Scheldt, and between that river and the Lys, the heads of their columns moved to their left up the Scheldt, with a view of carrying into effect the proposed plans.

Previous to this movement of the Duke de Bourgogne's, he had detached a corps which had taken possession of Ghent by surprise; and the inhabitants of Bruges had opened their gates to Count La Motte, who commanded, in the neighbourhood of Ypres, a body of French cavalry and several battalions.

As soon as Marlborough was aware of the Duke de Bourgogne's march, he moved without delay from the neighbourhood of Louvain; crossed the canal between Brussels and Malines, and making the circuit of Brussels, encamped at Anderlecht to be in readiness to oppose any attempt in that quarter. At Anderlecht receiving information of the enemy's movements towards the Dender, he marched from thence at mid-night, on the 6th June, in the hopes of overtaking the Duke de Vendôme before he reached that river. Upon his arrival at Assche, half way between Brussels and Alost, finding that the French had already crossed the Dender at Alost, he directed his march to Lessines, situated considerably higher up that river. He passed the Dender at Lessines; and, marching upon Oudenarde, his advanced corps came in sight of the French army about noon, upon the 11th July. The French had established, as already stated, their bridges at Gâvre, and were quietly passing the Scheldt, little expecting to find Marlborough upon their flank at Oudenarde.

The advanced guard of the allies was engaged with the enemy for some time before the columns of the army could come up. Generals Cadogan and Rantzau, who commanded it, threw bridges over the Scheldt, a little below Oudenarde, and, crossing that river, put themselves in position behind a small rivulet which runs into the Scheldt

at Eyne, about a mile and a half from Oudenarde, taking prisoners a number of French soldiers who were employed foraging. The Duke de Bourgogne had so little idea of Marlborough's approach that he imagined his foragers had been molested by the garrison of Oudenarde, and sent seven battalions to take possession of the village of Eyne as a check upon their proceedings. These battalions were attacked and defeated by Cadogan, who took possession of Eyne. In the mean time Marlborough's army appeared, and descending from the height above Oudenarde passed the Scheldt on the bridges laid by its advanced guard. Marlborough formed his troops as they came up on the left of the advanced corps, which he pushed on beyond Eyne, to a little village called Hearne, on the Scheldt, and which thus became his right. His left extended to Worteghem. The French formed with their left at Asper; their centre at Huysse; and their left at Warmeghem. Taken, however, by surprise, their formations were irregular; and there was no ensemble in their defence. They were beaten upon every point, and retreated in the greatest confusion. A body of the best of of their troops made a forward movement upon the centre of the allies to the right of the village of Oycke, and where they maintained themselves, by the aid of some inclosures. Left, however, entirely to themselves, after the retreat of the

French army, they were attacked in the rear by the young Prince of Orange with the Dutch infantry, and were almost all destroyed or taken prisoners.

It was in the evening before the Duke of Marlborough was able to make his general attack. Night put an end to the pursuit. The French lost 7000 men in killed and wounded, and 9000 more lay down their arms.

The French army retreated to Ghent. The Duke de Bourgogne rallied them behind the canal between Bruges and Ghent, where he entrenched himself. Some idea of the confusion that prevailed in the French army may be formed by the circumstance stated by Marshal Berwick, in his Memoirs, of his having collected 9000 fugitives between Tournai, Lille, and Ypres; although the Duke de Bourgogne and the body of the army had retreated (in the contrary direction) to Ghent.

After the battle of Oudenarde, Marlborough advanced to Menin, in the neighbourhood of which he crossed the Lys; and forcing the French lines at Commynes, between the Lys and the Ypres, which he afterwards caused to be levelled, encamped at Wervick, preparatory to the siege of Lille, which was the next operation he decided upon.

The 25,000 Imperial troops Marlborough ex-

pected from the Rhine had arrived upon the Meuse (at Maestricht) previous to his late movements. Prince Eugene had pushed on with a small corps of cavalry only, and having joined Marlborough at Assche, on his march to the Dender, had been present at the battle of Oudenarde. Eugene remained with Marlborough; and the Imperialists were ordered from Maestricht to Brussels, from whence it was intended they should escort the battering train and military stores required for the siege of Lille. As soon as the French government were aware of the march of Prince Eugene from the Rhine, to reinforce the Duke of Marlborough's army, Marshal Berwick was similarly detached from their army upon the Rhine. Berwick arrived with thirty-four battalions and sixty-five squadrons at Mons, immediately after the battle of Oudenarde.

The battering train for the siege of Lille was collected at Brussels. On the 6th August, ninety-four battering-guns, sixty heavy mortars, and three thousand waggons laden with powder, shot, and shells, left Brussels, under the escort of the Imperialists. This convoy was conducted by Halle to Soignies, from thence to Ath. At Ath it left the chaussée, and filed by Frasnè towards the Scheldt, which it crossed at Pont d'Espierres. The Duke of Marlborough advanced to Pont d'Espierres to meet this convoy. He encamped upon

his former ground, a little lower down the Scheldt than Pont d'Espierres, with his left upon the river, and his right at the village of Bellinghem, with sixty battalions, and one hundred squadrons. Prince Eugene, at the head of fifty-four battalions and eighty squadrons, advanced by Menin towards Lille, which he invested on the 13th August.

A very slight view of the map will show at once the boldness and decision of these operations, as well as the skill and energy with which they were conducted. To Marlborough we may with great truth apply that beautiful sentence of Lord Clarendon's, "that he had a head to conceive, a heart to attempt, and a hand to execute."

The French were masters of Ghent and Bruges; and the Duke de Bourgogne's army was entrenched behind the canal, between these two places. This army had consisted, at the commencement of the campaign, of one hundred and thirty-nine battalions and two hundred and four squadrons. It had been diminished considerably by the defeat it experienced near Oudenarde, probably to the amount of 20,000 men. It had, however, been reinforced by Count La Motte's corps, and could not, therefore, be much less efficient than it was originally. Parallel to the canal, between Bruges and Ghent, on the other side of Flanders, the French were in possession of

Nieuport and Ypres, which, of course, gave them the command of the navigation of the Yper. Ostend was in Marlborough's possession ; but the communication with it was very difficult whilst the enemy held Bruges and Nieuport. At Lille the garrison consisted of twenty-three battalions and three regiments of dragoons ; and Marshal Berwick was behind Mons, Condé, and Tournay, with a disposable force of forty battalions and one hundred squadrons. Under these circumstances, that Marlborough should besiege and take Lille, drawing his convoys of ammunition and stores from Brussels and from Ostend ; and that he should, afterwards, take both Ghent and Bruges, appears extraordinary and hardly credible. This was certainly the proudest moment of Marlborough's military career.

Prince Eugene commenced the siege of Lille by encamping his troops around the place ; and, to prevent any interruption, surrounding them by a line of circumvallation of a very respectable profile, and with a corresponding deep ditch. He opened the trenches on the night of the 23d August. There were two attacks ; one on each side of the Deule (where it leaves the town) on the Menin and the Ypres roads.

The French determined to assemble their armies, and to relieve Lille. The Duke de Bourgogne marched from Ghent to the valley of the Dender.

Marshal Berwick moved from Mons, by Enghien, towards the same river. The junction was formed between Grammont and Lessines ; and the French encamped on the same meadows on which the British cavalry were reviewed by the Duke of Wellington, in 1815, previous to the battle of Waterloo. The French force now united amounted to one hundred and forty battalions and two hundred and fifty squadrons, with two hundred pieces of artillery.

The Marque is a marshy rivulet. It rises between Douai and Lille, about ten miles from the latter ; towards which it runs for some little distance ; and then, making a circuit, it completely surrounds, at about the distance of seven miles, that half of Lille which fronts towards Tournai.

Behind this river, and within this circuit, Marlborough retired. The French advanced from Lessines to Tournai, and, crossing the Scheldt at the latter, marched towards Lille to attack Marlborough. The passage of the Marque was, however, to be effected, and Marlborough's army was in position behind it. His left was at Pont-à-Tressin, his centre at the village of Peronne, and his right crossed the chaussée from Douai to Lille, at the village of Antreulle. The French made a movement to their left, and, ascending the Marque, got upon the Douai chaussée, advanced from thence and passed the Marque at

Pont-à-Marque. Marlborough made a corresponding movement by his right. He placed his right upon the Deule, at Noyelles, his centre at the village of Ennenieres, and his left at Trêtin, close to the Marque. His two flanks were thus secure. The extent of the position is about six miles. There were no particular advantages in his front, excepting that the ground, sloping towards the enemy, formed a fine natural glacis. He immediately entrenched himself.

It is a remarkable fact, illustrative of the talent and decision of this great man, that, notwithstanding the French army was more than double in numbers to the one with which he covered the siege, he sent back to the besieging army a reinforcement of twenty-four battalions and sixty squadrons, which Prince Eugene had ordered to join him. It had been proposed in the council of war to discontinue the siege of Lille, and to unite both armies to oppose that of the Duke de Bourgogne. Marlborough wrote to the Dutch deputies who were with the army, that he was perfectly satisfied with the ground he occupied, between the Marque and the Deule, and that the French could make no impression upon him.

The Duke de Bourgogne remained several days in front of Marlborough's position. He sent to Douai for heavy artillery, with a view of destroying the entrenchments; a good deal of firing took

place; and the French advanced at one time so near, that it was expected they meant to endeavour to carry the works by assault. Upon the 14th September they, however, retreated, and, crossing the Scheldt at Tournai, occupied the left bank of that river from near Oudenarde to Tournai, having their head-quarters at the Abbey of Saulchoi, close to the latter place. Their object was to prevent any further convoys of ammunition or stores being forwarded from Brussels across the Scheldt to the besieging army in front of Lille. Two additional ones had arrived safely within Prince Eugene's lines, whilst the Duke of Burgundy was in front of Marlborough's position, between the Deule and the Marque.

As soon as the Duke de Bourgogne made this movement to the Scheldt, Marlborough marched to the northward of Lille, and encamped at Roncq, two miles from Menin, and about seven from Lille. In this position he was sufficiently near to be able to move again behind the Marque, should the French offer to re-advance towards Lille; and at the same time being upon the Ostend road, from which place he was distant only thirty-nine miles, he could push a corps on to Tourout, about half way, to protect the convoys of stores required for the siege of Lille, and which he now intended to draw from thence.

With a view to prevent the passage of any con-

voys from Ostend to Lille, the Duke de Bourgogne sent Count la Mothe behind the canal between Ghent to Bruges. He had thirty-four battalions and sixty-three squadrons entrusted to him for this purpose, which he assembled at Bruges. The French had, moreover, possession of Plassendael, within three miles of Ostend, the point where the canal from Bruges to Ostend meets the canal from Nieuport to Ostend. Under these circumstances it would seem to have been difficult for a convoy to proceed with safety. Yet one, nevertheless, did pass, highly to the credit of those concerned, in the arrangements. The convoy in question left Ostend on the morning of the 28th September by the Nieuport gate. Previous possession had been taken of the village of Leffingen, half-way between Ostend and Nieuport. The convoy filed behind the canal between Ostend and Nieuport, as far as Leffingen, where it crossed the canal, and advanced towards Rousselaare by St. Peter's Capelle, Couckelaare, and Hoogleede. The Duke of Marlborough came himself with a considerable corps as far as Rousselaare, fifteen miles from his camp at Roncq, and pushed on General Webb with eighteen battalions and five hundred cavalry to Tourout, eight miles farther. It was to the left of Tourout the convoy was to pass, so that General Webb was between the convoy and Count La Mothe at Bruges. Three battalions had also taken

possession of the village of Oudenburg, (upon the canal between Nieuport and Ostend, and close to Plassendael,) with a view to mask the French post at that point, and prevent any information respecting the march of the convoy being given from thence.

Count La Mothe hearing, however, of the intended convoy, left Bruges on the morning of the 28th September. He put himself in position across where the present chaussée is, between Ostend and Tourout, at a place called Moerdyk, to intercept it. Ridiculous as it may appear, he waited there some time, before he ascertained that it had already passed by his left. He now hastened to pursue it. General Webb (informed, by a cavalry patrole, of La Mothe's advance) made his arrangements with great ability and promptitude to receive him. At Wynendale about two miles in advance of Tourout towards Ostend, he drew up his troops in the rear of an opening between two woods. He placed a battalion in ambuscade in each wood. The French pushed, in column, into the opening. The sudden and unexpected fire they experienced upon both their flanks, as well as from the front, threw them into great confusion, and they retreated rapidly. Their dragoons were then most injudiciously brought forward, and lost a great number of men without the least chance of success. Marshal Berwick

observes of La Mothe with great truth, “ *Jamais homme de guerre ne s’y prit si mal.*” Count La Mothe made no attempt to turn General Webb. It by no means follows that he would have been successful, as he must have made a considerable circuit, which would have given time to General Webb to have changed his front. He, however, made no use of his very great superiority, to mask General Webb’s corps, whilst he might have pursued the convoy, the principal object for which he had made his movement. The uncertainty, however, the Count must have been in as to the strength of General Webb’s detachment, and the knowledge he had of the Duke of Marlborough, with a considerable corps, being arrived at Rous-selaare, only eight miles distant, from whence his retreat towards the canal between Bruges and Ghent could easily be cut off, induced him, no doubt, not to persevere. Count La Mothe retreated and fell back to Bruges.

In this affair the allies lost nine hundred men in killed and wounded, and the French about three thousand five hundred.

The Duke de Vendôme (angry at the passage of the convoy) came himself from the Scheldt to assume the command of La Mothe’s corps, which was augmented to fifty-one battalions and sixty-three squadrons. Vendôme established his headquarters at Oudenburg, close to Ostend; put his

left upon the canal between Bruges and Ostend, and his right at Moerdyk upon the chaussée between Ostend and Tourout. Marlborough moved again from his camp at Roncq, and advanced as far as Tourout, intending to attack Vendôme in this position. Vendôme moved by his left, and retreated behind the canal between Bruges and Ostend. Marlborough fell back to Rousselaare, where he remained for the present. The French, however, being masters of Nieuport, at length cut off all communication with Ostend by means of the sluices at the former place. They let in the salt water, and pushed the inundations to the highest pitch of which they were capable. With the help of boats, one or two more convoys were forwarded. But the French, sending from Dunkerque to Nieuport some of their naval officers, established a small flotilla of armed boats on the inundation. The village of Leffingen (nearly surrounded by water) was in consequence attacked and taken. Nearly one thousand two hundred Dutch and British soldiers were lost on this occasion. There was certainly here some oversight on the part of the allies, as both boatmen and boats, particularly calculated for this species of service, might have been procured to any extent from Holland. The inundations ought to have been in their favour, instead of against them.

Whilst these various operations were going on

Prince Eugene had continued to press steadily the siege of Lille. His arrangements and details as to the mode of carrying on the duties of the siege, were excellent, and might serve as models for every future operation of that nature. He seems to have adopted a happy medium between the Turkish mode (as explained under the account of the transactions of the year 1673) of never relieving their people until the end of a siege, and our system of so frequently changing, that it is never known which corps or brigade does its duty, and which not ; so that all feel equally void of interest in what is going on ; and are only anxious for the hour of the relief. The general officers were ordered to be constantly at the head of their brigades in the trenches. The director upon duty pointed out and superintended the work to be performed, but the general officers were answerable for its execution.

Lille was surrendered on the 23d October, having been besieged sixty-two days. Marshal Boufflers, who had already distinguished himself in the defence of Namur against King William, defended Lille. He now retired into the citadel, the siege of which was commenced by Prince Eugene a few days afterwards.

It must have been the convenience of water-carriage, by which the heavy ordnance and stores could be conveyed almost into the batteries from

Menin, that induced the selection of the front the allies attacked at the siege of Lille. The Tournai front would, under other circumstances, and if the allies had been in possession of Tournai, probably have been selected, as that front, offering a projecting angle, can be more easily enveloped and embraced by the besieger's batteries.

The Elector of Bavaria, who was still Governor-General of the Spanish Netherlands, had left the French army upon the Rhine for some time, and was established at Mons. He proposed to the French, that he should attack Brussels, whilst the allies were occupied with the siege of the citadel of Lille. He collected a few Spanish battalions, and being assisted from the French garrisons at Tournai, Mons and Condé, so as to complete his corps to 15,000 men, he marched from Mons on the 22d November, and established batteries against Brussels, between the Louvain and the Namur gates. The allies had 7000 men in garrison at Brussels.

Marlborough determined to march to the relief of Brussels. The French army, it will be remembered, occupied the right bank of the Scheldt from Tournai to Oudenarde, over which river it was necessary he should pass. So confident were the French that he could not cross the Scheldt, that the Duke de Vendôme wrote to Lewis XIV. the very day before Marlborough approached the

river, that he pledged himself it was impossible. Marlborough's arrangements for this operation, as for every other, appear to have been so clear and good, that it is an excellent lesson to enter into the detail of them.

Marlborough left his camp at Rousselaare, and crossed the Lys at Courtrai. From Courtrai he advanced in two columns. The one on the left was directed to cross at Gâvre, some miles below Oudenarde; to turn to its right, (as soon as it had effected its passage,) and to attack, instantly, whatever French corps might be met with on the heights above Oudenarde. The column of the right was to pass above Oudenarde, at Kerkhoven; to turn to its left, (as soon as it had crossed,) and to unite with the column of the left above Oudenarde. Prince Eugene, leaving a sufficient force to carry on the siege of the citadel of Lille, was to advance from Lille, and to pass the Scheldt, to the right of Marlborough, at Escanaffe. The marches of the columns were so arranged that they were all to arrive at their respective points before daylight on the 27th November. The garrison of Oudenarde were directed to march out of that fortress at the same moment, (leaving only a small force for its protection,) and to attack whatever French troops might occupy the height above them.

Marlborough's two columns were successful,

and united on the height above Oudenarde as proposed. Prince Eugene's column, meant to pass at Escanaffe, found the enemy prepared. Eugene, however, descended the left bank of the river, and crossed in the rear of Marlborough's column of the right. Thus the operation was completed, and the army assembled on the right bank of the Scheldt, above Oudenarde.

The French abandoned the banks of the Scheldt, and retreated; those below Oudenarde, to Ghent; and those above it, to their head-quarters at Saulschoi, near Tournai.

Prince Eugene, who had only co-operated in this movement to strengthen Marlborough, (in the event of the passage of the Scheldt having been vigorously opposed,) returned to press the siege of the citadel of Lille. Marlborough advanced towards Brussels by Alost.

Marlborough had, however, no occasion to conduct his army farther than Alost. The Elector of Bavaria, upon hearing of the passage of the Scheldt, retreated to Mons, leaving his battering guns behind him. Marlborough halted one day at Alost, and on the 1st December he returned towards Oudenarde. He did not, however, cross the Scheldt, but encamped in the neighbourhood of a village called Baleghem, upon the right bank of that river, from whence he advanced towards Ghent. He halted about three miles from Ghent,

with his right at Melle, and his left at Merlebeke, both upon the Scheldt, which here makes an elbow.

The citadel of Lille was taken possession of on the 9th December. Prince Eugene, leaving Prince Holstein Beck with a sufficient garrison to take care of Lille, crossed the Scheldt with the remainder of his army, on the 16th December, at Eenaeme, close to Oudenarde. It was arranged that Marlborough should superintend the siege of Ghent, which it was determined should be undertaken notwithstanding the advanced time of the year; and that Prince Eugene should command the covering army. Prince Eugene's corps marched, in consequence, from Eenaeme to Grammont, where they crossed the Dender and remained in position. The French army, after Marlborough's passage of the Scheldt, retreated behind the Scarp between St. Amant and Douai. Lewis XIV., angry at the result of the campaign, and at the conduct of his generals, ordered the Duke de Bourgogne to break up the army, and to place the troops in quarters in the different fortresses along the frontier, even before the citadel of Lille had capitulated. Prince Eugene's covering army had therefore no enemy to oppose.

Count La Mothe was still with a respectable corps behind the canal between Ghent and Bruges. The French had also garrisons in Ghent and

Bruges, as well as at the posts of Plassendaal and Leffingen, close to Ostend.

As soon as Count La Motte found that the siege of Ghent was seriously intended, he threw himself with his disposable corps into the place, thus augmenting its garrison to thirty-five battalions and nineteen squadrons.

Ghent may be considered as a large entrenched camp, covered by inundations, which it possesses great facility for forming. It had a very tolerable citadel, and was fortified on those fronts not protected by inundation. Such a place, although not a fortress, and susceptible of a protracted defence, like that of Lille, yet, with a garrison of thirty-five battalions, ought not to have been surrendered in a hurry. La Motte, however, capitulated on the 30th December, after a siege of six days. The French troops were allowed to retire with their arms to Tournai. The garrisons of Bruges, Plassendaal, and Leffingen, followed the example of Ghent.

Thus ended a campaign, which, for skill, judgment, perseverance, and spirit of enterprize, has probably never been surpassed.

The Dutch lost this year Marshal Overkerque. He died at the camp of Rousselaare. He was a most gallant and faithful soldier, a warm friend, and a great admirer of Marlborough's. Above all foolish jealousy or national prejudices, he gave

that cordial support to his great leader which ensured unanimity throughout the inferior ranks of the army, and did not a little contribute to the uninterrupted success of the operations.

1709.

The allied army assembled on the 24th June, a few miles to the southward of Lille, between the Marque and the Deule, on very nearly the same ground where Marlborough had entrenched himself to oppose the Duke de Bourgogne, during the siege of that place in the preceding year. Mons, Condé, Douai, Bethune, St. Venant, and Aire, connected together by the Haine, the Scheldt, the Scarp, the Deule, the Labiette, and the Lys, formed a barrier in front of the allies; and behind which Marshal Villars, to whom Lewis XIV. had entrusted the defence of his kingdom, collected the French army. In a central situation in the rear of this line, between Bethune and Bassée, he fortified his camp with great care.

It must be observed, however, that it was only that portion of the Scheldt between Condé and Mortagne which contributed to form this line. At Mortagne the Scarp joins the Scheldt, which, from that point, has its course to Tournai, at right angles to the line of defence taken up by Villars.

The French were in possession of Tournai. It is therefore evident, that had Marlborough broke through the line opposed to him, to the left of the Scheldt, Villars, by descending on the right of that river and crossing at Tournai, would have been in his rear, or on the left flank of his line of operations, as he thought proper.

These considerations induced Marlborough and Prince Eugene to undertake the siege of Tournai previous to any further advance.

Prince Eugene commanded the covering army. He placed his right at Pont-à-Tressin, upon the Marque, half way between Tournai and Lille; and his left, crossing the road from Tournai to Orchies, was upon the little rivulet the Lannon. He caused St. Amant upon the Scarp, and Mortagne, at the junction of the Scarp and the Scheldt, to be occupied.

The Duke of Marlborough directed in person the operations of the siege of Tournai, at the head of sixty battalions. His head-quarters were at Villemeaux, about a mile and a half from Tournai, towards Orchies. The trenches were opened on the night of the 7th July. The battering guns were brought up the Scheldt from Ghent. There were three attacks—one against that part of the enceinte between the citadel and the Scheldt, and which also partially embraced part of the citadel; a second on the other side of the river; and the

third from the Courtrai road. The town surrendered on the 28th of the same month. The approaches between the citadel and the Scheldt were then directed solely towards the citadel, against which trenches were also opened on the other side, close to the rampart of the body of the place. The siege of the citadel commenced on the 2d August, and the allies took possession of it on the 5th September. Megrigny, the French engineer who had built the citadel, was its governor. The galleries for the countermines had all been made before-hand with the greatest care; and the system was supposed to be very complete. The defence, nevertheless, was not any thing remarkable.

Whilst the operations of the siege of Tournai, and its citadel, were carrying on, Villars had done every thing in his power to strengthen his line of defence by entrenchments and inundations. Marlborough, however, after the fall of Tournai, moved rapidly by his left; and crossing the Haine above Mons, turned Villars's line, and thus rendered all his labours useless. Villars moved by his right, within his lines, towards Mons; and finding that Marlborough had already advanced beyond that place, and had crossed both the Haine and the Trouille, he halted at Malplaquet, and immediately commenced strengthening his position.

Villars was now at right angles to the line he had proposed to defend. He had not anticipated an attack in his present position; nor had any previous steps been consequently taken. If he had foreseen Marlborough's movement, he could not, however, have selected more favourable ground than that on which he was accidentally encamped. On his left was a thick wood, reaching all the way to the Haine; on his right, another wood extended nearly to Maubeuge. The opening or gap he had to occupy was not of a greater extent than he could have wished it. The ground between the woods was a ridge, sloping towards his enemy. There was also a quantity of trees scattered within the position, at hand to construct abbâtis, and to furnish palisades for the entrenchments, which, as already stated, he immediately constructed.

These woods are all cut periodically in France and in the Low Countries. It so happened, however, that, two summers after the battle of Waterloo, the trees were pretty much in the same state as in the year 1709; and a correct idea of the strength of the position could in consequence be formed.

The allies were two days in front of Villars. Their march had been rapid, and they waited for a considerable corps left at Tournai. The delay was, perhaps, unavoidable, but it was unfortunate,

as it gave the French time to perfect their entrenchments. On the morning of the 11th September, the Duke of Marlborough and Prince Eugene advanced, with one hundred and twenty-eight battalions, to the attack, and drove the enemy from their position. The left of the French retreated to Quievrain, the right to Bavay and Maubeuge.

The battle was most sanguinary ; and indeed it could not be otherwise, from the quantity of ab-bâtis, the strength of the entrenchments, and the valour with which they were defended. The Dutch infantry, which formed the left of the attack, suffered extremely. It was the dearest victory the allies had gained since the commencement of the war. It is impossible to ascertain correctly the numbers of French troops engaged ; but there is no reason to suppose they were less numerous than in the preceding year. It is known that great exertions had been made during the winter and the spring to augment the army. One hundred and ten thousand men may be stated as a very moderate computation of the amount of Villars's force.

Marlborough determined to besiege Mons. He had turned Villars's line of defence, and had defeated the French army in its rear ; but still, whilst the French held the fortresses before-mentioned, connected so closely to each other, the supplies

and stores from his rear could not be forwarded, nor further operations carried on, without a more secure line of communication. The siege of Mons was therefore decided upon.

The direction of the siege was given to the young Prince of Orange, who had already distinguished himself by his uncommon bravery and coolness, at the head of the Dutch infantry, at the battle of Malplaquet. Marlborough had his headquarters at the chateau of the Duke d'Hâvré, upon the Haine, during the siege. The allied army had their left upon the Sambre, and their right upon the Haine. The siege was commenced upon the 25th September, and Mons was surrendered on the 23d October. The allies previously had acquired possession of St. Guislain; which enabled them to draw off, very considerably, the inundations, although not completely; as the French, by being in possession of Condé, and shutting the sluices at that place, stopped the waters of the Haine, and caused them to overflow their banks to some extent up the valley as far as Mons.

The town was attacked from the hill of Bertaimont; as also upon the Hâvré front. The French army made no attempt to relieve it. Their measures, on the contrary, were of a defensive nature.

They remained between Quesnoy, Bavay, and Maubeuge; at the latter of which places Marshal Berwick, who joined the French army after its

defeat at Malplaquet, constructed an entrenched camp, the works of which remain even now in tolerable state, and exhibit an uncommon facility and judgment in taking up ground.

After the surrender of Mons, both armies retired into winter cantonments. The British to Ghent; the Danes to Bruges; the Prussians to the Meuse; Brussels, Louvain, and the towns and large villages in that neighbourhood received the remainder of the allies.

1710.

The allied army assembled earlier this year than usual. On the 20th April, Marlborough left Tournai, broke through Villars's line between Douai and Bethune, by crossing the Douai and Lille Canal at Pont-à-Vendin and at Courrieres. He placed himself in position across the chaussée leading from Douai to Arras, with his right a little in front of Courrieres, upon the Hante Deule; and his left extending to Vitry upon the Scarp. He covered his front with entrenchments. In this situation he protected the siege of Douai, which was invested on the 25th April.

Trenches were opened against Douai on the night of the 5th May. There were two attacks, one against the Ocre front, and the other that of Es-

querchim, both on the left bank of the Scarpe, upon which river Douai is situated. Forty battalions and as many squadrons, with a battering train of fifty heavy guns, were allotted to the siege. On the 29th May Douai surrendered.

Whilst the siege was carrying on, Marshal Villars assembled the French army at Cambray, from whence he marched to Arras, where he crossed the Scarpe, and advanced, on its left bank, towards Douai. He encamped opposite to Marlborough, at about three miles distant. After carefully reconnoitring the position of the allied army, it was, however, judged too strong to be attacked. Villars fell back, and encamped on the road between Arras and Cambrai, having his right at Marquion, within about five miles of Cambrai, and his left at Monchi-le-Preux, about the same distance from Arras, thus ready to move for the defence of either. In his front, from left to right, ran the parent streams of the Sanzet, a small river which, although its course is but a few miles in length, yet carries to the Scheldt, which it unites with at Bouchain, a considerable body of water.

This position of Villars's appears to have decided Marlborough and Prince Eugene not to besiege Arras, which, under other circumstances, in all probability, would have been the next step towards approaching the Somme. Marlborough moved by his right from his ground before Douai

on the 10th June, and advanced up the Scarp, towards Aubigny, upon that river, above Arras. Villars made a correspondent movement by his left, and placed his right at Arras, and his left thrown back behind one of the streams which feed the Scarp. The right of the allied army was now placed at Houdaim, upon the Labiette, a stream which runs through Bethune to the Lys; and its left at Ambigny, upon the Scarp. The Duke of Marlborough determined to besiege Bethune, which, by his late movements, was now in his rear.

The trenches were opened against Bethune on the night of the 23d July, and the garrison surrendered on the 31st August. There were two attacks, one upon the Arras front, and the second upon the castle or small citadel, from the St. Pol road. A nephew of Vauban's, at the head of nine battalions and four squadrons, commanded in Bethune, and acquired great credit by his defence.

During the siege of Bethune, Villars advanced to reconnoitre the position of the allied army. He placed his right near the source of the Scarp, and his left behind that of the C  nche. Marlborough's position was extensive, and not so strong as the one he had occupied whilst covering the siege of Douai. He expected that Villars would have attacked him. In consequence he left troops enough in the trenches to contain the garrison of Be-

thune, and reinforced his army with the remainder. The French, however, making no further demonstration, the operations of the siege were resumed.

The Cànche, which now became part of the line of defence adopted by Villars, rises not far from where the Scarp has its source. They, however, flow in different directions. The Cànche has its course to Hesdin, Montreuil, and to Etaples, at which place it runs into the British channel. The contending armies were now very near the field of Agincourt. Henry V. had to pass the Cànche and the Ternoise, one of its tributary rivers, in his way to Calais. The French moved up the Ternoise from Hesdin, on its right bank, to oppose him. He, however, crossed before they arrived to occupy the opposite ground. They then drew up between Agincourt and Traidencourt to prevent his further progress. The result is well known. In the present case the French were of course defending the opposite side of the river.

As soon as Marlborough was master of Bethune, he moved, by his right, which he placed at Therouenne, upon the Lys; and his left at Lillers, upon a small stream which runs into the Lys; thus interposing his army between the towns of Aire and St. Venant (both upon the Lys) and Marshal Villars. The Prince of Orange, with twenty battalions, was charged with the siege of St. Venant;

and the Prince of Anhalt Dessau, with forty, undertook that of Aire.

St. Venant is a small fortress, but reckoned strong from its local situation upon the Lys, at the point where that river is joined by two small streams, and which, all united, afford considerable inundations. The Prince of Orange succeeded in being able to turn the waters of the Lys and one of the rivulets. The trenches were opened on the night of the 16th September, and the garrison capitulated on the 29th of the same month.

Aire is a larger place than St. Venant; it is also considerably strengthened by inundations. There were two attacks, one to the right of the Bethune gate, and another upon that front between the Lys and the Caquette rivulet. Aire was invested on the 6th September, and surrendered on the 8th October. The garrison consisted of twenty battalions.

The capture of Aire closed the campaign. The allied army, as also that of the French, shortly afterwards went into winter-quarters.

1711.

The river Cànche was now the French line of defence from the sea-coast to nearly its source. A line of entrenchments connected the Cànche

with the Scarp. The Scarp afforded a barrier until it was similarly connected with the Sanzet. The Scheldt, receiving the Sanzet at Bouchain, became the line from Bouchain to Valenciennes. Lines were also constructed from Maubeuge upon the Sambre to Quesnoy, and prolonged from thence to the Scheldt, in the rear of Valenciennes. The bridges and roads were destroyed. Entrenchments, redoubts, inundations and abbatis were employed wherever they could be with any prospect of being useful.

It is impossible not to admire the wonderful activity of the French, and the elasticity of their spirits. Although unsuccessful in every campaign, and turned or beaten from every successive position and line of defence, yet the new one was always taken up with the same confidence and cheerfulness. In the present instance Villars announced his new lines as the *ne plus ultra* of Marlborough's career. The French army, and the French people, appear to have believed him, in spite of even the recent experience of the last campaign.

It is a common observation, that those who are elated in prosperity are most apt to be dejected in adversity. But the French are strong exceptions to this rule. No people are more elated in prosperity, and yet none bear up better against adversity. The superior talents and abilities of Marlbo-

rough triumphed over all their generals; but the French soldier appears to have fought as well in the last campaign as he did in the first.

The Duke of Marlborough assembled his army in front of Douai early in May. Villars, at the head of one hundred and fifty-six battalions and two hundred and twenty-seven squadrons, was behind the Sanzet. His head-quarters were at Oisy, opposite to Douai; his right towards Bouchain, and his left at Monchi-le-preux. The armies were close to each other. Marlborough moved by his right to Lillers, and from thence advanced towards Villars's entrenchments, between the Scarp and the Cânche, as if he meant to attack them. Villars moved by his left, within his lines, towards the threatened point. On the night of the 4th August Marlborough made a forced march by his left, and returned to the Sanzet, which he passed at Bac-au-bancheuil without the slightest molestation. Villars's *ne plus ultra* was thus very easily got the better of. As soon as Villars was made acquainted with Marlborough's march, he moved rapidly by his right towards the Sanzet. He was, however, too late; Marlborough had already passed. Villars placed his left at Marquion, upon one of the little streams which run into the Sanzet; and his left to the Scheldt, in front of Cambrai. Marlborough had his right

upon the Sanzet, and his left upon the Scheldt, and Bouchain in his rear.

Marlborough determined to make himself master of Bouchain preparatory to any further advance. He crossed the Scheldt by his left, which he pushed forward as far as Hâspre upon the Selle (a small stream which, rising near Catteau-Cambresis, runs into the Scheldt at Denain, a few miles below Bouchain); and he put his right upon the Scheldt, at the village of Ivuy. He detached General Fagel, with a considerable corps, to invest Bouchain on the left bank of the Scheldt.

Villars advanced to the ground Marlborough had thus left, and pushed on, close to Bouchain, upon the tongue of land between the Sanzet and the Scheldt. Marlborough's army being now separated by Bouchain and the Scheldt into two distinct corps, with a French army (equal in numbers to them both united) within gun-shot, the greatest precautions were requisite to prevent Villars from attacking either of them separately. Marlborough entrenched himself, and directed Fagel to do the same. Marlborough's lines from Hordaing to Ivuy, and from thence to Haspre, were 6000 toises, or about seven miles in length; those of Fagel not less than five miles. In addition to these works the army threw up a continued line from Fagel's camp to Marchiennes, upon the Scarp, (rather more than ten miles,) so as to

secure their convoys of provisions and ammunition (which they drew from thence) from being molested on their march.

In reflecting upon these stupendous works, thus executed almost at a nod, we are at a loss whether most to admire the docility and good will of the soldier, or the great and capacious mind which could conceive and direct such operations. They are equal to any thing ever done by the Romans, and only require the pen of a Cæsar to be known and duly appreciated by posterity.

Since the days of Marlborough a most excellent system of tactics has been unquestionably introduced into the British army. Changes of front are made with rapidity and precision; columns are deployed, or the line formed into columns, with an accuracy and celerity formerly never even contemplated. It appears, however, open to discussion, whether, in the great and essential points which ought to form the character of the soldier, such as cheerfulness under privations; readiness to encounter fatigue as well as danger; perseverance under toil, and courage in the field; the army of Marlborough has, or ever can be, exceeded.

Bouchain was invested, on the right bank of the Scheldt, on the 7th August; it was the 18th, however, before the investment could be so complete, on the other side of the town, as to prevent

Villars from communicating with the garrison across the inundation. This was, however, at last effected, and the garrison (about 3000 men) surrendered prisoners of war on the 14th September. The French army, amounting to 100,000 men, in position on the ground between the Scheldt and the Sanzet, and with a corps even across the Sanzet at Wavrechain, almost within musketry of Fagel's entrenchments, were unwilling witnesses to the capture.

This was the last act in the military life of the great Duke of Marlborough; a change of administration had taken place; party-spirit, the bane and curse of England, prevailed; and, to the eternal disgrace of those who advised the measure, the Duke of Marlborough was removed from the command of the army. His next campaign would, in all human probability, have been upon the Somme.

The Emperor Joseph, brother to the Archduke Charles, whom the allies were endeavouring to place upon the throne of Spain, died in the spring of this year. Charles was elected to the Imperial Crown; Prince Eugene quitted the army in the Low Countries soon after the campaign commenced, to attend to the Archduke's interests in Germany; and a considerable corps of the Imperial troops were withdrawn for the same purpose.

In returning from the army to Holland, the young Prince of Orange was unfortunately lost in

crossing the ferry over the Hollands Diep, at the Moerdÿk. He left a posthumous son, from whom the present reigning family of the Low Countries is descended.

1712.

Prince Eugene resumed the command of the Imperial army in Flanders. The Dutch government also entrusted to him the controul over their troops, which had been hitherto held by the Duke of Marlborough. The Duke of Ormond was at the head of the British and the British auxiliaries. The siege of Quesnoy was the first operation that was decided upon. The allied army crossed the Selle, and putting the rivulet the Escaillon before them, detached General Fagel, with thirty battalions and eighteen squadrons, to besiege Quesnoy. The siege commenced on the 8th June, and the garrison, consisting of 2700 men, surrendered prisoners of war on the 4th July.

Negotiations for peace had been for some time carrying on between Lewis XIV. and the new administration in England. The Duke of Ormond, with the British army, separated from the allies in consequence, on the 17th July, and marched to Ghent and Bruges. Troops were sent from England to take possession of Dunkirk, which Lewis

placed in the hands of the British government as a pledge of his sincerity.

This hasty separation of the Duke of Ormond's army from that of the allies was cruel, unpopular, and impolitic. It was cruel, in so much as many of the smaller states had been absolutely forced into the war by the influence and persuasion of England, and were now left to make the best peace they could for themselves. That it was unpopular, the circumstance of the German auxiliaries in British pay refusing to accompany the British troops (although it was clearly explained to them that they would forfeit all arrears by their disobedience) sufficiently attests. If steadiness of character is to be valued amongst nations as amongst individuals; if the old adage of honesty being the best policy is true; then was it impolitic. We were engaged in one cause with the allies; the justice and expediency of the war had been asserted over and over again by the parliament of the country; and the faith of the nation was pledged in repeated addresses to its support. It is true the nature of the war had changed since the death of the Emperor Joseph, and the election of his brother the Archduke Charles; and the same reasons which had been brought forward for not permitting the crown of Spain to be so closely connected with that of France, militated equally against its being united with that of the empire.

It is even questionable, from what we have seen in modern times, if the union of the crowns of France and Spain would have been so dangerous to this country as was then apprehended; but as this opens a wide field for discussion and conjecture, it will be as well to avoid it. It may, however, be asserted, without fear of contradiction, that in politics, as in war, the object to be attained ought to be first carefully considered, and then steadily pursued. All fluctuation of councils, all versatility in politics, are injurious to the character and welfare of a powerful country. In the present case the abandoning of our allies, and the making a separate peace with France and Spain, (in which the wretched commercial monopoly of supplying the Spanish colonies with negroes was the bonus we acquired for our breach of faith,) was long a reproach and stigma upon the English nation.

Notwithstanding the loss of the British contingent, in all about 18,000 men, Prince Eugene continued his operations. After the fall of Quesnoy he invested Landrecy.

During the siege of Bouchain, in the preceding campaign, the Duke of Marlborough had made Marchiennes his dépôt, on account of the facility it offered of water-carriage from Holland and Antwerp. Prince Eugene, from the same motives, continued to make use of Marchiennes for the

same purpose. Although in possession of Tournai, and of Bouchain on the Scheldt, yet he could not avail himself of this river and have his depôt at Bouchain, whilst the French were masters of Condé and of Valenciennes. It appears doubtful whether it was advisable for the allied army under Prince Eugene to approach the Sambre, having to communicate with their depôt across the Scheldt, the enemy being masters of the river both above and below (at Cambrai and Valenciennes); and it may be suggested that Arras, which was the only place the allies wanted, to have the uncontroled navigation of the Lys and Scarp, would have been the preferable acquisition.

As it was, however, Prince Eugene besieged Landrecy, drawing his stores from Marchiennes, a distance of nearly twenty-eight miles, not to his rear, but upon his right flank, and parallel to the enemy. His army was scattered along this extent, behind the Escaillon, until it joins the Scheldt, at Denain; and from thence covered by a line of entrenchments to Marchiennes.

Whatever may be thought of Prince Eugene's military talents, he certainly did not show them upon the present occasion; he exposed himself to the check which he subsequently experienced.

Villars made a flank movement, to his own left, by night; crossed the Scheldt at Neuville, between Bouchain and Denain; and at daylight, on

the morning of the 24th July, attacked and carried the entrenchments of Prince Eugene, between Marchiennes and Denain, close to the latter place, of which he got possession. He now had the Scheldt between him and Prince Eugene, and the depôt at Marchiennes in his rear.

Eugene made a desperate effort to cross the Scheldt, and retake Denain, but was repulsed. The allied army suffered considerably. Lord Albemarle, a Dutch officer, who commanded at Denain, was taken. They had 3000 men killed and wounded, and as many taken prisoners.

The consequences of the affair at Denain were most advantageous to France. Villars took possession of Marchiennes, where he made prisoners 5000 of the allied troops, and captured the stores and depôt of the allied army. Douai and Bouchain, left to themselves, and all communication cut off, by the French being masters of Marchiennes, were speedily retaken. Eugene was obliged to raise the siege of Landrecy, and, with the allied army, to retreat towards Mons. Quesnoy, without support, was immediately besieged and retaken by the French.

1713.

This year is remarkable for the peace of Utrecht. The negotiations which had been carrying on for

some time at Utrecht were brought to a close, and treaties of peace between France and Spain, with England and Holland, were signed in the month of February. The Emperor, not wishing to abandon his claim to the Spanish monarchy, continued the war upon the Rhine, but with very little effect, for some time longer.

The articles of these treaties, which affect the Low Countries, were as follow:—

I. The fortifications of Dunkirk to be levelled, and the harbour destroyed.

II. The Dutch to keep possession of the Spanish Netherlands for the present. They were to be held by them for the Emperor, to whom they were to be given over as soon as the terms of a treaty could be arranged, under the mediation of England, between the Emperor and the Dutch, as to the fortresses the latter were to hold in the Low Countries as a barrier or security against France. The French and Spanish garrisons to be forthwith withdrawn from such places as they still occupied in the Spanish Netherlands—Namur, Charleroi and their dependencies.

III. Lille, Orchies, Aire, Bethune and St. Venant, to be restored to the French. Menin, Tournai, Furnes, Fort Knock, Dixmude, Ypres, with Warneton, Commines and Werwick, to be considered as part of the Spanish Netherlands, and to be held by the Dutch, for the present, under

the same stipulations as those places mentioned in No. 2.

1714.

Preliminaries of peace were signed by Prince Eugene and Marshal Villars, plenipotentiaries, on the part of the Emperor and of Lewis XIV. at Radstadt.

1715.

The definitive treaty of peace was signed at Baden between the Emperor, the Empire, and the French. The French restored Old Brisach, Fribourg, Fort Kehl opposite to Strasbourg, and all posts on the right bank of the Rhine, to the Emperor or the Empire. Landau was kept by Lewis. The French gave back every thing they had taken from the Elector of Treves and the Elector Palatine. The Emperor, on the other hand, restored their dignities and possessions to the Electors of Bavaria and Cologne. The Emperor to take possession of the Spanish Netherlands, and of the additional territory added to them by France, as arranged in the treaty of Utrecht between Lewis XIV. and the Dutch.

The barrier-treaty was also negotiated and signed this year at Antwerp, between the Empe-

ror and the Dutch, under the mediation and guarantee of England.

By this treaty an army of 15,000 men was to be the peace establishment in the Netherlands; of which numbers the Emperor was to furnish three-fifths, and the Dutch the remaining two-fifths.

II. The Dutch troops were to garrison exclusively Namur, Tournai, Menin, Furnes, Warneton, Ypres, and Fort Knock; and the Dutch government to appoint the military governors of these places. Dendermonde to be garrisoned by the Imperialists and Dutch conjointly. The fortifications of the places held by the Dutch to be kept in repair by them. 1,250,000 florins of Dutch money, equal to about £114,000 sterling, to be paid yearly to Holland out of the revenues of the Spanish, now the Austrian, Netherlands, to cover the expenses of the troops, and keeping up the fortresses.

III. England guaranteed the above articles, and pledged herself to send 10,000 men to assist in the defence of the barrier-towns if attacked.

Thus, after a war of ten years, the Spanish Netherlands were wrested from France and Spain, and transferred to the Austrian government; and certainly, in so much as they had removed these fine provinces from the immediate influence of France, the allies had been successful in one of the great objects of the war. But the barrier-treaty carried

within itself the germs of its own destruction. It was not to be expected that the yearly allowance for the repair of the fortresses, and the maintenance of the garrisons, would be regularly paid to the Dutch. The Austrian government was not likely long to permit foreign troops to occupy five or six of their frontier fortresses. The barrier-treaty was founded upon the supposition that a good understanding was always to continue between the Imperial and the Dutch governments—a supposition which every page in the history of the world might have shown to be most erroneous. The fortresses permitted to be occupied were, moreover, insulated from the country most interested in supporting them; unconnected with each other; and, with the exception of Namur, not one of them calculated to prevent the invasion of Holland by the Meuse, and to hinder the French from penetrating between that river and the Rhine, according to the plan adopted by Lewis XIV. in 1672.

It is impossible not here to lament the change of councils, and the indecent haste with which the new ministry of England withdrew the British army, and recalled the Duke of Marlborough. Had they persevered another year, the check at Denain would, in all human probability, not only never have taken place, but the ensuing campaign would have been on the banks of the

Somme. There would have been no difficulty, under such circumstances, in procuring any barrier that might have been thought necessary; the Spanish Netherlands might have been united, in toto, to Holland, as has been done in modern times; and the Dutch, in possession of the revenues, the resources and the government of the country, instead of a few insulated fortresses, would not only have had an efficient barrier against France, as far as they themselves were concerned, but have been of no small advantage to the general welfare and the tranquillity of Europe, by opposing an armed frontier to the encroachments of France. In our time we have seen the Dutch compelled to withdraw their troops; the fortresses themselves levelled by the Imperial government; and the Netherlands, in consequence, overran by the French like a torrent. Had the country belonged to the Dutch, or had they been in possession of a real and efficient barrier of their own, this could not have taken place. May we not then affirm, that great part of the evils which Europe has suffered from the French revolution, is to be attributed to the conduct of the English ministry of 1712, and to the negligence and haste with which they negotiated the peace of Utrecht?

Lewis XIV. died on the 1st of September of this year. His character has been very differently

portrayed by historians. He is represented by some writers as an Augustus or a Trajan: by others he has been compared to Nero and Domitian. If we judge of him by his actions he must be esteemed a great man. The unbounded influence and authority he acquired and maintained in France, show that he was perfectly master of the art of commanding. He was the founder of the military order of St. Louis; and the noble establishment of the Invalids, near Paris, for the reception of old soldiers, was created by him. These measures secured to him the attachment of the army. The great stains upon his character are the cruel expulsion of the Protestants from France, and the destruction of the German provinces on both sides of the Rhine in 1689. His mistaken zeal for his religion may be advanced in defence of the first. In extenuation of the second, the weakness and wickedness of human nature, in possession of uncontrouled authority, is all that can be offered.

1716.

The Dutch, in compliance with the terms of the barrier-treaty, put the Emperor in possession of the Spanish Netherlands.

The Emperor Charles VI., whom the allies endeavoured to place, whilst Archduke Charles, on the Spanish throne; and for whom, at the peace of Utrecht, the Netherlands were divided, upon the same policy, from the Spanish monarchy, and transferred to the House of Austria, died in the year 1740, having swayed the Imperial sceptre twenty-nine years. He had no son. The great object of his ambition, the secret motive which influenced his conduct, during the whole of his reign, was the desire to secure the succession of the hereditary dominions of the House of Austria to his daughter, the Archduchess Maria Theresa. He had, soon after the peace of Utrecht, procured the sanction of the States composing the German confederacy, to this arrangement; and, in the year 1722, he was further gratified, by the Hungarian diet, held at Presbourg, also confirming this order of succession to the crown of that kingdom. Most of the powers of Europe agreed to guarantee the succession of the Austrian dominions to Maria Theresa. In order to procure that of France, the Duke of Lorraine, to whom Maria Theresa was married, gave up to Louis XV., under the influence of the Emperor, the province of Lorraine, in 1738, and accepted in lieu, according to an arrangement between the Emperor and the King of France, the grand duchy of Tuscany. The Emperor Charles, however, (as an author of

that day has justly observed,) notwithstanding his anxiety to obtain every possible guarantee to his favourite project, omitted to procure the two best, an efficient army, and a well-filled treasury.

No sooner was the Emperor dead, than Spain, France, Prussia, and Bavaria, (forgetting all their treaties and guarantees,) leagued to divide the Austrian dominions. The Elector of Bavaria, being subsequently elected to the Imperial throne, threw, moreover, the additional weight he acquired, as head of the Empire, into the scale. There appeared very little probability of the Archduke of Tuscany and Maria Theresa being able to resist such powerful adversaries.

That part of the Austrian possessions most coveted by the French was the Austrian Netherlands. England and Holland armed for their protection. Thus, after an interval of thirty-one years, the Low Countries became once more the seat of war.

1744.

Lewis XV. assembled his army for the invasion of the Austrian Netherlands at Lille, early in May, and which consisted of one hundred and twenty thousand men, with a full proportion of artillery. Marshal Saxe commanded it, under

the king, who was present in person. The first operation was the siege of Menin. Menin is only thirteen miles from Lille; and the waters of the Deule and of the Lys offered every facility for the conveyance of the battering-guns. Menin was invested on the night of the 18th May. The trenches were opened on the night of the 28th of the same month; and on the 7th June the garrison capitulated.

The French conducted their attack against the Ypres front. They also enveloped the outwork, on the right of the Lys, looking towards Halluin, with another approach. The garrison consisted of only twelve companies of Dutch infantry, and four troops of dragoons.

After the fall of Menin, Marshal Saxe determined to besiege Ypres. Ypres is fourteen miles from Menin. It was invested on the 6th June. The trenches were however not opened before the 15th, as the battering train and other requisites for the siege were to be conveyed by land from Menin.

Ypres is a very considerable city, surrounded by a good scarp; a deep and broad wet ditch; a variety of modern outworks beyond the body of the place on those fronts which are liable to attack; and protected by inundations on the remaining fronts. From this short description, it would appear, that with a sufficient garrison a good de-

fence might have been expected. There were however only one Dutch and three Swiss battalions in Dutch pay ; and four troops of cavalry in the place.

The French carried on their approaches on each side of the canal between Ypres and Dixmude. They got possession of the outwork covering the basin of the canal. There was no breach in the body of the place. The weakness of the garrison, however, determined the governor, the Prince of Hesse-Philipstal, to accept of the terms offered to him ; and on the 29th June he marched out of Ypres with the honours of war.

A brigade of the French army broke ground against Fort Knock on the 28th June, and it was taken possession of the next day. There was only a detachment of seventy-five men in garrison at this post. Fort Knock, it will be remembered, was built by the French at the point where Yser meets the Yperlee, or the canal between Ypres and Dixmude, and commands the water-communication from Ypres to Nieuport, as also from Ypres to Furnes. Fort Knock was so surrounded by water, and had such facilities for making inundations, that, had there been a sufficient garrison, an officer in command disposed to do his duty, might have given the French a good deal of trouble. As it was, however, the fort was surrendered in twenty-four hours.

At the same time that Marshal Saxe sent a brigade to take possession of Fort Knock, he detached a more considerable corps to besiege Furnes.

Looking forward, as Lewis XV. did, to the sieges of Nieuport and of Ostend, the possession of Furnes was of importance to his future operations, on account of its being situated at the point where the canals from Dunkirk and Bergues to Nieuport are met by the one from Ypres. Furnes, in this point of view, might be looked upon as an advanced guard to Nieuport and Ostend; neither of which places could be besieged, until Furnes was in the power of the French. The fortifications were nearly a regular octagon, with the usual outworks, and a good wet ditch. They had been constructed by Vauban, by order of Lewis XIV. during the period he had held Furnes; which place, it will be remembered, he gave up to the allies at the peace of Utrecht. The Dutch, however, appear to have been guilty of the same error at Furnes as at Menin, Ypres, and Fort Knock; that of allotting too small a garrison for its defence. The best of the Austrian troops were employed in Germany, and Maria Theresa could ill afford an additional army for the defence of the Netherlands. The barrier-towns were however, according to the barrier-treaty, to be exclusively under the charge of the Dutch government, as far as

regarded their military arrangements. The war had been, for some time, carrying on between the Austrians and their enemies, and although it was only this year that it reached the Low Countries, yet it would have been but prudent in the Dutch government, to have been better prepared to meet an event which in all probability was fast approaching.

There were two attacks against Furnes. One was conducted against that front between the Ypres and Bergues canals. The other had its left on the Nieuport canal. The trenches were opened at both attacks, on the night of the 7th July, and the garrison capitulated in three days. There were only three Dutch battalions in the place.

Whilst the French had been employed at these sieges, an allied army amounting to about seventy thousand men, and composed of British, Hanoverians, Austrians, and Dutch, had been assembled at Brussels; from whence they had crossed the Dender and marched to Oudenarde, in the neighbourhood of which place they remained behind the Scheldt, and covering Ghent, Antwerp, and Brussels. This army was, however, unfortunately without any one chief in possession of either authority or influence to direct their movements. The British and Hanoverians were commanded by General Wade. The Duke d'Ahremberg was

at the head of the Austrian troops. The Dutch were under the orders of Count Nassau.

The Austrians having been successful upon the Upper Rhine, which river they had crossed, threatening even to invade the newly-acquired province of Lorraine; Lewis XV. left the Low Countries after the capture of Furnes, and marched with a considerable corps of the best of his troops, for the defence of that part of his kingdom. The want of a directing power prevented, however, the allied army from profiting of this reduction of the French force in the Low Countries. Marshal Saxe remained behind the Lys, between Menin and Courtrai. The allied army advanced from Oudenarde in the country between the Lys and the Scheldt, as far as Lille, in the hope that Marshal Saxe would be induced to quit his position behind the Lys, for the protection of French Flanders. The French army, remaining, however, behind the Lys, that of the allies returned to its former ground near Oudenarde; from whence it soon afterwards went into winter-quarters.

1745.

The Emperor Charles VII. (the Elector of Bavaria) died in the month of January this year. His death enabled the Austrian government to

allot a greater proportion of their army to the defence of the Low Countries; as the young elector, very soon after the decease of his father, concluded a peace with Maria Theresa. The Grand Duke of Tuscany, the husband of Maria Theresa, being elected to the Imperial throne, gave moreover great additional weight, influence, and authority, to her cause.

Lewis XV. who had opposed the election of the grand duke, now Francis the First, to the Imperial crown, by every means in his power, made great exertions to wrest the Netherlands from the House of Austria, in this campaign. The French army was ordered to assemble in the neighbourhood of Lille, as in the preceding year. Marshal Saxe, to whom it was entrusted, invested Tournai on the 26th April. The trenches were opened on the night of the 30th of the same month. Lewis XV. accompanied by his son the dauphin, father to the unfortunate Lewis XVI., hastened to Paris to be present at the siege, and joined the army on the 8th of May.

The French corps appointed to cover the siege was placed about three miles higher up the Scheldt than Tournai: with its left at Ramecroix, upon the chaussée between Tournai and Leuze; its centre at Fontenoy; and its right thrown back at right angles to the left, at Antoin upon the Scheldt. The villages of Antoin and Fontenoy

were secured by entrenchments. Three redoubts were constructed between Antoin and Fontenoy, and two others, to the left of Fontenoy, in the direction of Ramecroix.

The command of the allied army had been given this year to H. R. H. the Duke of Cumberland, second son of George II., and uncle to his late Majesty. His Royal Highness advanced from Anderlecht, near Brussels, where he had assembled his army, to the relief of Tournai, and on the 11th May, at day-light, attacked the French. Lewis XV., receiving intelligence of his approach, left only twenty thousand men before Tournai; and, having reinforced the covering army with the remainder, awaited the approach of the allies in the position as described.

His Royal Highness caused the principal attack to be made upon the French left. The village of Fontenoy was carried; the redoubts to the left of the village were taken possession of; and the French giving way, and the allies pushing on, the battle appeared to be on the eve of being won.

It would, however, seem, that there was a radical error in the plan of the attack, and which caused in the end the failure of the operation.

The French right was at right angles to their left, and the village of Antoin, the point on which their right rested, may be considered to have been the citadel of their position. It is therefore evi-

dent that any success against their left could only be partial, and that the discomfited regiments had their retreat open upon their right, where they would meet with reinforcements and support. It is also clear that, excepting the French behaved very ill, which there was no right to calculate upon, an allied corps advancing from the French left would be entangled in a sort of cul-de-sac, and be exposed to a cross-fire, as long as the French right held Antoin and the redoubts between that village and Fontenoy;—all this would have been obviated by making the main attack between Fontenoy and Antoin. The French right and left would have been separated, and the allies would have been on the flank of each, from the unusual mode in which they were originally placed in position at right angles to each other. It is true the Duke of Cumberland directed an attack to be made upon the village of Antoin, by the Dutch infantry, which failed, and was not afterwards repeated. But this attack, it would appear, ought to have been the principal one, and to have been made under the superintendence and direction of the commander-in-chief, as the operation on which the event of the day depended.

The allied troops, who penetrated the French left, advanced, in a solid column, nearly to the road which runs from the chaussée, between Tournai and Leuze, to the village of Antoin. Ex-

posed to a fire in front and upon both flanks, and, not being supported, they at length fell back. The allies lost in killed and wounded nearly twelve thousand men. The principal loss fell upon the British, as it was chiefly the British battalions which happened to be opposed to the French left, and penetrated their line in the manner as described.

The Duke of Cumberland retreated to Ath, and remained for some time in position at Lessines, upon the Dender, a few miles lower down that river than Ath. At Lessines he was not more than twenty-five miles from Tournai, and was near enough to watch the French army, and to be able to throw reinforcements into whatever place they might deem it eligible to besiege, after the capture of Tournai.

After the battle of Fontenoy, the French pressed the siege of Tournai with renewed vigour. They attacked the two contiguous horn-works, upon the Courtrai and Lille roads. They got possession of the one upon the Courtrai road, and, from its terrepleine, breached the enceinte of the body of the place. The governor capitulated on the 23d, and the French took possession of Tournai on the 24th May.

The citadel of Tournai was next attacked. The trenches against it were opened on the last day of May. The approaches were conducted from

the neighbouring hornwork, as in the year 1709, when the Duke of Marlborough besieged the citadel of Tournai. The face of the bastion, looking into the ditch of the town, was breached, in consequence of which the governor capitulated on the 20th June. The defence, both of Tournai and of the citadel, were very respectable. The garrison consisted entirely of Dutch troops. They lost four thousand men out of nine thousand they had at the beginning of the siege.

The French army advanced to Leuze on the 1st July, in consequence of which the allied army retreated lower down the Dender, and, crossing that river at Grammont, put themselves in position behind it, to dispute the passage. The object, however, of Marshal Saxe, was to surprise Ghent, which was the depôt of the allied army; and his movement upon Leuze, by which he threatened the Duke of Cumberland upon the Dender, at the same time that he did not withdraw too far from the Scheldt, was to facilitate the operation. There was a garrison in the citadel of Ghent; and, as the allies had, moreover, possession of Oudenarde, (which was a respectable fortress, about sixteen miles in advance of Ghent, upon the Scheldt,) there was no apprehension of any attempt to take Ghent by a coup-de-main; although, from its extent, and the several openings in its encinte to admit the Scheldt, the Lys, and

the canals for Bruges and Sas-de-Gand, it was peculiarly liable to such an undertaking.

The French marched from Leuze, by Rebay and Wannebeck, on the left bank of the Dender, from whence, crossing over to the Scheldt, they put themselves behind the Swaline, a small stream running into the Scheldt, about four miles lower down than Oudenarde. By this movement they appeared to have the siege of Oudenarde in contemplation. The same day that Marshal Saxe moved from Leuze, he detached Count Lowendahl by the left bank of the Scheldt towards Ghent. His own movements, between the Scheldt and the Dender, had been to cover the march of Lowendahl from the Duke of Cumberland, who, with the allied army, was, as has been already stated, behind the Dender, at Grammont. In order still further to conceal the attempt upon Ghent, Marshal Saxe detached, from his camp upon the Swaline, a corps of two brigades of infantry, with three regiments of cavalry, twenty pieces of artillery, and twenty pontoons, with instructions to advance to Melle, within a couple of miles of Ghent, upon the chaussée from thence to Alost, and close to the Scheldt, to throw a bridge over the Scheldt at that place, and to remain à cheval upon the river; thus cutting off all communication between Ghent and the Duke of Cumberland's army.

Although the movements of Marshal Saxe, and

his encampment upon the Swaline, appeared calculated for the siege of Oudenarde, yet it seemed advisable to the Duke of Cumberland, that the garrison of Ghent should be reinforced in consequence of the near neighbourhood of the enemy. His Royal Highness sent a corps, amounting to 4000 men, from Grammont, on the 8th July, to Ninove, lower down the Dender, from whence they were to march, on the ensuing morning, to Ghent. It happened that the troops detached by Marshal Saxe to Melle, had marched that very day. It was about six in the afternoon when the British detachment arrived at Melle, on their way to Ghent. The French corps had but just come to their ground, and had parked their guns. Their cavalry, however, fortunately for them, had not unsaddled, nor their infantry piled their arms. The surprise appears to have been mutual; and the same degree of negligence to attach to both parties. The British advanced guard and the head of the column pushed through, and got into Ghent. The remainder moved to their left, amongst the inclosures, to avoid the enemy's cavalry. Night put an end to the confusion. The allied detachment, which was principally British, had six hundred men killed and wounded, and lost fourteen hundred more in prisoners, besides baggage, ammunition, and some guns.

Count Lowendahl came before that part of the

walls of Ghent, on the night of the 10th of July, between the Lys and the Scheldt, and formed his columns on the very ground on which the British constructed two redoubts in the year 1815; and which spot has since been very happily chosen as the site for the new citadel. He entered, without much difficulty, by the beds of both rivers. It may not be irrelevant to remark, that the opening by which a river either enters or leaves a fortress is, generally, the point to be selected for a coup-de-main. The garrison retired to the citadel, against which trenches were opened on the night of the 12th July; and, on the 15th, they surrendered prisoners of war.

The Duke of Cumberland left the banks of the Dender after the capture of Ghent. He retreated to Brussels, and placed the allied army behind the canal, between Brussels and Vilvorde.

The siege of Oudenarde was now determined upon. Count Lowendahl was charged with this operation; the French army remaining upon the Swaline to prevent any interruption. The trenches were opened on the night of the 17th July. On the night of the 19th the French were able to place thirty-six guns and eight mortars in battery—a very extraordinary instance of activity, and which bespeaks great method and considerable previous arrangement. The garrison capitulated on the 21st July: it consisted of one thou-

sand men in all; but was composed of detachments from the different allied nations, under an Austrian governor, which arrangement does not seem to have been calculated to ensure the best defence the place was capable of. The approaches were conducted from the same height to the right of the Scheldt, above Oudenarde, on which the British placed a field-work in 1815, and which is now occupied in a permanent manner.

After the surrender of Oudenarde, the French army marched to Alost, and encamped with its right at Haeltert, and its left at Hosstaede, behind the Dender. Count Lowendahl was detached, with twenty-three battalions, and a regiment of dragoons, to besiege Ostend. The Duke d'Harcourt was subsequently charged with that of Dendermond; to facilitate which, the French army crossed the Dender, and placed its right between Alost and Weise; its centre at Lebbeq, and its left at Basserode; and a corps of cavalry was passed over to the left bank of the Scheldt.

The principal defence of Dendermond consisted in its inundations, which its situation, at the junction of the Dender and the Scheldt, affords the facility of being able to make, to a very considerable extent. It can only be approached by a narrow isthmus, which was occupied by a redoubt. The strength of the garrison not ad-

mitting of this redoubt being held, the French took immediate possession of it, and established a battery of six guns and four mortars. The garrison, consisting of one Austrian and one Dutch battalion, surrendered the day after the firing commenced. The Duke of Cumberland attempted to reinforce the garrison by sending some troops by the Scheldt from Antwerp; but the French took three or four of the craft thus employed, and drove back the remainder.

The siege of Ostend, in the mean while, was carried on in the rear of the French army. Count Lowendahl opened the trenches on the night of 13th August against the Nieuport front, which is the only approach to Ostend which cannot be inundated. A small fort, called Fort Philip, constructed for the protection of the sluice, and mouth of the canal, from Bruges to Ostend, at Plassandael, was surrendered to the enemy without any resistance; and the governor of Ostend withdrew his detachment from an advanced work upon the sand hills towards Nieuport, called Fort Albert, occupying the spot on which Fort Wellington has since been constructed. Fort Albert was in a neglected state, and the garrison were liable to have been cut off by an assault; but this was not the case with the work at Passandael, which ought to have been defended.

In furtherance of their regular approaches, by

the Nieuport front, the French constructed batteries on the east side of the harbour, from whence they kept up a constant fire upon the town, and upon the reverse of the front they attacked. On the 24th August the governor capitulated, although the French had only reached the salient angles of the covertway. The garrison consisted of five British battalions; one Dutch, two companies of Austrian infantry, and two hundred and fifty gunners.

As soon as the French had possession of Ostend, they detached a small corps to invest Nieuport, against which place they broke ground on the 31st August. Nieuport is situated upon an island (formed by the separation of the Ypres into two branches) at about two miles from the sea. These two streams reunite below the town. By stopping the course of the Ypres, its waters can be spread almost all round Nieuport; and the inundations thrown even up the valley of the Yper to a very considerable extent. That front of Nieuport, however, which looks towards the sea, cannot be protected by inundations, on account of the superior level of a strip of sandy soil, about eight hundred yards wide. A small space on the left bank of the Yper, below Nieuport, is also above the level of the inundation. To prevent an enemy from approaching Nieuport by the last, a small fort called Fort Viervoet had been constructed, which completely occupied the ground. A line

of lunettes, with good wet ditches, and connected together by a covertway, was to be overcome in attacking by the first; and in the rear of this line, was the left branch of the Yper, not fordable. Behind the Yper were the outworks of the body of the place, consisting of a detached roomy bastion, having a large lunette on each flank. These works, insulated by deep and broad wet ditches were, consequently, not to be carried by assault; and, moreover, were seen into and commanded by the enceinte of the town, which consisted of an old wall, of a respectable height, flanked by towers. It would appear from this description that Nieuport ought to have been better defended. The French placed eighteen guns and twenty-two mortars in battery upon the strip of ground which could not be inundated between Nieuport and the sea; and, having also opened a fire against Fort Viervoet, the garrison surrendered on the fifth day. Nieuport was taken possession of on the 6th September.

As soon as Nieuport was occupied by a French garrison, Marshal Saxe withdrew behind the Dender, and put his left at Ninove, and his right at Alost, to cover the siege of Ath. Ath was invested on the 26th September.

The Duke of Cumberland advanced as far as Halle, from his ground between Vilvorde and Brussels, to endeavour to disturb the siege of

Ath. Marshal Saxe, however, moving up the Dender, by his right, the allied army did not advance beyond Halle.

Ath was attacked upon that front between the Dender and the Cambron. Strong enfilading batteries were also established on the left of the Dender, close to the Tournai chaussée. The trenches were opened on the night of the 26th September, and the place taken possession of on the 11th of October. The garrison consisted of twelve hundred men, and was composed of detachments of Austrian, English, and Dutch troops.

After the surrender of Ath, the French army went into winter cantonments, having their headquarters at Ghent. The allied army did the same, having their headquarters at Antwerp, and occupying Brussels, Vilvorde, and Malines. They had also garrisons in the fortresses of Mons, Charleroi, and Namur. The Duke of Cumberland returned to England, leaving the command, for the winter, with the Prince of Waldeck.

The result of the campaign of the year 1745 was, unquestionably, very unfavourable to the allies. The loss of the battle of Fontenoy did not, however, tarnish their arms; nor were the consequences so detrimental as might have been expected. The attempt was manly and soldierlike. We may regret the failure, but the enterprise itself must always command respect. The negli-

gence of the corps meant to have defended Ghent, seems to have deranged the plans of the Duke of Cumberland more than the failure of the attack at Fontenoy ; and the reverses of the campaign may, with apparent justice, be attributed to the consequences of that most unmilitary rencontre at Melle. It would, perhaps, have been more prudent in the Duke of Cumberland (considering that the French upon the Swaline were nearer, considerably, to Ghent than he was at Grammont) to have kept the Dender, in the first instance, and, subsequently, the Scheldt, between the detachment he sent to Ghent and the enemy ; and which might easily have been done, if, instead of passing the Dender at Ninove, they had continued to descend by the right bank of that river, crossed the Scheldt at Dendermond, and entered Ghent on the left bank of the Scheldt. In all probability they would have met with no interruption on this line of communication.

1746.

The loss of the line of the Dender, of which the French had complete possession, being masters of Dendermond and of Ath, the fortresses at each extremity, was very disadvantageous to the allies, in so much as Brussels became liable to be sud-

denly attacked from the Dender, there being not only no intermediate fortress, but even no walled town of which a post could be made. Marshal Saxe availed himself of these circumstances, and having drawn suddenly, with the utmost secrecy and expedition, troops from Ghent, Oudenarde, Ath, Tournai, and Maubeuge, and so combined the movements of the different corps as to bring them all before Brussels on the 28th January—he unexpectedly invested the town on that day.

The garrison of Brussels consisted of eighteen battalions, partly Dutch and partly Swiss in the Dutch service, and also of eight squadrons of cavalry, making a total of about twelve thousand men. Notwithstanding the severity of the season the French broke ground, and carried on their approaches from the left of the Louvain gate, going out of Brussels. The garrison surrendered on the thirteenth day of the attack, and were made prisoners of war.

The rebellion which had taken place in Scotland, where the unfortunate grandson of James II. was endeavouring to recover the throne of his ancestors, induced the British government, not only to withdraw the British regiments from the Low Countries, but to call upon the Dutch for a corps of six thousand troops, as also to transport a brigade of Hessians to England. These steps, added to the loss of the eighteen battalions thus

unfortunately taken prisoners at Brussels, very much crippled the allied army. The French made considerable efforts to collect such a force as to be enabled to profit to the utmost of the favourable prospect before them.

Lewis XV. arrived at Brussels on the 4th May. His army consisted of one hundred and twenty thousand men, and was cantoned with its right at Tervere, and its left at Vilvorde, under the orders of Marshal Saxe. Another French corps, composed of twenty-four battalions and thirty-seven squadrons, was collected at Maubeuge, with a view to the attack of the three remaining fortresses, on the frontiers of the Austrian Netherlands, Mons, Charleroi, and Namur.

The allied army, under the command of the Austrian general Bathiani, amounted to only forty-four thousand men. They took up their ground behind the Dyle, with their right at Malines, and their left at Louvain. They abandoned this position on the 9th May, on the advance of the French, and retreated behind the Demer, with their right at Ærschot and their left at Diest. This was a more concentrated and infinitely better position than the first, keeping in view the small army of the allies. The French army, however, taking possession of Malines, and pushing a strong corps to Tirlemont, thus threatening to turn Bathiani on both flanks,

he abandoned the line of the Demer, and put himself behind the Nethe, and which he subsequently withdrew from as the French advanced, and were enabled to turn his right by crossing the Nethe, lower down, beyond Malines. Marshal Saxe passing the Nethe in force, and at several points, the allied army was compelled to retreat for fear of being surrounded by the superior numbers of the enemy. Bathiani left a garrison in the citadel of Antwerp, and fell back to Breda with an advanced corps at Hoogstraaten.

The retreat of the allied army is highly creditable to the Austrian general, Bathiani. He did not lose a man; and he compelled, by his judicious movements, a very superior French army to be rather more than a fortnight in marching from Brussels to Antwerp.

Marshal Saxe took immediate possession of Antwerp; he caused the citadel to be forthwith besieged. It was surrendered on the seventh day after the trenches had been opened, before the enemy had even constructed their breaching batteries. The French took possession of the citadel of Antwerp on the 1st June.

The retreat of the allies towards Holland was not only necessary on account of the superiority of the enemy, but was connected with the junction of considerable reinforcements they expected, of Austrian and of Hanoverian troops, advancing

from Germany ; and who were to pass the Meuse at Grâve. Marshal Saxe determined to remain himself in front of the allied army ; and to detach, to his rear, to besiege Mons. On the 28th May and on the 2d June the French troops destined for this operation, left the army, which remained in the neighbourhood of Antwerp, between the Scheyne and the Nethe. Mons was invested on the 7th June. It was, however, not before the 24th that the French broke ground, in consequence of some delay in forwarding the battering train, which was drawn from Condé and Valenciennes. Mons was surrendered on the 11th July, after a siege of sixteen days. There was nothing remarkable in the operation. The approaches were carried on from the hill of Bertaimont, and from the opposite side of Nimy ; instead of from the hill of Bertaimont and the neighbouring height of Palisel, on the right bank of the Trouille, as when besieged by the allies after the battle of Malplaquet, in 1709. The French lost no time in investing Charleroi after the surrender of Mons. As the distance is only twenty-five miles, the battering guns were soon moved, and the trenches were opened against Charleroi on the night of the 28th July. There were three attacks ; one from the high ground to the southward, but which is now included within the new fortress ; a second

from the Namur side ; and the third was directed against the low town on the right bank of the Sambre. The place was taken on the morning of the sixth day of the siege, before a single outwork was even touched ; something in a similar manner to the way the French got possession of Valenciennes in 1677. A small detachment of the troops on duty in the trenches, at day-light on the morning of the 2d August, pursued part of the garrison from the covertway into a small horn-work, connecting the fortress with the lower town, the drawbridge not having been raised in the confusion. The noise and alarm of this unexpected event drew off the attention of that part of the garrison opposed to the south attack ; and they abandoned the front they were to defend, conceiving themselves assailed in the rear. The French troops availed themselves, without waiting for any orders, of these circumstances, and got possession of the ramparts of the place.

The allied army having been joined (between Brey and Hasselt) by its reinforcements of Hanoverian, Dutch, Hessian, and Austrian troops, now amounted to eighty-seven thousand men. It was commanded by Prince Charles of Lorraine. Marshal Saxe recalled the greater part of the corps, which had been detached to carry on the sieges of Mons and Charleroi, and placed his army behind

the Dyle, to the right and left of Louvain, which he occupied as the centre of his line, and with an advanced corps at Tirlemont.

Prince Charles of Lorraine advanced up the valley of the Meuse, and encamped upon the Jaare near Hannut, upon the 30th September. The object of his movement was to relieve Charleroi. Marshal Saxe hastened from the Dyle, and placed himself with his right upon the Orneau, (a rivulet which, rising not far from Gembloux, runs into the Sambre, between Namur and Charleroi,) and his left upon one of the small streams which form the Dyle. He was thus upon the flank of the allied army, if they advanced to Charleroi. Charleroi having been captured, as already explained, on the 2d August, the allied army took up a position to cover Namur, with their right at the source of the Meuse, and their left at Mazy upon the Orneau. The hostile armies were thus as close to each other as they well could be without coming into contact.

The position now occupied by the allied army was the same as was selected by King William to cover the siege of Namur during that operation in 1695.

Marshal Saxe quitted his ground on the 15th August; and moving by his left, on the left bank of the Meuse, endeavoured to pass that river to attack the allied army. Prince Charles of

Lorraine, marching by his right upon the right bank of the river, prevented the passage. The French, however, pushing on a corps rapidly, on the night of the 20th August, took possession of Huy, situated where the Mehaigne joins the Meuse. This gave them a point of contact with the Meuse, by which river the allied army drew, from Holland and Liege, the greater part of its supplies. The fortifications of Huy had never been repaired since the year 1718, when the Dutch destroyed them, previous to withdrawing their troops and restoring the place to the Prince Bishop of Liege, agreeable to a convention to that effect, founded upon the barrier-treaty; but it appears to have been an oversight on the part of Prince Charles of Lorraine not to have occupied Huy, or at least to have prevented the French from so doing, as his intercourse with his rear was thus cut off.

The allied army was obliged to cross the Meuse in consequence. This they effected on the night of the 29th August, in three columns; one passing at Namur, and two others at the villages of Andenne and Seille, between Namur and Huy.

As soon as the allied army had crossed the Meuse, Marshal Saxe caused Namur to be invested. An additional corps of French troops descended the Meuse from Charlemont, to assist in this operation. Marshal Saxe now counter-marched his army, and advancing from the Me-

haigne, with his rear to Namur, put himself in position to cover the siege, with his right upon the chaussée between Brussels and Liège, and his left at Tongres; thus fronting towards Liège, which was the point to which it appeared that Prince Charles of Lorraine was conducting the allied army to recross the Meuse. The allied army moved, however, lower down the Meuse, and took up its ground on the right bank, with its right at Maestricht, and its left at Visé. In this situation Sir John Ligonier, with nine British battalions, joined the allies, as also a division of the Bavarian army. On the 13th September Prince Charles of Lorraine crossed the Meuse a little lower down than Maestricht, and advancing up the left bank towards the French army, put his right at Glans upon the Jaare, and his left at Groot Spauwen. Marshal Saxe placed his left at Tongres, and his right at Bilsen.

The allied army moved by their left, crossed the Jaare, and put their left at Ans, close to Liège, and their right at Houtain, some little distance from the right bank of the Jaare.

Whilst these different movements of the armies were in progress, the siege of Namur had been carried on by the French with great activity. Namur was surrendered on the 19th September, and Marshal Saxe's army was immediately reinforced by nineteen battalions and as many squa-

drons from the besieging corps. The citadel of Namur capitulated on the last day of September, after a siege of six days.

Marshal Saxe, having the whole of his army assembled since the termination of the operations against Namur, determined to attack the allies in their present position.

The right of the allied army was, as has been already stated, at the village of Houtain. This was occupied by the Austrians and Bavarians, who extended to Lier, which was held by the Hanoverian infantry. The English and Hessians had possession of the villages of Worouw and of Rocour. The Dutch troops continued the line from Rocour to Ans. The cavalry of each nation was in the rear of the villages occupied by its respective infantry. The artillery placed in the most advantageous positions along the line. The Dutch, however, were the only troops who had strengthened their part of the position by field-works.

On the morning of the 11th October the French army advanced to the attack in ten columns, six of which were of infantry, and four of cavalry. This mode of mixing the columns of infantry and cavalry was adopted, it will be remembered, by Marlborough in conducting the attack upon the French and Bavarian armies, at the battle of Blenheim, and appears to be admirably calculated

to enable the two arms to afford each other mutual assistance.

The principal efforts of the French were directed against the villages of Ans upon the left, and upon those of Rocour, Worouw, and Liers, in the centre. They contented themselves with threatening the right. Notwithstanding a most obstinate defence, the French penetrated between Ans and Rocour, and, towards the close of the day, the allied army retreated. The troops from the left crossed the Meuse at Heerstal, and those from the centre, at Visé. The right did not cross the Meuse, but, retreating towards Maestricht, between the Jaare and the Meuse, occupied the strong ground, known by the name of the Roman camp, about five miles from Houtain. The French unquestionably gained the battle, as the allied army retreated, but there never was a victory productive of so little advantage to the conquerors as the battle of Rocour. The French troops remained on the field the night of the action, and the next day fell back to Tongres, from whence they went into winter-quarters. The allies lost five thousand men in killed and wounded, and left thirty pieces of artillery behind them in position. The French must have suffered very considerably in the attacks upon the villages, although the extent of their loss was never acknowledged.

1747.

The allies made great exertions to ensure a sufficient army in the Low Countries, early in this year, to oppose the further progress of the enemy, if not to recover part of the Netherlands. Tranquillity being restored in Scotland, His Royal Highness the Duke of Cumberland reassumed the command of the army, and the British troops were enabled to furnish their full contingent. The Austrians and Bavarians assembled at Venlo upon the Meuse; the British, Hanoverians, and Hessians, at Eindhoven; and the Dutch, in the neighbourhood of Breda. Their united numbers amounted to nearly one hundred and twenty thousand men. The French, on their part, were not idle. They reinforced their army to such an extent, that it consisted of one hundred and forty thousand men, at the commencement of this campaign. They assembled it in the neighbourhood of Brussels; with its right at Wavre, and its left at the junction of the Senne and the Dyle, below Malines. They, moreover, held Antwerp in force; thus covering their conquests on the side of Flanders. The garrisons of Mons, Charleroi, and of Namur were strengthened from France, so as not to weaken the disposable force in the field. A battering train was collected at Metz, and another at Ghent,

with a good deal of publicity, in order to keep the allies in suspense, as to their views and intentions; and to make them apprehend, equally, the siege of Maestricht, on one flank, or that of Bergen-opzoom on the other.

Marshal Saxe had, however, determined to attack Dutch Flanders; and to take every thing from Holland, on the left bank of the Scheldt. The present situation of the French army was peculiarly well calculated to cover the operation. Count Lowendahl was accordingly detached, to the rear of the army, to Bruges; from whence he successively besieged and took Sluys, (the mouth of the canal from Bruges to the arm of the sea surrounding the island of Cadsand, at the mouth of the Scheldt,) Yssendyk, Sas-de-Gand, and Philippine; whilst another corps, descending the left bank of the Scheldt, took Liefenshoek, Hulst, and Axel.

The Duke of Cumberland assembled his army, and approached Antwerp. He placed his right at Brecht, and his left upon the little Nethc, above Lier. On the 15th May he advanced still nearer, and put his right at Braschaet, and his left at Santhoven. He caused his battering train to be brought forward from Breda, and employed parties in making fascines, as if he intended to besiege Antwerp. Marshal Saxe, however, remained behind the Dyle, and contented himself with rein-

forcing the garrison of Antwerp ; and with ordering a bridge to be constructed, with the craft of the country, over the Rupel, so as to be enabled to move rapidly to Antwerp in several columns, should occasion require it. It is curious that a bridge of the very same nature, and at the very same spot, should have been constructed in the year 1815, by the British, without any reference to Marshal Saxe's operations. In addition to the existing fortifications of Antwerp, Marshal Saxe caused an entrenched camp to be constructed, for the reception of the additional troops he allotted for its defence. This entrenched camp, it may be remarked, having been enlarged by the French, was employed to protect the construction of a considerable proportion of the men-of-war they built on the Scheldt in later days.

The Duke of Cumberland moved by his left, and put himself behind the Dicmer at Diest. This was a central position, about thirty-five miles from Maestricht, and not quite so much from Antwerp. Marshal Saxe, having reinforced his army with the corps employed to reduce Dutch Flanders, and leaving twenty-eight battalions and sixteen squadrons in Antwerp, moved by his right to Tongres, with a view to invest Maestricht ; the battering train for the siege of which had been forwarded to Namur. The allied army hastened to protect Maestricht, and took up a position

within three miles of that place, with its right at the village of Groote Spauwen, its centre at Vleeghem and Lawfeldt, and its left at Kessel. While taking up its ground on the 1st July, the French army, commanded by Marshal Saxe, (under the immediate orders of Lewis XV. in person,) came in sight, advancing from Tongres. The French formed their troops upon the high ground to the right and left of the village of Henderen, and extended beyond Rymps. It was the next morning, however, before their army had sufficiently closed up to enable them to advance. On the morning of the 2d July, they attacked the left of the centre of the allied army. The village of Lawfeldt was the key to the position. It was entrusted to eight battalions of British and Hanoverian infantry. The enemy were repeatedly driven out. By dint, however, of bringing up fresh troops, and by advancing a corps which cut off its communication from the allied army, it was at length taken, which decided the Duke of Cumberland to retreat. There seems to have been a want of unity or ensemble in the operations of the allied army on this day; and not so much spirit of enterprize amongst those employed on the right, as could have been wished. The Duke of Cumberland directed a forward movement to be made by his right, against the French left; which, in all probability, would have been attended with the

happiest effects, occupied as the enemy were with the attack upon *Lauwfeldt*. It was not undertaken, owing, as was alleged, to the impossibility of being able to debouche from *Groot Spauwen* under the heavy cannonade directed against that village. It cannot be ascertained if it was or was not to be done; but that it was not done, must be admitted to have been unfortunate. The allied army crossed the *Meuse*, about a mile and a half below *Maestricht*, at *Smermaes*, and encamped close to *Maestricht*, on the right side of the river. The French remained on the field of battle for the night. They afterwards put themselves between the *Jaare* and the *Demer*, with their head-quarters at *Housselt*; and established a corps upon the hill of *St. Pierre*, close to *Maestricht*, between the *Jaare* and the *Meuse*. This corps, although it could not be said to blockade *Maestricht*, yet prevented any movement taking place, of which the French had not immediate knowledge.

As the siege of *Maestricht* could not be undertaken with much prospect of success, whilst the allied army remained in its present position, *Marshal Saxe* determined to attempt that of *Bergenopzoom*. The French having a battering train upon that side of the Netherlands, as well as the one upon the *Meuse*, with which they meant to have besieged *Maestricht*, it was only the march towards *Bergenopzoom*, about eighty miles from

Maestricht, which could make any difference in the two operations.

Count Lowendahl was detached with twenty-two battalions and ten squadrons, to besiege Bergenopzoom; the French army, under Marshal Saxe, remaining upon the Meuse. He arrived before Bergenopzoom on the 12th July, and encamped with his right to the Scheldt, and his left upon the little rivulet the Zoom.

The fortifications of Bergenopzoom have been very little changed since this siege. But Bergenopzoom was, in 1747, the right of the lines of Steenberg; and, from the remains which now exist of those lines, some opinion may be formed of their former strength and solidity. They extended about four miles, from Bergenopzoom upon the Scheldt, to Steenberg, upon one of the creeks of the sea. Their object was to cover the valuable island of Tholen. Independent of the fortresses of Steenberg and Bergenopzoom upon their flanks, these lines were supported by three very respectable forts at different points where they could be most useful; and were, moreover, protected, in a great part of their front, by inundations. Without forcing these lines, it is evident Bergenopzoom could not be invested. In the present case, several battalions were encamped behind them. As, therefore, the garrison of Bergenopzoom could be reinforced, or even changed, at pleasure, and the

communication was open with Holland, both by the Scheldt and Steenberg, to receive supplies of ammunition and other essential articles, the chances of success appeared very much against the French.

On the night of the 14th July, Count Lowendahl opened the trenches. The siege lasted sixty-five days. Considerable reinforcements were obliged to be sent from the French army upon the Meuse. Lowendahl's army was augmented to forty-two battalions and seventy squadrons. The French must, however, have raised the siege after all, if there had not been a dispute as to their respective right to command and give orders, between the governor-general of the province (who threw himself into Bergenopzoom) and the military governor of the fortress. A place besieged sixty-five days can hardly be said to be taken by surprise; but yet such was the case at Bergenopzoom. The bastions were not entrenched, nor any preparations made to resist an assault. The garrison withdrew, upon that event, towards Steenberg. Two Scotch battalions got great credit for stopping the enemy in the square, in the middle of the town, for a considerable time, and then retreating by the Steenberg gate, with their arms and colours. Bergenopzoom was taken on the 16th September.

Soon after the capture of Bergenopzoom, the armies on both sides went into winter-quarters.

1748.

A convention was signed this year at the Hague, on the 26th January, between Austria, Great Britain, and Holland; by which they agreed to reinforce their armies in the Low Countries, so that the total numbers should amount to one hundred and ninety-two thousand men. Austria was to furnish sixty thousand; and Great Britain and Holland, sixty-six thousand each. The loss of Dutch Flanders, in the commencement of the campaign, had caused a revolution in the government of the United States. The republican party had been obliged to submit to the renewal of the office of stadtholder; and William Prince of Nassau-Dietz, representative of the House of Orange, had been appointed to that dignity. The capture of Bergenopzoom had still further alarmed the Dutch; and the possibility of the French invading Holland, induced them to make great exertions to endeavour to reconquer the Austrian Netherlands.

Negotiations for peace were commenced; and the different belligerent powers sent their several ministers in March to Aix-la-Chapelle, which, by common accord, was declared a neutral town,

and the troops of all nations were prohibited from advancing within a certain extent of it.

Lewis XV. determined, however, that the pending negotiations should not interfere with the operations of the war; and under the impression that the capture of Maestricht would very much strengthen the claims of his ministers at Aix-la-Chapelle, gave directions to Marshal Saxe to besiege that fortress.

Marshal Saxe had not been able to besiege Maestricht, in the preceding campaign, after he had gained the battle of Lauwfeldt, from the circumstance of his not having dislodged the Duke of Cumberland from its vicinity. The result of that battle had been merely to move the allied army from the left to the right bank of the Meuse. It is evident, that to besiege Maestricht with any prospect of success, it was necessary for Marshal Saxe not only to invest the place on both banks of the Meuse, but also to have a sufficient force on each side of the river, to be enabled to oppose the allied army. The necessary arrangements required to be conducted with great secrecy and promptitude, and the attention of the allies to be drawn off to another quarter.

Marshal Saxe assembled his army between Lier and Antwerp towards the end of March; to which latter place he forwarded a battering train. These arrangements seemed to point out Breda as the

proposed point of attack. In the mean while a corps, consisting of fifty-nine battalions and twenty-nine squadrons, was assembled under Count Lowendahl, at Montmedy and Sedan. The march of these troops was directed, through the Duchy of Luxembourg, upon Maestricht. They were placed behind the Geule, (a river which runs from the neighbourhood of Aix-la-Chapelle into the Meuse a little below Maestricht,) with their headquarters at the village of Op Haren. Marshal Saxe, combining the movements of his army with those of the corps of Lowendahl, already described, moved from Antwerp on the 4th April, and approached Maestricht on the right side of the Meuse. By these operations of the French armies Maestricht was invested on the 13th April.

The Duke of Cumberland was at the Hague when the news of the investment of Maestricht arrived. He proceeded without delay to Ruremonde, where he immediately assembled the Austrian and British troops from Eyndhoven and Venloo, and sent instructions for the Dutch from Breda and Bois-le-due to join him, proposing to advance up the Meuse to attack the French, before they had time to strengthen their position.

Marshal Saxe kept Lowendahl's corps behind the Geule; and having caused several bridges to be thrown over the Meuse to ensure the communication between the two French armies, he placed

himself behind the little rivulet of *Lonaken*, with his right upon the *Meuse*. He constructed along his front twenty-four redoubts, each redoubt containing four pieces of artillery and a battalion. The principal part of his infantry encamped in the rear of this line, and furnished the detachments required for the operations of the siege. He also held *Bilsen* and *Hasselt* to his left upon the *Demer*, with a considerable corps; so that had the allied army endeavoured to turn the line of his redoubts, and to penetrate between the source of the *Lonaken* and that of the *Demer*, they would have exposed their own right to be taken in flank.

These preliminary arrangements being made, the trenches against *Maestricht* were opened on the night of the 15th April, by a working party of 6000 men, under the personal superintendence of *Marshal Saxe* himself. Every thing connected with this siege seems to have been so well arranged, that the success of the operation could not be doubtful. The front attacked was that on the left bank of the *Meuse*, looking down the river. Trenches were also opened by *Count Lowendahl* against the works on the right side of the *Meuse*. *Maestricht* was surrendered on the 6th May, after a siege of eighteen days. The garrison consisted of twenty-three battalions and six hundred cavalry—Austrian, Bavarian and Dutch troops. The French had one hundred and forty-

three battalions and seventy-seven squadrons employed at this siege.

Preliminaries of peace were signed on the 30th April, by which it was agreed that hostilities were immediately to cease in the Low Countries, with the exception of the siege of Maestricht, to the successful termination of which the French court attached considerable importance. As Maestricht was to be restored to the Dutch, the Duke of Cumberland sent orders to the governor to surrender the place, if Marshal Saxe would grant to the garrison honourable terms. Baron Aylva, who commanded, not conceiving the authority of the Duke of Cumberland sufficient, a suspension of arms was agreed upon until he could receive instructions from the Dutch government; which having been forwarded to him, to the same effect, the French took possession of Maestricht on the 10th May. The conduct of Baron Aylva was extremely honourable, and his defence very gallant. The progress made by the enemy was such, however, that he could not have held out many days longer.

The definitive treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle was signed on the 18th October. By this treaty Lewis XV. not only restored Bergenopzoom, Maestricht, and all Dutch Flanders to the Dutch, but the whole of his conquests in the Netherlands to Austria; and undertook, moreover, to destroy all the

sea-defences or batteries protecting the harbour of Dunkirk. The fortifications towards the land were not to be touched. It is worthy of remark that this is the only treaty, from the peace of the Pyrenees up to its date, by which the French did not acquire, or have confirmed to them, some advantage of frontier on the side of the Low Countries. Even after the reverses of the war of the Spanish Succession, and the advance of Marlborough to Bouchain, yet, at the peace of Utrecht, they were gainers. They had been eminently successful in the five campaigns of Marshal Saxe; but they gave up every thing at the peace.

The article with respect to Dunkirk had much better have been omitted. It was calculated to insult and hurt the feelings of the people of France, without being of any, the slightest, use to the English merchants, for whose protection it was stated to have been necessary. Dunkirk was said to afford protection to French privateers. This objection might apply in time of war; in time of peace, if Dunkirk had been as strong as Lille, it could not have interfered with the commerce of England; and as, at the re-commencement of hostilities, one fortnight would be all that could be required to construct as many batteries as might be judged necessary for the protection of the harbour of Dunkirk, and of all the privateers of France that could possibly assemble there, the precaution of

causing the fortifications to be destroyed appears to have been about as absurd on the part of the English ministry to ask, as it was weak and derogatory to the dignity of their nation, on that of the French to grant.

From the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, in the year 1748, the Netherlands enjoyed an uninterrupted period of thirty-three years of peace and tranquillity, under the mild and gentle sway of the House of Austria. Their customs, laws and privileges were respected; the taxes were trifling, and levied only by their own consent. The elder inhabitants speak always, to this day, with attachment and gratitude of the Austrian government, although later circumstances, which will be mentioned according to the dates when they occurred, caused a very general revolt against the Emperor Joseph. As no military event took place during the years alluded to, nor any political transactions which may be supposed to have had any influence on subsequent wars, there is nothing which the plan of this work requires to be noticed until the year 1781.

1781.

Joseph II., son of Maria Theresa, who at this period swayed the Imperial sceptre, and who had succeeded to his mother in the hereditary states of

the House of Austria, thought proper this year to call upon the Dutch to withdraw their troops from those towns in the Austrian Netherlands, of which they were entitled, under the barrier-treaty of 1715, to keep military possession. The allowance for the repairs of the fortifications, and for the maintenance of the garrisons, had been withheld by the Austrian government for several years, under various pretences. Forgetting equally to whom he owed the possession of the Netherlands, and the tenure by which he held them, Joseph carried his views of reform, and his wish to make alterations in the political and military situation of these provinces, still farther. He not only had neglected the fortresses, but he now proposed to cause them to be destroyed altogether. The tranquillity the Netherlands had enjoyed since the peace of 1748, and the connection which had lately taken place between the House of Austria and France, by the marriage of his sister, the ill-fated Marie-Antoinette, with Lewis XVI., seem to have lulled Joseph into the opinion, that a war upon that frontier was never to take place again; like the man in the fable, who, walking by the sea-side on a fine day, expected never to see another storm. The reflection that these fortresses had occupied Lewis XV. with a very powerful army, four years, (1744, 1745, 1746 and 1747,) although, from circumstances, they had not been at that

period sufficiently garrisoned; the remembrance that the army which ought to have co-operated with the fortresses in the defence of the Netherlands in that war, had been diminished by the recall of the British regiments to put down an insurrection at home, and by the necessity that existed for employing the Austrian troops upon other services, appear to have escaped the recollection of the advisers of this measure; and because Marshal Saxe had conquered the Netherlands, notwithstanding the fortresses and the barrier-garrisons, it was proposed to have neither the one nor the other. Instead of rectifying the errors of the barrier-treaty, and making better arrangements for the future, it was determined to do away with the system altogether. Well may we exclaim with the French moralist—"L'expérience des pères est perdue pour les enfans!"

1782.

The Dutch troops were withdrawn early in this year from the barrier-towns, and Joseph gave immediate orders for the fortifications being demolished. The barrier-treaty had been drawn up, it will be remembered, under the mediation and guarantee of England. The British government, not only fully occupied with the American war, but

actually engaged in hostilities with the Dutch, did not interfere. The Dutch government, obliged to submit, and receiving only rude and laconic answers to their representations, from the Emperor's ministers, recalled their regiments; but protested officially against this violation of their rights, and of all existing treaties.

1783.

The facility with which the Emperor Joseph II. had succeeded in carrying his point relative to the Dutch garrisons being withdrawn, encouraged him to make further claims upon the government of the United States. He seized upon three forts, or, more properly speaking, three redoubts, belonging to the Dutch, constructed upon the bank of the canal between Sluys and Bruges, under the pretext of the ground on which they were situated being, as he asserted, within the limits of the Austrian Netherlands. He also caused the remains of a Dutch soldier, who had died whilst in garrison at Liefenshoek, and which had been buried in the usual place, in the vicinity, to be disinterred and thrown into the ditch of the fort, alleging that the body had been deposited within the Austrian limits. There is something so revolting to human nature in this last-mentioned

mode adopted by Joseph for asserting his rights, that, were it not authenticated beyond the possibility of doubt, we could hardly fancy it possible that any man with the common feelings or education of a gentleman, much less one whose title of Emperor might have reminded him that he himself was a soldier, could have sanctioned such an outrage.

1784.

Conferences were held at Brussels this year between the Imperial and the Dutch plenipotentiaries, to endeavour to arrange amicably the existing differences. Joseph's minister claimed for his master, Maastricht, Bergenopzoom, and, generally speaking, all those places or territories which were originally part of the Spanish Netherlands, but which, having been conquered by the Dutch during their long struggle with the Spaniards, had been confirmed to them at the peace of Munster, in 1648, by that power. He offered, however, to give up these claims, if the United States would consent to the removal of all impediments to the navigation of the Scheldt, so that ships and vessels of any tonnage might be allowed to navigate that river to and from Antwerp. It was evident that this last point was the object of all Joseph's

previous measures, and that the territorial claims were only advanced as a cover for this proposal.

Under the conviction that the Dutch would not venture to enter into hostilities with him, Joseph ordered a vessel, under the Imperial colours, to sail from Antwerp to Ostend, and a brig, similarly decorated, from Ostend to Antwerp. Both these vessels were brought to by the Dutch, and compelled to return to their respective ports. The Imperial minister at the Hague was immediately recalled, and every thing wore the appearance of an approaching rupture.

1785.

Under the mediation of France a treaty was signed on the 8th November, this year, at Fontainebleau, between the Emperor and the Dutch, by which Joseph abandoned his claims upon Maestricht, Bergenopzoom, and the other places he had alleged were part of the Austrian Netherlands; as also withdrew his plan for opening the navigation of the Scheldt. The Dutch gave up Lillo and Liefenshoek to the Emperor, and agreed to destroy two small forts they had on the right bank of the Scheldt, a little lower down than Lillo, called Fort Cruis and Fort Fredirick-Henry. There was also an amicable arrangement respect-

ing the frontier between Austrian and Dutch Flanders.

Thus ended a war, if it may be so called, between the Emperor Joseph and Holland, begun as inconsiderately as it was abandoned precipitately. No preparations had been made by Joseph, and no means collected for enforcing his demands; he seems to have relied entirely on the supposed unwillingness of the Dutch to go to war with him; when he found they were firm he was obliged to desist.

It may not here be deemed an irrelevant remark to observe how often we find in history, that events which have been looked forward to by the wisest statesmen either with the greatest apprehension or the most lively satisfaction, have, when at last they have occurred, brought with them nothing to fear, or but little to delight. The Scheldt is now open, and has been for years; yet we do not see the commerce of Amsterdam diminish, or Holland impoverished, as was predicted. Joseph expected that his alliance with France was to permit him to demolish the fortresses, and to diminish his army in the Low Countries; and yet it was under the mediation of France that the Scheldt was shut against his wish; and France even declared that she was prepared to go to war to prevent his encroachments on Holland—of so little consequence (may we not add, fortunately?) are

the ties of blood or consanguinity amongst statesmen, compared with the attainment of political objects, or when put in opposition to political interests.

1787.

The policy of France had induced her to mediate between the Emperor Joseph II. and the Dutch; and the treaty of Fontainebleau was (as we have seen) negotiated and signed in 1785 under her influence. The Count de Vergennes, who was the French minister, was anxious to put an end to the political connection between England and Holland, and made use of all the means and influence at his disposal, to create a party amongst the Dutch favourably disposed towards France. These were the real motives and views of the French government in giving their assistance to the Dutch in the business of the navigation of the Scheldt. The same reasons continued to direct their conduct. Finding that the members of the House of Orange, and almost all the principal families composing the aristocracy of Holland were attached to their ancient alliance with England from habit, long connection, and principle, the Count de Vergennes was so weak and short-sighted as to encourage the reformers,

or patriotic party, in the United States, who, in consequence, began to boast of the assistance they might expect from France in effecting a revolution in their government, and in removing the Stadtholder from all authority. In this frame of mind, and having deeply imbibed the fatal spirit of innovation, which commenced about this time to spread over Europe, it was not likely that the Dutch patriots would be long without an opportunity or pretext for disturbing the tranquillity of the country. It was an established prerogative of the Stadtholder to name the magistracy. The towns of Elbourg and of Hattem, in Gelderland, refused to submit to the authority of those thus appointed. At the request of the states of that province, the Stadtholder ordered troops to be quartered in those towns as a punishment for their refractory spirit, and to be ready to enforce obedience to the laws and customs of the republic. The states of the province of Holland, siding with the inhabitants of Elbourg and of Hattem, suspended, on the 22d September, 1786, the Stadtholder from the command of their army. The different provinces took opposite sides in this dispute, and although the Court of France, as also that of Berlin, sent their respective ministers to Nimeguen, to which city the Stadtholder had withdrawn from Holland, to endeavour to bring about an amicable arrangement, yet nothing could

be agreed upon. Both sides were equally angry, and it was evident that the question was to be decided only by the force of arms, and that a civil war was fast approaching.

At this critical moment, when the slightest spark was only wanting to kindle a flame which could not have been extinguished without the most dreadful scenes of bloodshed and commotion, the sister to the King of Prussia, who was married to the Stadtholder, proposed to travel from Nimeguen to the Hague. She was stopped at Schoonhoven, on the frontiers of the province of Holland, by a detachment of troops in the service of the States of Holland; and, after being detained for some time as a prisoner, compelled to return to Nimeguen. This insult offered to his sister, afforded to the King of Prussia an opportunity, of which he gladly availed himself, to interfere in the internal affairs of Holland. Having in vain demanded satisfaction, he ordered thirty thousand of his troops, under the command of the Duke of Brunswick, (who was uncle to the Stadtholder,) to enter Holland. The patriotic party expected to have been supported by France. The French minister at Berlin gave in, indeed, an official paper, stating that the French Court could not permit any foreign or armed interference in the disputes in Holland, and that the whole of the forces and means of France would, if requisite,

be employed to support the independence of the republic. England, on her part, declared that she would be ready to defend the Stadtholder, if attacked by France. There was thus every appearance of a general war, and which in all probability must have taken place, had the troops of the patriots been able, even for one campaign, to make head against the Prussian army. The decision and celerity of the Duke of Brunswick quickly re-established order. He entered Holland in the month of September, and took possession of Amsterdam on the 11th October, after a slight resistance. By the 31st October, the Stadtholder was completely re-established in his authority.

The Prussian army, destined for the invasion of Holland, was assembled at Wesel upon the Rhine, by the end of the first week in September. The Stadtholder's Court was at Nimeguen, and a corps of Dutch troops, who had preserved their fidelity to his Highness, consisting of nine battalions and seven squadrons, were in possession of Amersfoort, and encamped in that neighbourhood, under the command of the Stadtholder in person. The Duke of Brunswick had, therefore, no opposition to expect in his passage of the Rhine, the Wahal, or the Yssel, and was at liberty to chuse his line of operations. The patriots had selected Utrecht for their head-quarters,

having their left at Naarden on the Zuyder-Zee, and their right at Gorcum upon the Wahal, near the head of the Bies-bos. This line is intersected by the Rhine, which flows for many miles parallel to the Wahal. The Patriots occupied Vijanen, situated at the point of intersection, in force, and strengthened this important place very considerably.

The Prussian army advanced in three columns. The first crossed the Yssel near to Arnheim, and moved by Amersfoort to Naarden. The second was similarly conducted across the Yssel; but, turning to its left, it crossed the Rhine at Arnheim, and, marching on the left bank of that river, was meant to attack Vijanen. The third, passing the Rhine at Wesel and the Wahal at Nimeguen, marched by the right bank of the Wahal against Gorcum. The facility of transport which the two columns, advancing by the Wahal and the Rhine, were in possession of, induced the Duke of Brunswick to carry with him every requisite for a siege, as also for constructing such bridges as might be wanted.

Upon the advance of the Prussians, the Rhingrave of Salm, to whom the patriots had given the command of their army, retreated from Utrecht. His troops fell back to Amsterdam and Muyden, considerable numbers either, however, dispersing or joining the Stadtholder's corps.

It is a curious fact that the Rhingrave himself was never heard of;—his body was never even found: and to this day it is uncertain whether he destroyed himself, or was murdered in the retreat by some of the disbanded soldiers. A universal panic seems to have prevailed. The strongest places were abandoned in confusion, and the Prussians met with no opposition until they approached Amsterdam.

Lewis XIV., it will be remembered, had been in possession of Utrecht in 1672, and, nevertheless, was not able to make any impression upon Holland. The most difficult part of the campaign—the acquiring possession of Amsterdam—was still to be performed. Circumstances were, however, very different. The patriots were a party only in Holland, and they did not carry with them the landholders, the peasantry, or the army. They were principally litigious and troublesome burghers, with whom men of desperate fortunes had united. Some few persons of real substance, and well-disposed, had unquestionably joined them with the purest intentions; but all such being now aware of their error, and, anxious to save their country from the horrors of war, hastened to submit to the Stadtholder. The regular troops obeyed an order sent to them by his Highness, and, quitting Amsterdam, marched towards Breda and Bois-le-duc to wait his further

commands. On the 10th October the town of Amsterdam capitulated to the Duke of Brunswick. On the 11th a Prussian guard took possession of the gate of Leyden.

Previous to the surrender of Amsterdam, the Duke of Brunswick had determined, in case he should have been obliged to proceed to extremities, to advance by his left. Although the patriots had surrendered the fortresses of Naarden, Muyden, and of Weesp, to the Prussians, yet they could not have approached Amsterdam by their right, on account of the armed vessels and gun-boats on the Zuyder-Zee. It would have been pretty nearly as difficult to have moved forward by their left, had gun-boats been introduced on the Lake of Haerlem, which might easily have been done. This important measure having been neglected or overlooked, the Duke of Brunswick availed himself of it to push a Prussian corps across the lake or sea of Haerlem, by which means he was enabled to turn the enemy at Amstelveen, and the other points they occupied upon the dikes, upon which only the Prussians could advance. In this operation (the Prussian staff being very little acquainted with the management of troops in boats, and with the details of embarking and disembarking regiments) the Duke of Brunswick derived considerable assistance from several English officers, who were volunteers with

his army. It was to one of these (Colonel Gordon) that the idea of the measure itself (which was decisive as to the fate of Amsterdam) has been attributed.

Six Prussian battalions were left at Amsterdam until the Stadtholder had time to reorganize the Dutch army. The Duke of Brunswick and the remainder of the Prussian army left Holland in November. This expedition into Holland only cost the Prussian army two hundred and twenty-one men in killed and wounded.

1789.

This year is remarkable in the Low Countries for the insurrection of the inhabitants against the Emperor Joseph II.; for their having declared themselves an independent republic, and compelled the Austrian troops to evacuate the country. These events were produced by the injudicious haste with which Joseph attempted to introduce certain reforms; which, although perhaps they would ultimately have been beneficial to the people, and were unquestionably well meant by the Austrian government; yet could not be submitted to, upon the simple decree of the Emperor; he having, in the Netherlands, no greater power than what the constitution of the provinces gave to his predecessors, the Dukes of Brabant and

Limbourg, according to the terms of the Joy-Entrée, the Magna Charta of the Netherlands. The principal acts of authority exercised by Joseph, and which ultimately were the cause of the insurrection, and nearly deprived the Austrian government of these fine provinces, were the arbitrary suppression of a number of convents, and of the diocesan schools; and the substitution of a seminary at Louvain, and of an university at Brussels, under the control and authority of the government, in lieu of the establishments thus abolished; the doing away all the provincial courts of judicature, and creating a general court at Brussels with a power of appeal, in particular cases, to Vienna.

These measures were first promulgated in 1787; but, in consequence of the discontent they occasioned, and the angry feelings of the people, they were revoked. Between thirty and forty thousand Austrian troops were ordered into the Netherlands in the autumn of 1787. Joseph, feeling himself stronger, persevered in his proposed reforms, and as the States, on the other hand, withheld all supplies, it was evident hostilities must shortly take place. The Emperor's declaration on the 7th January of this year to the States of Brabant, that in consequence of their continuing to refuse to grant the customary supplies, he considered himself as absolved from the obligations of the

Joyous Entry, may be considered as the declaration of war.

Cardinal Frankenberg, Archbishop of Malines, the Duke d'Ahremberg, and a considerable number of the deputies of the States had retired to Breda, from whence they addressed the Emperor, appealing to God and their swords. It was, however, not before October that any decided act of hostility took place. A body of Brabançons who had assembled at Turnhout, between Breda and Antwerp, under the command of Vander Meersch, were attacked by the Austrian general Schrøder with three thousand Imperial troops. The Austrians were repulsed, and a considerable number taken prisoners.

The insurrection having also broke out at Ghent on the 13th November, and the Austrian garrison having been obliged to evacuate that city, General Alton, who commanded the Austrian army in the Netherlands, deemed it advisable to conclude an armistice on the 2d December, with the insurgent general Vander Meersch, in hopes that some steps would be taken at Vienna to allay the state of irritation which it was evident prevailed to an alarming extent. Alton was, however, shortly afterwards, on the 12th December, obliged to enter into a capitulation himself at Brussels; in consequence of the inhabitants having risen against the Austrian garrison; and he

agreed to retire to Namur, leaving behind him his arms, artillery, ammunition, and the military chest. On the 13th December the independence of the Netherlands was proclaimed at Brussels. The Austrian army, joined by the garrisons and detachments from the various other places of the Low Countries, left Namur on the 21st December, and retreated to Luxembourg, pursued by the Netherland troops commanded by Vander Meersch.

1790.

The deputies of Brabant, Flanders, Hainaut, Namur, Malines, Antwerp, Tournai, Guelderland, and of Limbourg, assembled on the 7th January at Brussels, and elected a council for the management of their affairs, and the carrying on the government. They sent agents to London and to Berlin, to endeavour to get their new republic acknowledged.


The Emperor Joseph, the unfortunate author of all these proceedings, died on the 20th February. His conduct appears to have been the most inconsistent, and the most irreconcilable with any fixed principles of government, of almost any monarch who ever sat upon a throne. With one hand he threw down the fortresses and the citadels of the Low Countries, so as to deprive himself of the

means of coercion ; whilst with the other, he performed the most arbitrary acts, totally in opposition to the feelings and sentiments of his subjects. He lived long enough to witness the flame he had kindled. It seems very questionable, had he not died at the time he did, whether it would have been so easily extinguished.

Leopold II., who succeeded to Joseph, immediately published a declaration, containing his disapprobation of his brother's measures with respect to the Netherlands, and expressed his own determination to govern the provinces according to the stipulations of the Joyous Entry. He followed up this avowal of his sentiments and intentions by collecting a considerable force in the province of Luxembourg. The inhabitants of the Low Countries were, in the mean while, divided by faction and parties. The council and the majority of the Seigneurs and men of substance in the different provinces were anxious for a federal government founded upon the antient mode of electing deputies to the States. With the lower orders and with some of the leading families, the new doctrines of perfect equality, at this time promulgated in France, had gained ground. Vander Meersch, who commanded their army, sided with this latter party. The Council sent a deputation to confer with him. Vander Meersch arrested the deputies. The coun-

cil with great spirit directed another general officer, named Schœnfeld, in their service, (and who, with a corps of 6000 men, had just taken possession of the citadel of Antwerp, after a long blockade,) to march against Vander Meersch. Vander Meersch advanced from Namur to meet Schœnfeld, but as soon as he had left the town the inhabitants shut the gates, and declared for the Council and General Schœnfeld. The soldiers of Vander Meersch's corps also deserting him, he was arrested, and sent a prisoner to the citadel of Antwerp, the 14th April.

Schœnfeld subsequently advanced from Namur as far as the town of Marche, about forty-two miles from Luxembourg, at the head of 15,000 of the Netherland troops. In this situation he was attacked, and completely defeated, by an Austrian corps, commanded by Count Baillet de la Tour, the 23d May. The Council of the Netherlands, after this event, seeing little probability of being able to oppose the Austrian armies, applied to the British and Dutch governments (as guarantees of the constitution and privileges of the Netherland provinces at the time they were transferred to the Austrian dominions) to interfere with Leopold in their behalf. A congress took place at the Hague in September, composed of ministers duly authorized on the part of Great Britain, Holland and Prussia, as mediators; and to which the



Emperor Leopold sent also an accredited agent; and the Council of the Netherlands were permitted to depute two members. On the 10th December a convention was agreed to, and signed; by which the Emperor confirmed all the customs and privileges of the provinces composing the Austrian Netherlands; promised a general amnesty, with very few exceptions; and revoked the decrees and measures of Joseph which had caused the disturbances. Upon these conditions Great Britain, Holland and Prussia guaranteed, on the one side, the sovereignty of the Netherlands to the House of Austria; and, on the other, to the inhabitants the possession of their laws, customs and usages.

Thus ended an insurrection which it has been requisite to enter into some detail about, as it shook the Austrian authority in the Netherlands, and contributed in no small degree to the easy conquest of these provinces by Dumourier, in the year after the ensuing one. The agitation had hardly subsided; the lower orders were equally displeased with the proceedings of their own council of government, and with the Austrians; the link connecting these provinces and the Emperor was broken; and the minds of men were prepared for change—the possibility and propriety of which became a favourite subject of discussion.

1792.

On the 20th April, this year, France declared war against Austria. It was determined to invade the Austrian Netherlands without delay. The late insurrections against the Austrian government were hardly appeased; the revolutionary doctrines and republican principles of the authors of the French revolution were supposed to have spread in the Low Countries; and it was hoped that the French armies would meet with the support of the people in general. Under this impression the military preparations were not of a magnitude either corresponding with the importance of the operation, or with the acknowledged strength of the Austrian army. The Austrian troops were, in fact, more numerous this year than formerly, the army having been considerably reinforced in consequence of the late revolt.

The plan for the proposed invasion of the Netherlands was a simultaneous attack upon Mons, Tournai and Furnes, by three corps of 10,000 men each, moving the same day from Valenciennes, Lille and Dunkirk. Another corps was to descend the valley of the Meuse, taking possession of Namur and Huy, and to penetrate as far as Liege. The corps meant for the attack of Mons moved from its camp of Famars, in the neighbourhood of

Valenciennes, to Quievrain; and from thence to Boussu, not more than six miles from Mons. Some trifling skirmishing took place, both at Quievrain and in front of Boussu, with the Austrian light troops. The ground at Boussu offering some advantages of position, and there not being sufficient day-light to advance towards Mons, the French general, Biron, after pushing the Austrians towards Mons, retreated to Boussu, where he encamped for the night, proposing to advance next morning. In the night, however, the French troops, agitated by the passions which at that moment inflamed all France; suspicious of their officers, and sufficiently acquainted with the revolutionary proceedings at Paris to have become highly insubordinate, broke out into an open mutiny; compelled their general to retreat to Quievrain; and from thence, upon the advance of an Austrian patrol, made the best of their way to Valenciennes, leaving their guns, tents and stores behind them to be taken possession of by the enemy.

The column destined to advance upon Tournai was still more unfortunate. Between Baisieu and the heights of Marquin, about four miles from Tournai, it fell in with an Austrian corps of three thousand men, which had been pushed forward from Tournai. The French immediately gave way, and leaving their guns (as was the case

in front of Mons) for the enemy, they retreated to Lille in the greatest confusion. The soldiers, upon their return to Lille, put their general and one or two officers to death; they also massacred, in their rage, a few Austrian prisoners who had been so unfortunate as to fall into their hands.

The general officer who superintended the movement from Dunkirk to Furnes, took possession of the latter place without any resistance; but, in consequence of the fate of the two attacks upon his right, he returned again to Dunkirk.

The corps meant to penetrate into the Netherlands, by the Meuse, assembled at Givèt. It was commanded by La Fayette. This corps never advanced beyond Givèt, in consequence of the results of the operations against Mons and Tournai.

The complete failure of the projected attack upon the Austrian Netherlands, and the approach of the enemy towards the frontiers of France, created great alarm. The French army was in consequence collected in several entrenched camps. The ground near Maubeuge, formerly fortified by Berwick, after the battle of Malplaquet; that of Famars, near Valenciennes; the tongue of land formed by the junction of the Scarp and the Scheldt, beyond St. Amand, near the village of Maulde; and the entrenchments thrown up by Vauban, near Dunkirk, were selected as advantageous positions wherein different corps were

assembled and formed, and the temporary occupation of which was meant to prevent the country from being overrun by the enemy, and to give time to the troops to recover their confidence.

The Austrians had no intention of penetrating into France by French Flanders. An incursion was made as far as Bavay, and another to Pont-sur-Sambre, from Charleroi; but these were merely feints to draw off the attention of the French from the serious invasion projected by the Prussians, assisted by a considerable body of emigrants, by the Moselle, and towards which a corps of the Austrian army, from the Netherlands, was to co-operate. The advance of the Prussians, emigrants and Austrians was checked near St. Menchoult, upon the Aisne, by the able arrangements of the French general, Dumourier; the details of which important service do not, however, enter into the account of the transactions of the war in the Low Countries. To be enabled to oppose the allies between the Moselle and the Meuse, Dumourier had been obliged to withdraw a considerable proportion of the troops allotted to the defence of French Flanders. The Duke of Saxe-Teschen, Governor of the Austrian Netherlands, availed himself of this circumstance to advance from Tournai, and to bombard Lille, in hopes of compelling the garrison, already in a state of mutiny, and considered, even in point of

numbers, totally inadequate to the defence of the place, to admit the Austrian troops. The retreat of the Prussians from the Moselle, and the march of Dumourier, with the French army, towards the Low Countries, induced the Duke of Saxe-Teschen to abandon his enterprize, and to retire into the Austrian Netherlands. On the 7th October the Austrians retreated from their position before Lille to Tournai.

Notwithstanding the advanced season of the year, the French government determined to renew their attempt at the conquest of the Austrian Netherlands. The Austrian force was diminished by the absence of the corps detached beyond Luxembourg, to co-operate with the Prussian invasion of France, and which had not yet returned to the Netherlands. The French army was numerous, and flushed with success. It will be also remembered that those fortresses which had in former wars contributed to the defence of the country, were now mostly dismantled. The decision of the French was therefore, under all circumstances, founded upon the soundest military principles. The experience of all ages has shown the policy of following up success, and of giving as little time as possible to an enemy to recover the effects of any unexpected reverse, and to make arrangements for defensive warfare. Dumourier, who commanded the French army destined to attack

the Austrian Netherlands, determined to move in four columns; the one upon the right, consisting of sixteen thousand men, was to descend the valley of the Meuse; to take possession of Namur, and to prevent the Austrian corps from Luxembourg passing the Meuse, and co-operating with the Duke of Saxe-Teschen in the defence of the Netherlands. The second column, consisting of a corps of twelve thousand men, was to move from Maubeuge upon Charleroi; from thence to descend the Sambre, and to co-operate with the first column in the attack upon Namur, and in opposing the advance of the Austrian corps from Luxembourg. The third corps was assembled at Famars, near Valenciennes. It consisted of forty thousand men, and was under Dumourier's own guidance. This corps was meant to advance by Mons to Brussels. The fourth column, composed of eighteen thousand men, was ordered to take possession of Tournai, and to move by the valley of the Scheldt.

To oppose the French invasion, the Austrians had not, at first, more than 26,000 troops in the Netherlands. The corps expected from Luxembourg consisted of 15,000 men, under the command of General Clairfait. This reinforcement joined before the French commenced their movements; the French corps destined to advance by the Meuse having been unavoidably delayed be-

yond the period its arrival at Namur had been calculated upon. The Austrian army for the defence of the Netherlands, therefore, amounted to rather more than 40,000 men. These numbers, nevertheless, could hardly be reckoned adequate to their proposed object; and the Duke of Saxe-Teschen rendered his disposable force still smaller, by disseminating it in too many points, and acting upon too extended a line of defence. He occupied Warneton upon the Lys; Mount Trinity, behind Tournai, upon the Scheldt; Bury, upon the chaussée, from Condé, into the Netherlands; and also the citadel of Namur, with detached corps; and placed himself, with about 26,000 men, across the chaussée, between Valenciennes and Mons; with his right upon the Haine, at St. Guislain; and his left upon the thick wood of Sars, to oppose the advance of the French from Mons.

This position of the Austrians was, however, very easily to be turned, whilst the French were masters of Condé, where the Haine joins the Scheldt. Dumourier, accordingly, ordered a corps of 8000 men to be pushed through Condé. This measure necessitated a prolongation of the Austrian right, across the Haine, to oppose the advance from Condé; and, of course, a corresponding weakening of their centre. The French availed themselves of it; and attacking the original right, which was now the centre of the Austrian posi-

tion, took possession of the village of Thûlin. The Austrians retreated; and, concentrating their means, put their right upon the village of Jemappe upon the Haine, and their left upon the village of Cuesmes. This position they had previously prepared, and strengthened it with several redoubts, in which they had placed artillery.

Notwithstanding this ground had been selected beforehand, it is impossible to say that it was judiciously chosen. Its right cannot be turned; but its left, which is thrown back, can be embraced or enveloped by any quantity of fire the assailant may have at his disposal. It is to be wondered at, that the Austrians did not entrench themselves on the neighbouring heights of Bertaimont; where, it would rather appear, they would have had much greater facilities for a defensive position.

On the 6th November, Dumourier attacked the Austrian army. The villages of Jemappe and of Cuesmes were both taken possession of, although very gallantly defended. The Austrians were compelled to retreat towards Brussels, with the loss of four thousand men in killed and wounded. The French took possession of Mons the next day. The detachment which Dumourier had pushed through Condé, to threaten the right of the Austrian position, previous to his advance, moved forward and took possession of Ath, on the 8th No-

vember, as soon as it was acquainted with the result of the battle of Jemappe.

The Duke of Saxe-Teschen withdrew his different detached corps from the several points they had occupied along the frontier, and concentrated his force at Hälle, in front of Brussels. He evacuated Brussels on the 13th November; and retreating by Louvain and Tirlemont, crossed the Meuse at Liege on the 27th of the same month. The column led by Dumourier, reinforced by its detachment, which had taken possession of Ath, followed the Austrians; and after taking possession of Brussels, Louvain, Tirlemont, and Liege, went into winter-cantonments between the Roer and the Meuse, on the 12th December.

The two columns meant to penetrate by the Meuse and by the Sambre were too late, as has been already stated, to prevent the Austrian corps from the province of Luxembourg passing the Meuse. They, however, descended the valley of the Meuse, after taking possession of Namur; and joined the corps, which had gained the battle of Jemappe, at Liege.

The fourth corps, which was destined to attack Tournai, took possession of that place on the 8th November, without opposition. It afterwards occupied Ghent, Oudenarde, and Antwerp. The citadel of the latter was the only place against which it was necessary to break ground. The

citadel of Antwerp surrendered on the 30th November. A detachment from the garrison of Dunkirk was sent to take possession of Nieuport and Ostend; both of which places opened their gates to the French, the Austrian garrisons having been withdrawn.

Thus, in little more than six weeks, the French were in undisputed possession of the whole of the Austrian Netherlands.

1793.

France declared war against England and Holland on the 1st February of this year. This declaration has been reckoned wanton and premature. The violence and fury of the mad revolutionists, who, at this time, were in possession of the government, could, indeed, only be equalled by their ignorance of the true interests and policy of their country. In this instance, however, they do not appear to have acted injudiciously. It was evident that neither the governments of England or Holland could permit France to remain in possession of the Netherlands; the sovereignty of which they had so very lately, as by the convention at the Hague, of the year 1790, guaranteed to the House of Austria. If, therefore, France meant to keep possession of these provinces, it

was pretty evident she would have ultimately to go to war with England and Holland, as well as with Austria. Under these circumstances, it was better to go to war and to commence hostilities with Holland, at any rate, before that power could be prepared for the encounter.

Dumourier projected a plan for the immediate invasion of Holland. His disposable force, for this expedition, was not more than about 20,000 men. It may, however, be observed, with respect to the early campaigns of the war of the French revolution, that their merits are to be judged by very different principles from those of former wars. The French revolutionary leaders had the art to separate the people of the countries they invaded from their governments. The doctrines of equality and the rights of man preceded their armies, who were hailed as the champions of liberty and friends of the people, until fatal experience taught another lesson. The patriotic party in Holland, put down by the Prussians in 1787, still existed; and the French were invited, and their arrival anxiously looked for at Amsterdam, by all those who wished to get rid of the Stadtholder and to establish a more popular government.

Under these circumstances, and keeping in view that the French were only to be auxiliaries in the business, the scheme of Dumourier will not perhaps be found so rash or impracticable as it would

otherwise appear, if considered as a mere military movement.

To penetrate into Holland, from the Netherlands, it is necessary that the most important branch of the Rhine, called the Wahal, should be passed. Lewis XIV. advancing between the Rhine and the Meuse, in 1672, did indeed turn the natural barrier of the Wahal, by crossing the Rhine at Tollhuys, before the separation of the Wahal from that river; and the French army, in 1702, evidently contemplated the same operation, when the Duke of Marlborough took the command of the allies, and by his prompt and judicious movements compelled them to retreat. Dumourier could not, however, adopt this plan; he was not in possession of the places upon the Meuse and the Rhine. He proposed to pass the Wahal at its mouth, where it forms a small sea, called the Biesbos, from two to three miles wide. There are three communications across this water; from Williamstadt, the Moerdyk, and a small village called Lâge Swaluwe. Williamstadt is a fortified town, and had a garrison. The Lâge Swaluwe was too near to the fortress of Gertruydenberg. The passage at the Moerdyk was the one consequently selected by Dumourier. He assembled the force he meant to employ upon this service at Antwerp, (from whence it is about thirty-seven miles to the Moerdyk,) and commenced his march

on the 22d February, leaving the fortresses of Breda and Gertruydenberg to his right, and Bergenopzoom and Williamstadt to his left. He had no means of crossing the Biesbos, but by the help of such craft as he should be able to seize. He had no haven on the other side to receive him, or tête-de-pont to cover his landing. It is evident that the utmost secrecy and celerity were necessary, to give him a chance of success.

Dumourier, in his Memoirs, complains of the want of activity and energy in the officer commanding his advanced corps, who, by not pushing on sufficiently, permitted the Dutch to withdraw all the better description of vessels. Whilst he attempted to remedy this error, and to procure the requisite craft, the Dutch had time to prepare for his reception on the opposite coast, as also to introduce gun-boats and armed vessels into the Biesbos. It was evident that the scheme had now become impracticable. Dumourier remained, however, some time longer in this country, in hopes of being able to effect the passage of the Biesbos, although every day's delay made the attempt more hazardous. He employed his troops in the mean while in blockading Breda, Gertruydenburg and Williamstadt. He succeeded, after a partial bombardment, in getting possession of the two first, in which there were very inefficient garrisons—Breda had only twelve hun-

dred men and a few cavalry. It was, however, shamefully and prematurely surrendered on the 24th February, after a few shells had been thrown into the town from four mortars and four howitzers only. Gertruydenburg was not better defended, and surrendered on the 5th March to an attack of a similar nature. The Dutch threw reinforcements by water into Williamstadt; and the French, unable to blockade this place, or to cut off its communication with the opposite coast, gave up the attempt to become masters of it, after a few days firing.

Whilst these operations were carrying on upon the shores of the Biesbos, an Austrian army of thirty thousand men was assembled upon the Erft, between the Rhine and the Roer. A second Austrian corps of twenty-five thousand men was upon its march from the Hereditary Dominions, and destined to pass the Rhine at Cologne, or at Wesel, as might be necessary; and an army of Prussians and Hanoverians, under Prince Frederick of Brunswick, had entered the Duchy of Cleves, crossed the Meuse at Grâve, and were advancing upon Boisleduc. It is evident that Dumourier ought to have abandoned his enterprize upon Holland as soon as he had failed in his attempt to surprize the passage of the Biesbos; his presence, and the aid of the troops he had des-

tined for the service in Holland, were required to defend the Netherlands.

The French troops charged with the defence of the Roer appear to have done their duty very negligently; they seem to have been scattered over the country, between the Roer and the Meuse, more with a view to comfortable accommodation in their cantonments, than for any military object. The only people assembled were a corps of fifteen thousand men upon the Meuse, employed to blockade Maestricht.

On the 1st March the Austrians commenced their operations. They pushed the French from behind the Roer across the Meuse, about thirty miles; and from thence to Louvain, about forty-five miles farther. The French concentrated their army upon the heights behind Louvain, having the Dyle on one flank, and the canal from Louvain to Malines on the other; with an advanced guard at Tirlemont, and two intermediate posts, en échelon, at Cumplich and at Bouterseim, to keep up the communication. In this position Dumourier joined them on the 13th March.

It will be remembered that in the year 1705, Marlborough had not been able to force the passage of the Dyle in this very place; and that he was obliged to make a considerable circuit to turn the Dyle, and to bring his army in front of that of the Elector of Bavaria and of Marshal Villeroi.

Dumourier was not, however, contented with this position, although one of the strongest in the Low Countries. He advanced his troops from behind the Dyle, and keeping a corps of reserve in his own hands, between Boutersem and Cumplich across the chaussée between Louvain and Tirlemont, he occupied, with the remainder of his army, the line of the great Geete, placing his right at Judoigne and his left at Diest^{*}, at least thirty miles apart; thus scattering his force at the very moment he ought rather, it would appear, to have kept it concentrated. He even sent a division still lower down the Geete than Diest, to Aerschot, to keep up his communication with the corps he had left near Breda, and which division was still further to detach to Lier. A small body was, moreover, ordered to Turnhout, with a view to the same purpose.

Dumourier had forty thousand infantry and five thousand cavalry with him, between Louvain and Tirlemont; he had eighteen thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry in the neighbourhood of Breda; five thousand troops were detached at Aerschot, Lier, and Turnhout; and a corps of twelve thousand infantry and fifteen hundred cavalry were at Namur and upon the Meuse. His means do not appear to have been insufficient if judiciously employed.

On the morning of the 15th March, the very

day after Dumourier had made the movements above described, the Austrians attacked Tirlemont, which was the central place Dumourier occupied upon the Geete. The French were driven from it, and the corps upon the right and left of Tirlemont, charged with the defence of the Geete, fell back in consequence of the position being forced in the centre. The Austrians did not, however, follow up their blow, and the French re-occupied, at night, the line of the Geete, with the exception of Tirlemont.

On the morning of the 16th March, Dumourier attacked, in force, and retook Tirlemont. If the Austrians meant to keep possession of Tirlemont, they committed an error in not occupying the heights of Oplinter, on the left of the Geete, but which flank the chaussée by which they communicated with Tirlemont. Upon retreating from Tirlemont they suffered from the fire of the French upon this height. The Austrians, after the loss of Tirlemont, retreated behind the small Geete, and put their right at the village of Neerlanden, their left at that of Overwinden, and occupied Neerwinden in their centre. The French crossed the great Geete, and put themselves in position opposite to the Austrians, with their right at Goidsenhove, and their left at the bridge of Orsmael, upon the little Geete.

The 17th of March passed quietly, each army remaining in its position.

On the morning of the 18th, Dumourier attacked the Austrians. The French advanced in eight columns. The one upon their right was destined to attack the Austrian left, and to turn it, between Landen and Overwinden; the second to take possession of the high ground at what is called the tomb of Middlewinde, from whence it was to cannonade the village of Overwinden, occupied, as already stated, by the Austrians; the third, fourth and fifth to carry the village of Neerwinden; the sixth to attack Neerlanden; the seventh to turn the Austrian right, and advance by the chaussée towards St. Tron; the eighth to take possession of the town of Leuw, a little lower down the Geete than the Austrian position.

The different columns moved from their ground about seven o'clock. The one upon the right penetrated between Landen and Overwinden, and subsequently attacked the village of Overwinden on its left. The second column gained the high ground of the tomb of Middlewinde, from whence it commenced cannonading the village of Overwinden, and threw the first column into confusion. The Austrians drove back this column, and retook the tomb of Middlewinde. The three columns destined for the attack of Neerwinden at one time had penetrated into the village; but they were re-

pulsed by the Austrian infantry, and suffered severely by the Austrian cavalry, who charged them from both sides of the village after their failure. The sixth and seventh columns could not be brought to pass the Geete; whether from the circumstance of their being new troops, or the want of spirit on the part of those appointed to lead them, does not appear. The eighth column quietly took possession of Leuw, which the Austrians had not occupied.

It would thus appear that the only column which was successful was the one upon the left, directed to take possession of Leuw, where no opposition was offered; and yet Dumourier, in his *Mémoires*, asserts that he had at one period won the battle. He certainly showed considerable talents in stopping the Prussian armies at St. Menchault, in France, in the preceding year; as also in his plan and arrangements for the invasion of the Netherlands. His scheme for passing the Bies-bos and penetrating into Holland may have been practicable, from the state of parties at that time, if executed with secrecy and celerity; but his persevering in that attempt after the Dutch government had time to prepare to oppose him; his allowing his army to be driven from the Roer to Louvain, without being present to give any orders or directions at the period he was most wanted; his subsequent re-advance from the strong ground be-

hind the Dyle, without any apparent motive; and his fighting this battle of Neerwinden, without previously concentrating his means, would rather tend to make his having possessed such splendid military talents and judgment as have been imputed to him, very questionable.

The very same ground, thus defended by the Austrians, was before remarkable for having been occupied by King William, in 1693, when attacked by Marshal Luxembourg. King William, however, fronted in a different direction, as the French advanced upon him from the Meuse. The particulars of the battle are detailed in the account of the transactions of that year.

The French did not lose more than four thousand men at the battle of Neerwinden by the sword; but the disorganization and desertion that took place in their army was very considerable. Dumourier did not, however, retreat, nor the Austrians follow up their victory so rapidly as might have been expected. He only withdrew from Tirlemont (within five miles of the field of battle), in the night of the 19th March. On the 22d of the same month, having continued his retreat as far as Louvain, he entered into an agreement at that place, with the Austrians, to evacuate the Netherlands. In all probability, considerations of a personal nature, and the apprehensions of being dragged to the scaffold for his want of success, by the revolutionary madmen who

governed France at that period, must have influenced Dumourier's conduct, and have pointed out to him the policy of securing the protection of Austria; as there does not appear any good military reason for his having abandoned the contest without a further struggle. The French army retreated by Brussels and Tournai into France.

Whilst these transactions were carrying on with the corps more immediately under Dumourier's own orders, the troops he had destined for the attack of Holland had been placed in garrison in Breda, Gertruydenberg, and in Antwerp. All these places capitulated, after the loss of the battle of Neerwinden; and the French corps at Namur retreated up the Meuse, and was placed in Givët and Maubeuge. By the end of the first week in April, there was not a French soldier in the Netherlands.

The French government having issued an order to arrest Dumourier, and to bring him to Paris, (which, in those days, was pretty tantamount to a sentence of death,) this officer fled to the Austrian head-quarters. He made some ineffectual attempts to interest the army in his quarrel; but as the multitude generally judge of a cause by its success, it must be acknowledged that he chose an unfortunate moment to try the attachment of his soldiers.

General Dampierre was appointed to the command of the French army. He adopted the same

plan which had been followed in the commencement of the preceding year, to restore the discipline and confidence of the troops. He collected them in entrenched camps at different parts of the frontier entrusted to his charge, between the Meuse and the sea ; Givèt, upon the Meuse ; Charleroi and Maubeuge, upon the Sambre ; Famars, near Valenciennes ; the Plain of the Magdalen, near Lille ; and Mount Cassel, near St. Omer, were the points he selected.

The Austrian army, which had followed that of Dumourier, had its head-quarters at Mons. It had been joined by ten thousand Prussians, and this united force was placed in a line of positions opposite to France from Namur to Menin.

On the 9th April, the combined Austrian and Prussian army made a general forward movement, threatening equally Lille, Valenciennes, Condé, and Maubeuge. The line of the Scheldt appears, however, to have been the one they had determined upon for their operations.

In the Duke of Marlborough's campaigns, not only the government of Holland, but the assemblies of the states of the different provinces, and the inhabitants themselves, were so hearty and sincere in the cause, (which was, in fact, their own fully as much as it was that of England,) that the greatest good will was manifested in forwarding assistance of every kind from that country ; and,

doubtless, the aid to be derived from thence influenced the Duke of Marlborough in always keeping up his communication by water with Holland. In the present war, however, circumstances were different: the French had persuaded the people of the Seven-United-Provinces that they were not at war with them, but with their government. There was a strong party against the Stadtholder: the same cordial co-operation could not be expected, whatever the wishes of the better-disposed part of the inhabitants or of the members of the government might have been. These reflections occur in weighing the propriety of the motives which may be thought to have influenced the advance of the Austrians by the Scheldt. It afforded the advantage of water-carriage from Holland, as far as Cambrai, for the conveyance of the stores, ammunition and battering guns of an invading army. On the other side, however, there were the inconveniencies of four sieges, as Condé, Valenciennes, Bouchain, and Cambrai, were necessarily to be taken before the navigation of the Scheldt could be made use of. As the Austrians had to bring their battering-train, with every shot and shell they required, from Vienna, with a great deal of land-carriage, the selection of the line of the Scheldt, for their advance into France, does not appear to have been peculiarly happy. They had to encounter the evils of the sieges, without the prospect of receiv-

ing any benefit from the navigation of the river, in their further operations after they had captured the places. Surely that line ought to have been chosen for their advance into France, which gave them fewer and smaller fortresses to besiege, and required, consequently, less stores and materials to be brought from such a distance.

Such a line seems to have offered itself from Mons, by Maubeuge and Avesnes. If the Austrians had advanced by this road, there would have been only an absolute necessity for besieging these two small places. Landrecies and Quesnoi would have been upon their right; but these fortresses are not of an extent or magnitude to have contained any corps d'armée to have acted upon the Austrian flank. Situated at the distance of from twelve to twenty miles from the chaussée from Mons to Laon, they might have been passed without any great risk, and the Austrian army conducted to the Aisne and the Oise in a very short space of time.

It is true that, by advancing thus by their left, the Austrians would have exposed Flanders, upon their right, to have been again over-run by the French. But, independent of its not being very likely that the French would invade Flanders, whilst an enemy was in their own country, the Austrians had the fortresses of Antwerp, Ostend, Nieuport, and Ypres, the last of which, although partly demolished by the Emperor Joseph, and its

outworks destroyed, still (by the help of its inundations) was susceptible of being made a very good temporary place. If sufficient garrisons had been allotted to these four fortresses, and a disposable corps left between the Lys and the Scheldt, under an intelligent officer, for the defence of Flanders, it would seem that there would have been a greater chance of success, than by undertaking these very heavy sieges, and attacking simultaneously the whole extent of the French frontier. By the former, time was given to the enemy to raise and equip his reinforcements; and by the latter, the advantages of science, skill, and previous training, were thrown away; as the war necessarily became a war of posts and skirmishes, in which the French young soldiers, intelligent, zealous, and active, had the opportunity afforded them of acquiring experience and confidence.

The French fell back, generally, along the frontier, in consequence of the Austrian movements of the 9th April: they even evacuated their entrenched camp at Famars, in the rear of Valenciennes. The Austrians invested Condé on the 16th of the same month. One column, from Tournai, moving by Maulde and St. Amant, was able to reach the left bank of that part of the Scheldt between Valenciennes and Condé; another corps was pushed to the right bank from Mons by Quievrain. The investment, or blockade, was thus complete.

The French attacked, with various success, on different days, the Austrian corps to the right and left, upon the Sambre and upon the Lys, as also their advanced posts at Orchies and Lannoy, looking towards Lille. They re-occupied their camp at Famars; and on the 1st May, made a general attack, advancing from thence and from Orchies, upon the Austrian and Prussian troops employed to blockade Condé, at Maulde, St. Amant, Raines, and the different posts held by them. They were, however, every where repulsed, after an obstinate engagement, and retreated again to the heights of Famars.

As far back as in February, in this year, when the Dutch government were alarmed by the threatened invasion and passage of the Biesbos by Dumourier, a brigade of the British Guards had been sent to Holland. These troops, since considerably reinforced, and united with a Hanoverian corps, advanced (under the command of H. R. H. the Duke of York) to join the Austrians, and prolonged the right of the allied army from Tournai to Courtrai. A Dutch corps d'armée, which had moved forward into the Netherlands, at the same time, occupied Menin.

On the 8th May, the French made another effort to relieve Condé. They were, however, every where repulsed, and lost their general in chief Dampierre. The English army came into action

on this day, for the first time in this war; and commenced a contest, which may be said not to have ended until their march to Paris, in 1815. It was in directing an attack against the British, that General Dampierre was understood to have lost his life from a shot from an English field-piece.

On the 23d May, the allies made a general forward movement; attacked all the French posts from Orchies to Maubeuge; and, carrying the entrenched camp of Famars with the bayonet, invested Valenciennes on the next day. The French collected their principal forces between Bouchain and Cambrai, behind the river Sanzet, at its junction with the Scheldt, where there are the remains of some ancient entrenchments known by the name of Cæsar's Camp.

The allies determined to undertake the siege of Valenciennes, and to trust to a blockade for the surrender of Condé, the charge of which was given to the Duke of Wirtemberg. H. R. H. the Duke of York took the command of that proportion of the army destined to besiege Valenciennes; and the Prince of Saxe-Cobourg, with the remainder, covered the operation.

The Austrian battering-train, consisting of one hundred and seventy-eight pieces of artillery, with the proportion of one thousand shot for each gun, and six hundred shells for each mortar and howitzer, and the requisite quantity of powder, was

on its way from Vienna. It required ten weeks for its conveyance; and this immense train was obliged to be divided into separate columns, to be moved in succession, at fixed intervals, in order to be able to procure the means of transport. Accustomed as we are to the assistance of shipping, the convenience of wharfs, and the peculiar activity and talent of seamen in landing great weights, the moving of two hundred pieces of heavy ordnance does not immediately, perhaps, appear any thing very difficult or extraordinary. But, if the distance, and the quantity of the land-carriage absolutely necessary, be taken into consideration, the conducting of such a train from Vienna, to besiege Valenciennes, must be looked upon as a very surprising effort.

As the first division of the Austrian battering-train only arrived at Ath on the 11th May, and the remainder could not be expected until towards the end of the month, the Prince of Cobourg applied to the States of Holland, and, after some difficulties, obtained the loan of one hundred and fourteen heavy guns and mortars, with a due proportion of shot, shells, and powder, from them. These indispensable articles were conveyed by water to Brussels, and from thence obliged to be transported by land-carriage, thirty-five miles farther, to Ath, which town was fixed upon as the general depôt for the materials and stores requisite for the siege of Valen-

ciennes; Ath is twenty miles from Valenciennes; and all this heavy ordnance, together with the addition of the balks and planks for platforms, was to be carried this further distance. These particulars are entered into with a view of giving any military man, who has not turned his mind to this branch of his profession, and into whose hands these sheets may fall, some idea of the details and arrangements requisite to be attended to, in order to bring the siege of an important fortress to a successful issue. Cæsar calls the baggage of his army impedimenta. What would he have said to a modern siege-equipment?

The trenches were opened against Valenciennes on the night of the 13th June. The attacks were carried on against the hornwork of Mons, pushed out beyond the body of the place between the Scheldt and the little rivulet the Rhonelle. Valenciennes was surrendered on the 28th of the same month, although there was no breach in the body of the place. The very heavy concentrated fire brought upon the front attacked, not only from the batteries in the trenches, but from enfilading ricochet batteries established on the heights above the villages of Marly and of Anzin, caused such an amazing loss to the garrison, and dismounted so much of their ordnance, that they were compelled to surrender. In the official journal of this siege by the Austrian General Unterberger, who commanded the artillery, it is amusing to read his

statement of six eighteen-pounders and six mortars being lent to the British artillery, as a very great favour, from the Imperial park, in order to enable them to have two batteries of their own on the left of those of the Austrians. In a few days, however, they fired away all the ammunition he gave them; and the guns had run at their vents, in consequence, as he states, of too rapid firing. He, therefore, would neither change the guns, nor send any more powder to such improvident soldiers. The arsenal at Woolwich may be said to have repaid, with interest, during the war, this little accommodation of General Unterberger's.

This siege of Valenciennes is remarkable for affording the first practical proof of the besieger being able to blow in the galleries to the countermines of the besieged, without being compelled to approach so near as was formerly judged necessary; and, in so much, has rendered the art of mining less useful for defence. It was a received opinion, that no additional quantity of powder exploded in a mine beyond what was required to cause an excavation, would have any lateral effect, at a greater distance than the length of its line of least resistance; or, in other words, that no more mischief would be done by loading a mine with one thousand than with one hundred pounds of powder, at equal depths from the surface. The term "globe of compression" is applied to designate the space sup-

posed to be acted upon by the powder. The Austrians made use of this expression at Valenciennes, to distinguish these overloaded mines, three of which they exploded previous to the assaulting of the hornwork. They found that they could extend the shock, by adding to the powder, to the distance of three times what had been assumed as an incontrovertible fact; and, of course, injure their enemies' galleries within that additional space. It would, indeed, appear, that much more, upon this subject, is yet to be learnt.

Whilst the siege of Valenciennes was carrying on, Condé was taken possession of; the garrison having been compelled to surrender for want of provisions. Condé capitulated on the 12th July.

After the capture of Valenciennes, the allied army moved up the right bank of the Scheldt; and proposed, by crossing that river at Creve-Cœur, above Cambrai, to inclose the French corps which occupied the camp of Cæsar, in the peninsula formed by the junction of the Scheldt and the Sanzet. The French evacuated the camp of Cæsar, and, crossing the Sanzet at the Bac-au-bancheuil and at Palluel, retreated behind the Scarp above Douai. They previously threw a sufficient garrison into Cambrai, which was thus left to itself.—It was invested on the same day, the 8th of August, by a detachment of the allied army, but which was subsequently withdrawn.

The Austrians having decided to besiege Quesnoy, and there appearing no enemy likely to disturb them in that operation, after this retreat of the French behind the Scarp, it was determined that an impression should be made upon French Flanders. His Royal Highness the Duke of York, with the British, Hanoverians, and Hessians, separated from Prince Cobourg, and marching by Valenciennes and Tournai, crossed the Lys, between Menin and Wervicke, on his march towards Dunkirk, which it was proposed to besiege. It was upon this occasion that, upon the 18th of August, the British Guards distinguished themselves by driving with the bayonet, with so much gallantry, a very superior number of the enemy out of the village of Lincelles, situated upon the chaussée between Lille and Wervicke.

The troops destined for the operations against Dunkirk were assembled at Furnes; and marched from thence towards Dunkirk on the 23d of August. From Furnes to Dunkirk is about twelve miles. The approach is by a deep sandy tongue of land, a little more than a mile broad; bounded, in looking towards Dunkirk, on the right, by the sea; and, on the left, by the canal from Furnes to Dunkirk. Beyond this canal is an immense marsh, or swamp, called the Grande Mocr, about seven miles long by four in breadth. The town of Bergues is about five miles distant from Dunkirk

inland. Furnes, Dunkirk, and Bergues, form a triangle, connected together by canals which surround and inclose the Grande Moer.

The corps which marched from Furnes on the 23d of August, advanced in three columns, along the space between the canal and the sea, as explained, drove in the French advanced piquets, and commenced their operations against Dunkirk.—From the description, however, of the situation of Dunkirk, it is evident that troops approaching from this quarter alone could not invest the place, nor prevent the enemy from throwing in what reinforcements he might think proper, either from Bergues or from Gravelines. This only could be done by the covering army being placed in such a situation as to cut off all communication between Dunkirk and the country. It would appear, from a slight view of the map, that the possession of Bergues is an almost indispensable preliminary step to the siege of Dunkirk. The covering army, commanded by the Hanoverian marshal, Freytag, was, upon the present occasion, not only not in possession of Bergues, but it was placed in position in the rear of Bergues, at Hondshoote, half-way between Bergues and Furnes, with its right flank upon the canal. In this situation it was attacked on the 8th of September, and after the loss of 1,500 men, compelled to retire toward Furnes.—This defeat of the covering corps necessitated the imme-

diate retreat of the besieging army ; as it is evident that, had the enemy followed up his blow, and reached Furnes before the British army, it would have been in a very awkward predicament, with the sea on one side, the Grande Moer on the other ; cooped up in a narrow sandy isthmus, with a fortress in its front and an enemy in its rear. The British* were obliged to leave thirty-two heavy guns behind them, in front of Dunkirk, for want of means of transport.

Whilst these operations had been carrying on against Dunkirk, the Austrians had pressed successfully the siege of Quesnoy, which capitulated on the 9th of September. They now determined to pass the Sambre, and to attempt to get possession of Maubeuge and of Landrecies. The British, Dutch, and Hanoverians, leaving the sea-coast, approached the Austrians, and encamped at Cisoing, between Lille and Orchies. The Austrians crossed the Sambre on the 29th of September, and invested both Landrecies and Maubeuge. They were joined by the British, Hanoverians, and Dutch on the 5th and 8th of October ; and the allied army put itself in position, on the right of the Sambre, with its head-quarters at Watignies. A good deal of severe fighting took place, but without any marked result. The Austrians gave up the idea of besieging either Maubeuge or Landrecies during the present campaign ; and the allies repassed the Sambre, and

went into winter-quarters about the middle of November. The English and Hanoverian head-quarters at Ghent—the Austrians at Mons—the Dutch at Leige. The Prussian troops had been withdrawn some time to assist in the operations of that power upon the Rhine.

Thus ended a very eventful campaign in which the allies had been eminently successful. In the commencement of the year the French were in possession of the Netherlands, occupied the country between the Roer and the Meuse, and were endeavouring to penetrate into Holland. They were now not only confined within their own limits, but three of their fortresses, Condé, Valenciennes, and Quesnoy were garrisoned by the Austrians.

Much censure has been bestowed upon the attempt to get possession of Dunkirk; and the reverses which the allies experienced, in the ensuing year, have been attributed to the separation of the British forces from that of the Austrians. In this view of the subject, in order to enhance the merits of their own success at Hondschoote, when they attacked the covering army, all the French writers and compilers of memoirs agree. This generally-received opinion appears, nevertheless, to be erroneous.—If the British and Hanoverian army had remained with the Austrians during the siege of Quesnoy, all that they could have done would have

been to cover that operation. As the siege suffered no interruption, it follows that their absence was not detrimental. It may, perhaps, be said that they might have besieged Maubeuge or Landrecies while the Austrians were occupied with Quesnoy. But they had no battering train of their own; and from the little anecdote of General Unterberger, mentioned in the account of the siege of Valenciennes, it would not appear that the Imperialists were willing to lend them one, had such an operation been deemed advisable. The capture of Dunkirk would have been of the utmost consequence to the allies.—It would have secured to the English a speedy communication with England, on the right flank of their line of operations, and given them a tête-de-pont of their own for the reception of the reinforcements, ammunition, and stores required from thence. The object was worth the attempt; and, although unsuccessful, it doubtless contributed to the facility with which the Austrians took Quesnoy, by distracting the attention of the French, and compelling them to assemble an army upon their left flank, which otherwise might have been employed in reinforcing their right. It seems only to be lamented that Marshal Freytag's army was not more numerous, and that it was not placed in a more judicious position.

1794.

The allied army was assembled early in April between the Sambre and the Scheldt, and was reviewed near Catteau-Cambresis, on the 16th of that month, by the Emperor Francis II. It was divided into three corps.—The first was formed by the Imperial troops, and was commanded by the Prince of Saxe-Cobourg.—The second consisted of the British, Hanoverians, Hessians, and Austrians, and was under the orders of His Royal Highness the Duke of York.—The third, led by the Hereditary Prince of Orange, the present King of the Netherlands, was composed of the Dutch troops and the Austrian corps of General La Tour.

The French, on their side, had made amazing efforts to reinforce and to organise their army. However detestable and horrid the conduct of the sanguinary tyrants who had usurped the power of the French government, it is impossible not to do them the justice to say that they were sincere in their desire to prevent the invasion of their country. It cannot be said of them, as of Cæsar, “The virtues of humanity were theirs.” But they possessed the useful qualities of activity and energy, however disgraced by crimes and odious by innumerable villanies.

The French army was posted with its right at Landrecies upon the Sambre, and its left near Guise, upon the Oise. The allied army moved in eight columns, upon the morning of the 17th of April, attacked the French, dislodged them, drove them behind the Oise, and invested Landrecies.

Pichegru, who had been appointed to command the French armies destined to defend that frontier opposite to the Netherlands, seeing what little chance he had, with his new levies, of being able to oppose such very fine troops, and in such considerable numbers as were now brought against him, determined to make his principal effort upon his left, and to invade Flanders; trusting that his success in that undertaking would induce the allied army to make a considerable detachment to its right, and that it might thus be prevented from following up its success, and advancing upon the Oise.

In pursuance of this plan, he proceeded himself to Lille, and directed the movements of two heavy columns from thence on the 26th April. The first, consisting of twenty thousand men, was employed to blockade Menin. The second, which amounted to thirty thousand, was pushed beyond Menin to Courtray; of which town it took possession. The fortifications of Courtray had been completely dismantled by Joseph; but the enceinte of Menin was still susceptible of some defence.

To mask this operation, he ordered the garrison of Cambray, reinforced by whatever disposable French troops could be collected from the Scheldt, to attack, upon the same morning, His Royal Highness the Duke of York, who was in position upon the heights of Catteau-Cambresis to cover the siege of Landrecies. The French troops employed upon this service amounted to thirty thousand. They advanced in three columns. Their attack was impetuous; but they were repulsed, and driven back into Cambray, with considerable loss, leaving their general a prisoner behind them.

Two days previous to this action on the heights of Catteau, a patrol of cavalry, of the allied army, in advancing to reconnoitre what force the enemy might have collected at Cæsar's Camp on the Scheldt, fell in with a very superior corps, composed both of infantry and cavalry, at the village of Villars-en-Cauchie, which they immediately attacked and dispersed. This affair could have no effect upon the general result of the campaign; but it was so very creditable to the troops engaged, particularly to the British 15th regiment of light dragoons, that it ought not to be passed over as one of those daily skirmishes which constantly take place in the vicinity of large armies.

The Austrian general, Clairfait, who was charged with the defence of the Netherlands during the absence of the allied army upon the Sambre, as-

sembled his disposable force at Tournai; from whence he advanced to Moescron, commanding the communication between Courtrai and Menin, in hopes to be able to relieve Menin, of which the French had not yet got possession.

In this situation Pichegru attacked him on the 29th April, and drove him back to Tournai with considerable loss. General Hamerstein, with four battalions of Hanoverians and four companies of emigrants, which composed the garrison, seeing no prospect of being relieved, evacuated Menin during the night, and gallantly forced his way through the enemy. The French took possession of Menin the next day.

Clairfait left Tournai, and, descending by the Scheldt, crossed the Lys below Courtrai, and established his head-quarters at Thielt, about ten miles in advance of the canal between Ghent and Bruges, twenty miles from Ghent, and not quite so much from Bruges. Having been reinforced, he re-advanced on the 10th May to endeavour to dislodge the French from Courtrai. He put himself in position between the two chaussées, leading respectively from the towns of Menin and Courtrai to Bruges. The French, sallying forth from both Menin and Courtrai, after a very severe engagement compelled him again to retreat to Thielt.

Whilst these operations were carrying on in Flanders, Landrecies was surrendered to the Aus-

trians. Instead, however, of following up their success upon the Sambre, the attention of the allies was necessarily drawn towards the Lys in consequence of Pichegru's success; and his plan was already so far successful, that all idea of invading France was, for the present, suspended.

His Royal Highness the Duke of York's corps d'armée left the Sambre, and assembled at Tournai, to assist General Clairfait. The French, advancing from Lille, attacked His Royal Highness's army, in position in front of Tournai, on the 11th May, but were repulsed with considerable loss. It was agreed upon that His Royal Highness should move from Tournai toward the Lys; whilst General Clairfait, advancing from Thielt, should pass that river at Werwick; and after effecting his junction with the Duke of York, they should attack the French at Courtrai with their united force.

The allied army, under His Royal Highness's orders, moved in five columns, on the night of the 16th May, for these objects, which were to be attempted on the morning of the 17th. The two columns of the left had to dislodge the French posts, along the banks of the Marque, in front of Lille, which were found stronger than was expected; and more time being required in consequence, the services of these troops were not available for any further operations during this day. The column upon the right reported the enemy in

too great numbers at Moescron, and fell back, without making any attack, to the Scheldt. Thus there only remained, disposable, two columns, consisting each of fourteen battalions, with some cavalry. These troops were pushed forward in hopes of being able to communicate with General Clairfait; but they were not able, from the opposition they experienced, to reach the chaussée between Lille and Courtrai. The next morning, surrounded by the enemy, in very superior numbers, who had advanced from Lille, it was with the utmost difficulty, and only with a considerable loss, that they were enabled to make good their retreat. General Clairfait advanced on his side, crossed the Lys, and reached the villages of Blaton and of Lincelles; from whence he was also compelled to retreat, and to fall back again to Thielt. The French, emboldened by their success, attacked the allied army on the 22d May, which was in position in front of Tournai, and under the immediate command of the Emperor Francis in person. They commenced their attack soon after day-light, and continued it for twelve hours, by bringing up a constant succession of fresh troops. This appears to have been as harassing and severe an action as was fought during the whole war. The French left twelve thousand men upon the field.

Pichegru moved to his left, and invested Ypres on the 1st June. He placed a corps to cover the

siege towards Rousselaere, with its right at Paschendaale, and its left at Langhmarcq. Ypres surrendered on the 17th June. Clairfait advanced from Thielt to Rousselaere to endeavour to raise the siege; but was compelled again to retreat, after a severe action, in which both parties suffered considerably. Pichegru continuing to descend the Lys, Clairfait quitted Thielt, and put himself behind the canal between Ghent and Bruges. At Ghent he was reinforced by a corps of about five thousand British infantry, which arrived there on the 21st June, having been disembarked a few days before at Ostend, under the command of the present Marquis of Hastings. The French attempted to make themselves masters of Ghent, on the 24th June, but were repulsed. On the 1st July, however, they entered Bruges; and on the same day the fortress of Ostend was surrendered to them.

The Emperor Francis having returned to Vienna soon after the battle in front of Tournai, of the 22d May, there was, unfortunately, no person in the Netherlands having sufficient authority or influence with the armies of the different allied powers to enable him to direct their movements, and combine the operations of the whole for the general good. To this want of a directing authority must be attributed the loss of Ostend. There appears no reason why this very important

fortress should have been abandoned. Surely Clairfait, instead of retreating by Ghent to Brussels, (which he did upon Pichegru's further advance,) ought to have looked to the security of Ostend. The corps under his orders, reinforced by that lately landed from England, was perfectly adequate to have kept Ostend and Nieuport; the possession of which places would have been of the utmost importance.

During these operations in Flanders, the French had considerably reinforced their army opposed to that of the Austrians upon the Sambre. They descended its right bank, and crossing above and below Charleroi, invested that fortress. The Dutch army joined that of the Austrians upon the Sambre, and the French were repeatedly driven back across that river. They, however, constantly renewed the attack; and at length established themselves, in force, on the left of the Sambre, and succeeded in making themselves masters of Charleroi, after a siege of twelve days. Charleroi was taken possession of on the 28th June.

The outworks of Charleroi had been destroyed by the Emperor Joseph; but the body of the place had not been injured. Since the battle of Neerwinden great exertions had been made by the Austrians to put Charleroi in a respectable state of defence: they had surrounded the escarp by earth-works, which they had caused to be pali-

saded and fraised; mounted fifty pieces of artillery, and allotted a garrison of three thousand men to its defence. It ought not to have been surrendered so easily.

The very day on which the French had got possession of Charleroi, the united Austrian and Dutch army advanced to relieve it. The French army was dispersed in the shape of a semi-circle round Charleroi, at about five miles equidistant from that fortress, considered as the centre; having their left at Fontaine-l'Evêque, up the Sambre, and their right at Lambusart, down the river. They occupied Fontaine-l'Evêque, Trazigny, Gosselies, Fleurus, and Lambusart. If the French position should appear too extensive, what must be thought of the mode adopted to attack it? Instead of concentrating his means, and assailing the weakest points with an overwhelming force, Prince Saxe-Cobourg divided his army into five distinct corps; each corps making its own individual attack upon a separate point of the French semi-circle. Such were the arrangements for the battle of Fleurus. The results were, that the allied columns were repulsed; one attack only (that upon the French right, at Lambusart) was successful. The columns, however, which had penetrated being opposed in front by the French troops who had again rallied, and attacked upon their right flank by those divisions of the French to the left

of Lambusart, who had repelled the attack upon themselves, they were obliged to retire.

After the loss of the battle of Fleurus, the Austrians seem to have abandoned all idea of keeping possession of the Netherlands. They retreated to Mont-St.-Jean, in the first instance, in front of Brussels. They moved by their left, on the 6th July, to Corbecq; and subsequently by Tirlemont and Tongres to Liege, taking up a position near the chartreuse at this place to secure the bridge over the Meuse. Here they waited until they were joined by General Clairfait, who, leaving Ghent on the 2d July, marched by Alost to Brussels; which he evacuated on the 8th of the same month. On the 27th July the Austrian army crossed the Meuse; from which day may be dated the cessation of the Austrian authority in the Netherlands.

The English and Hanoverian army at Tournai, by the success of Pichegru upon one flank, and the retreat of the Austrians, after the battle of Fleurus, upon the other, was thus left in an awkward predicament. Pichegru had already agitated the idea of crossing the Scheldt at Oudenarde, and getting between this army and its retreat. It began, indeed, to be a question of some importance in which line it should retreat. Ghent and Ostend were already in possession of the enemy. The French army, which had gained the battle of Fleurus, was advancing upon Brussels. His Royal Highness

the Duke of York, under these circumstances, caused Tournai to be evacuated. The British and Hanoverian army fell back by Renaix to the valley of the Dender, which was in fact the only road open to them; and being reinforced at Alost by the five thousand men disembarked at Ostend, as already stated, they took up a position behind the canal between Louvain and Malines, and put themselves in communication with the Dutch troops near to the latter place. The Dutch corps d'armée had retreated, after the battle of Fleurus, by Sambref and Nivelles to Brussels; and from thence, on its way towards Holland, halted behind the canal already mentioned. On its march from Nivelles to Brussels, this army crossed the future field of Waterloo. It was under the command of the Hereditary Prince of Orange, the present King of the Netherlands. It made a stand on the 6th July in front of the entrance into the forest of Soignies, more to the rear and to the right than the British position of the 18th June, 1815. The French turned its right, getting between Braine-la-leud and the forest; and, of course, rendered an immediate retreat necessary.

It is a curious coincidence of circumstances, not only that an action should have been fought on the ground destined twenty-one years afterwards to be the scene of a battle which was to establish the kingdom of the Netherlands, but that the future

king of the country, his present Majesty, should have been present, and commanded the Dutch corps engaged.

The two French armies (the one which had gained the battle of Fleurus, and the other which had overrun Flanders) were both directed upon Brussels, where they formed their junction on the 11th July. His Royal Highness the Duke of York, in consequence, withdrew from behind the Malines canal, and retreated behind the Nethe on the 15th of the same month. The French again divided their force; and whilst Pichegru, with one army, followed the English, Hanoverians, and Dutch; Jourdan, with the remaining corps, was directed to march upon the Meuse in pursuit of the Austrians.

From the banks of the Nethe to the frontiers of Holland there is about thirty miles of poor country, (what the French call *bruyère*,) affording very little resource to an army. This was crossed by the retreating allied forces. The Dutch, marching to Ramsdonk, put themselves behind a branch of the Meuse, called the Oude Maas, between Heusden and Gertruydenberg, with their head-quarters at Gorcum. The Duke of York's army occupied the line of the Aa, a stream which flows through Bois-le-duc, where it joins the Dummel, and soon afterwards, with their united waters, runs into the Meuse.

By these retrograde movements, not only Antwerp and the Scheldt were abandoned, but the Dutch fortresses of Breda, Bergenopzoom, and their possessions of Dutch Brabant and of Dutch Flanders, were exposed to the enemy. It appears, at first view of the subject, matter of regret that the fortress of Antwerp and its citadel should not have been occupied by a sufficient garrison from the British army. On the left flank of the French it would have been to them a considerable inconvenience, and would have retarded their advance towards Holland. But it must be remembered that Antwerp is fifty miles from the sea; and as an enemy, master of the country, could easily cut off all communication by the Scheldt; and as, consequently, reinforcements could neither be forwarded from England, nor the garrison withdrawn in case of necessity, any British troops left there would in all probability have been sacrificed. The Austrians, who had the civil and military authority in the Low Countries, had already shewn, by the way in which they had withdrawn from Ostend, that they did not attach much value to the maintaining a communication between England and the Netherlands; and now that their armies had evacuated the country and retreated beyond the Meuse, there appeared no probable means of collecting a sufficient force (for some time, at any rate) capable of compelling the French to desist from the blockade or siege of

Antwerp. These reasons must have influenced the abandoning of Antwerp, of which the French took possession without the expense of a shot.

The conduct of the Austrian government seems difficult to account for by any acknowledged principle of civil or military policy. They made great exertions to rescue the Netherlands from the French in the beginning of this very year: they collected a fine army—the Emperor himself came to animate it with his presence, and to partake its glory. Every thing shewed a determination, not only to keep possession of the Netherlands, but to add to their possessions in those provinces, by conquering additional territory from France; but, no sooner did Pichegru penetrate into Flanders on the one side, and the Prince of Saxe-Cobourg lose the battle of Fleurus on the other, (evils which, although considerable, appear by no means to have been irreparable,) than they abandoned the country without attempting any further defence, and yielded up the fortresses without an effort. A war of any duration, in the Netherlands, could not, doubtless, have been maintained by Austria, at such a distance from her resources, without considerable expense, amounting, in all probability, to more than the pecuniary benefit she could have derived from the revenues of those provinces for years. But there is a character for consistency and for firmness essentially necessary to be preserved by all states, (and

more particularly by military ones, which are so much founded upon public opinion,) the expenditure of which cannot be reduced to calculation. The Austrian court would hardly have it to be imagined, that, in assembling their army upon the heights of Catteau-Cambresis, and in carrying the war into France, they looked for an uninterrupted course of victory. They must have been aware that reverses are to be expected; and, as it would appear, they ought, in this instance, at any rate, to have been better prepared to encounter them. Another campaign in the Netherlands might have prevented those upon the Danube and in Italy.

The Austrian Netherlands being thus abandoned to their fate, the next object for the British and Hanoverian army was to assist the Dutch government in preventing the invasion of Holland. For this purpose His Royal Highness the Duke of York conducted it across the Wahal at Nimeguen, and placed it on the right bank of that river, and in communication with the Dutch army which had crossed the Wahal lower down at Gorcum. A great deal of agitation and disaffection to their government prevailed in Holland; and there was a violent party against the Stadtholder, who were anxious for the success of the French. The military position of the allied army, there was every reason to hope, however, would prevent the enemy from entering Holland; notwithstanding that Breda, Bois-le-duc, and,

generally speaking, all the Dutch fortresses on the left bank of the Wahal, even Nimeguen included, although so close to the allied line of defence, had fallen into the hands of the French with very little trouble. Few of these places were either armed, garrisoned, or provisioned, for a siege. The Dutch government were very well disposed; but the forms of their complicated administration were not calculated for an emergency which required great activity and decision. The reverses of the war had come upon them unexpectedly, and before they were prepared. Some of their officers, in charge of these fortresses, were moreover anxious for a change of government, and availed themselves of the state of their garrisons as an excuse to surrender with little or no opposition. The governor of Grâve must be mentioned as an honourable exception: he defended Grâve for sixty days, and only then surrendered for want of provisions.

The French army, which followed the Austrians across the Meuse, not only overran the country between the Meuse and the Rhine, and made themselves masters of all the places upon the Meuse with little or no opposition, but, after the retreat of the Austrians across the Rhine, took possession of Bonn and of Cologne.

With the surrender of Grâve, which took place on the 28th December, ended the military events of the year 1794; a year which had no little influ-

ence on the succeeding events of the war. The incursion of Dumourier into the Netherlands had been rapid; but he had as rapidly been driven out; and the established high character of the Austrian army, and of the science and talents of the Austrian generals, had not suffered in the estimation of Europe. But now that the élite of their troops had been beaten, and that their government withdrew from provinces it had undertaken, with so much éclat, to defend; in so much as the Austrian army had been high in estimation, so now did that of the French republic gain ground. This opinion, whether true or otherwise, very much facilitated, of course, their future conquests.

1795.

The severe frost, with which this year commenced, did away all the advantages of the line of defence adopted by the allied army behind the Wahal, and laid Holland open to an invasion. The French having previously pushed over a corps from Nimeguen, passed the Wahal in force, in several columns, above that fortress on the 11th January. The States of the province of Utrecht immediately deputed to the French general to capitulate. Pichegru entered Utrecht on the 18th, and Amsterdam on the 20th January, which town

likewise sent deputies to meet him; and where the French were received with all possible demonstrations of joy.

The Dutch army, which had its head quarters at Gorcum, was thus turned by the French passing the Wahal in the neighbourhood of Nimeguen. The Prince of Orange, seeing the turn affairs had taken, and being convinced of the impossibility of defending a country which, in the folly of the moment, hailed the arrival of the enemy with joy, went to the Hague; and from thence to Scheveling, where he embarked for England; trusting that time would open the eyes of his countrymen; and that although at present apparently infatuated with the modern principles of French liberty and equality, yet that their natural good sense and steadiness of character would soon point out to them the necessity of a gradation of ranks in every society; the impossibility of any community existing in which obedience and respect are not paid to the magistrate; and that the only practical equality, in human affairs, is that of an equal distribution of the laws.

The British army retreated behind the Yssel; from whence (by a very distressing march in the depth of winter) it traversed Westphalia and reached Embden, where it embarked for England. The fate of this gallant army was peculiarly unfortunate. In the preceding campaign, it had emi-

nently contributed towards the success of the allies; in the present, on every occasion, it had discomfited the enemy; and neither it, or its chief, had any thing to do with the causes of failure. These things were not, however, sufficiently considered. It did not return a victorious army. The courage of the soldier could not be doubted, and was not even impugned by the enemy. The talents and skill of the officer were therefore in fault. It became an undeniable proposition, that English troops could do nothing upon the continent. This assumption, so convenient to France, was re-echoed so frequently by every French writer, that at last it became a matter of universal belief.

The Dutch, having changed their form of government, and abolished the Stadtholdership, entered into a treaty of peace with France on the 16th May; by which that part of Flanders on the left bank of the Scheldt, which used to be called Dutch Flanders, was ceded to France; as also Maestricht and Venlo upon the Meuse; the harbour of Flushing was to belong to the French and Dutch conjointly; and the navigation of the Rhine, the Meuse, and the Scheldt, with all their branches, was to be perfectly free for both nations.

1799.

Holland had been now, nearly five years, under the grasp of revolutionary France. The patriotic leaders, and others, who had either welcomed the arrival of the French, or contributed to their success, were supposed by this time to have recovered from their error, and to deplore the oppression and misery of their country. The moment appeared advantageous to the British ministry; and it was determined to make a considerable effort in favour of an ancient and attached ally of England; and which, if successful, could not fail to have a beneficial effect upon the general result of the war.

With this view a corps of twelve thousand men, under Sir Ralph Abercromby, were disembarked, on the 27th August, on the beach to the southward of the Helder. North Holland forms a peninsula; of which the Helder is the extreme north point. Sir Ralph, having made good his landing, put himself in position across the peninsula. The fortifications at the Helder (which were only open batteries for the protection of the Texel) were taken possession of by the English; and the Dutch men of war hoisted the Orange flag, and joined the British.

On the 10th September the French and Dutch troops, (united,) to the amount of twenty-four thousand men, attacked the British position at day-light: they were, however, repulsed with considerable loss.

On the 16th September considerable reinforcements arrived from England; and, two days afterwards, the first division of a Russian corps (which had been allotted to serve with the British) was also disembarked. His Royal Highness the Duke of York, who had arrived from England and assumed the command of the allied British and Russian forces, found himself at the head of about thirty thousand men.

The necessity of an immediate forward movement being evident, as every hour's delay gave additional strength to the enemy, His Royal Highness the Duke of York determined to attack the French and Dutch army, in his front, on the 19th September. The army moved in four columns: those upon the right and left were meant to turn the enemy's flanks, whilst those of the center were destined to attack the position, and prevent reinforcements being detached to either flank.

The column of the right, which was composed of Russians, advanced with great gallantry, drove every thing before them, and got possession of Bergen, a considerable village in the rear of the

French left. In this situation, however, they were surrounded; and, after suffering great loss, were compelled to surrender. The troops which attacked the center of the French and Dutch position forced the enemy to retreat; but, in consequence of the reverses upon the right, the advantages they had gained were not followed up. The column of the left met with very little opposition, and took possession of Hoorn, a small town upon the Zuider Zee, considerably to the rear of the enemy's right, but at some distance. The next day the British re-occupied the ground they were in possession of previous to these movements.

On the 2d October the British army made another attack, in which they were eminently successful. They turned the French left, and compelled them to retreat beyond Alkmaar, of which town they took possession. The French and Dutch took up another position in the rear, having their head quarters at Beverwyk. The peninsula, on which these very severe actions were fought, becomes narrower in front of Beverwyk; so that the new position was stronger than the one abandoned, as being more compact and contracted. The British, by their victory of the 2d October, gained only a small extent of territory; and an enemy, posted behind dikes, and continually receiving reinforcements, was to be again attacked

and dislodged before any further advance could be made.

On the morning of the 6th October, the Duke of York caused the new position of the enemy to be assailed. The columns of the right were successful ; the others were not so fortunate. After a very severe struggle, both armies re-occupied, at night, their original ground. As it was now evident that no ultimate success could be expected from persevering in an endeavour to penetrate towards Amsterdam by North Holland, an armistice was proposed and agreed to on the 18th October ; by the terms of which, the British army was to be withdrawn from Holland by the 1st November. Thus ended an attempt to drive the French out of Holland ; but which, unfortunately, notwithstanding the most persevering efforts of the greatest gallantry, only riveted the chains of the Dutch ; and, instead of separating, was the pretext for connecting the two countries more closely together. The cause of the failure may principally be attributed to the injudicious selection of the point of attack. As, at Fontenoy, the enemy was driven back upon his resources and reinforcements. Surrounded and intersected, as Holland is, by water, it appears extraordinary that no attempts were made, by means of our maritime superiority, to turn the French in North-Holland ; or to distract their

attention by making other debarkations, the operations of which might have been combined with the one which actually took place. This oversight seems to have been a fundamental error in the original project. After the army was once landed, and the French and Dutch assembled in its front, no detachment could have been made without great danger; but three corps of twelve thousand men each, landed at different places, and moving rapidly, according to a preconcerted arrangement, upon certain points, would have baffled the enemy's calculations, and had more chance of success, than by being collected together upon a narrow peninsula, intersected with dikes and canals, and where every hundred yards afforded the enemy as good a defensive position as the one he had been previously compelled to abandon. The service was also undertaken too late in the year, to have permitted the blow to have been followed up, had the attempt been successful. The contrary winds, which unfortunately prevailed, were also another disadvantage, by preventing the arrivals of the different corps of the army in such rapid succession as could have been wished; thus giving time to the enemy, after the point of attack was made known, and the first troops were landed, to collect his means and to make his arrangements.

1801.

This year is remarkable for the peace of Luneville between the Emperor and the French republic, by which the former gave up to France the Austrian Netherlands, forgetting that he was bound by the barrier treaty, which put his ancestor in possession of those provinces—never to cede any part of them whatever to France. Of so little value are treaties when at variance with the convenience of the politics of the moment. In the present instance, the French being already in military possession of the Netherlands, the cession was of the less consequence. It nevertheless was not very regular without some reference to Great Britain. The events of the war, and the necessity that existed of procuring peace for the Austrian dominions, must be considered as the excuse.

1809.

The Scheldt having been now for some years included within the territories of France, the activity and energy of the French government created a fleet of line-of-battle ships at Antwerp. More praise was bestowed on this fleet, in the

French and the continental newspapers (under the influence of France) than it has been since found, to deserve. The possibility, however, of hostile men-of-war issuing from the Scheldt compelled the English government to maintain a considerable squadron at the mouth of that river. The absence of the French armies this year upon the Danube, appeared to afford an opportunity of attacking Antwerp and for destroying this fleet. The British Government determined that the army to be embarked for this purpose should be sufficiently numerous to be able to profit of any inclination which might be shown by the inhabitants of the Netherlands to throw off the French yoke, should any such appearance be made manifest.

A force of not less than thirty-six thousand men, sailed for the mouth of the Scheldt towards the end of July. On the 30th of the same month, a debarkation was effected on the northern side of the island of Walcheren; and on the 3d August the English were in possession of that island, with the exception of Flushing which was invested.

The Scheldt flows from Antwerp towards the sea for twenty miles, without interruption. It is then divided by the island of South Beveland into two branches, called the West and the East Scheldt. The west Scheldt continues its course for about forty miles, having the coast of the

island of South Beveland on its right, and the main land on its left, until it joins the German Ocean, between the islands of Walcheren and Cadsand, three miles apart.

The East Scheldt has the island of South Beveland on its left, and the coast of Brabant on its right, until past Bergenopzoom, where a deep, but narrow river, separates the island of Tholen from the main land. The coast of Tholen now becomes the right of the East Scheldt. The islands afterwards of Duiveland and of Schouwen upon the right, and of North Beeveland and of Walcheren upon the left, from the mouth of the East Scheldt.

It is evident from this description, that the possession of the island of South Beeveland has nothing to do with the approach of an army towards Antwerp.

South Beeveland separates the two Scheldts ; and, of course, one or the other branch must be crossed by an army in South Beeveland before it could move forward. It is true, the French garrison from South Beeveland forded the east Scheldt, and retreated into Brabant by this step. In the wars in the Duke of Alva's time, a Spanish commander crossed from the main land to the island of Beeveland, at the same place. But what may be performed by small corps, and in cases of considerable emergency, cannot be con-

sidered as examples for the conduct of a great army. The eastern Scheldt is here two miles and a half broad : the tide rises twelve feet. The bed of the river is intersected with creeks. There are not more than six peasants who have ever forded it. It is apprehended, he would be a very bold general who would undertake to conduct his army, with its baggage, artillery, and stores, across such an obstacle.

The island of Tholen offers no such disadvantage. The access to it from the East Scheldt is easy. Fifty-gun ships, if required, can come nearly opposite to the town of Tholen. An army can move from Tholen upon the main land in any number of columns, or upon any extent of front required. The communication from Tholen with the mouth of the East Scheldt, called the Roompot, is secure. It appears to amount to a demonstration, that the East Scheldt and the island of Tholen ought to have been selected as the line by which the army might have effected their advance upon Antwerp.

These reflections, however, either escaped the observation of those concerned in directing the arrangements of this expedition ; or they were not sufficiently acquainted with the localities of the country. At the same time that a debarkation was effected upon the island of Walcheren, a considerable corps was landed upon South Beveland.

This island was taken possession of, including Fort Batz, (situated at the point of the island nearest to Antwerp, and where the Scheldt divides into its two branches,) without the expense of a single shot. Thus, in three or four days, after the arrival of the armament at the mouths of the Scheldt, the islands of South Beeveland and of Walcheren were in possession of the British troops, with the exception of the town of Flushing on the latter, which was invested. The army remained in these two islands whilst the siege of Flushing was carrying on. This loss of time must be reckoned another, and a very serious error. The possession of Flushing had no more to do with the advance of the army by the eastern Scheldt than, as it has been shown, had the island of South Beeveland; and, if even the line of the western Scheldt was to be persevered in, the fate of Flushing could not affect the forward movements of the troops already disembarked in South Beeveland, as craft of all description might have been passed into the western Scheldt, by the passage between Walcheren and South Beeveland, so as to be assembled at Batz, for the conveyance of the army across the Scheldt. Whatever line it was in contemplation to adopt for the further advance of the army, it is evident this delay was most unfortunate, and that it afforded time to an active enemy to collect his means of defence, and to throw such

considerable reinforcements into Antwerp as to make the attainment of the ultimate object of the expedition more than doubtful.

Flushing was taken possession of on the 16th August. After the capture of Flushing, a garrison of nine thousand men was left on the island of Walcheren, and the army moved forward to Batz, partly conveyed by transports and partly marching across the island of South Beeveland. On the 29th August the idea of all further operations was entirely given up; and, on the 14th September, the commander in chief, the Earl of Chatham, returned to England, leaving a force of fifteen thousand men in the island of Walcheren. This corps, much reduced by sickness, was re-embarked in December, at which period the island was finally evacuated.

Thus ended an expedition, in which, although great means were employed to accomplish a comparatively very trifling object, yet nothing but disappointment ensued. The causes of failure appear to have been, in the first instance, the erroneous selection of the line of operations, and, in the second, the not having acted upon that line with sufficient activity.

1810.

The French took possession, in the beginning of this year, of Breda and of Bergenopzoom. French troops subsequently were introduced into Amsterdam; and Holland was incorporated with the French empire. It is understood that some Dutch military-men and others, actuated by a manly and patriotic feeling, proposed to resist this insulting and humiliating proceeding on the part of France. But the French were too powerful, and already in possession of the strongholds of the country, before their intentions were declared. The minds of the population in general were not wound up to that pitch of dislike and resistance to French rule and to French connection, which afterwards became manifest all over Europe.

1813.

The reverses which the French army experienced, in the summer and autumn of this year, compelled them to withdraw from Germany and to retreat to the left bank of the Rhine. On the 31st October, Napoleon, with the remains of his

army, crossed the Rhine at Mayence, having had great difficulty in even reaching that river from the interposition of a Bavarian corps, upon the French line of retreat, at Hanau upon the Mayn, about thirty-five miles from Mayence.

The allies determined to follow up their success, and to invade France without delay. It was arranged that their principal army should cross the Rhine at Bâle, and move towards Paris in co-operation with another corps which was to penetrate by Geneva. The Prussian army of Marshal Blucher was to advance from Mayence, and the army of the north of Germany, composed of various nations, to pass the Rhine between Coblentz and Nimeguen, and to compel the French to evacuate Holland and the Netherlands.

The French government appear neither to have apprehended the immediate advance of the allies, nor to have had any idea of their intended line of operations. The invasion from Bâle and from Geneva seem to have been quite unexpected. If an opinion may be formed from the measures they pursued, it was in the Low Countries that they rather thought the allied armies would endeavour to penetrate. Several battalions of the guard were hurried to Antwerp, and the few disposable troops they had were sent to defend the passage of the Rhine between Nimeguen and Cologne.

The march of events was, however, too rapid to

be arrested by ordinary means. As soon as the French army had been obliged to retreat to the left bank of the Rhine, the Dutch availed themselves of the opportunity to throw off the yoke of France. The French troops in Holland were compelled to retire within the fortresses. A deputation was sent to London, to solicit a renewal of the ancient alliance with England, and to invite the Prince of Orange, the present King of the Netherlands, to return to Holland. On the 30th November his Majesty landed at Scheveling.

A Russian corps, forming part of the army of the north of Germany, entered the province of Groninguen, and marched upon the Yssel. The Dutch craft upon the *Zuider-zee* carried the Russian infantry to Amsterdam, which city they entered on the 1st December.

The French general who commanded in chief in the Low Countries, alarmed at the universal defection, and under the apprehension of having all his troops cut off in detail, determined to concentrate his forces, and with this view, gave orders to evacuate Breda, Gertruydenberg, Bergenopzoom, and Williamstadt, and for the troops to march to Antwerp. Counter-orders were sent from Paris in time to prevent the evacuation of Bergenopzoom; but the garrisons from Breda, Gertruydenberg, and Williamstadt, had been withdrawn. The Russians, passing the Biesbos

at the Moerdyk, immediately took possession of the two former; and a brigade of English guards (which had been landed at Scheveling) were pushed also across the Biesbos lower down, and secured Williamstadt. The British government having immediately determined to give every assistance in their power to the Dutch, they were thus, by the possession of Williamstadt, furnished with a point of debarkation. A British force, (which, including the brigade of guards, did not however amount to more than nine thousand men,) was sent to Holland forthwith, and disembarked at Williamstadt. The command of this corps, (which it was understood was immediately to be reinforced,) was entrusted to Lord Lynedoch, who having himself arrived in the Roompot, landed without delay, and hastened forward to Tholen.

The year 1813 closed whilst these operations were going on. The British troops occupied Tholen, Steenberg, and Williamstadt. The Russians Breda and Gertruydenberg. The French were however, in possession of the fortresses of the Helder, Flushing, Muiden, Gorcum, Boisle-duc, Bergenopzoom, Batz, Naarden, Maestricht, and Grave, in the Dutch provinces; independent of Antwerp with its detached forts; as also Ostend, Nieuport, and Ypres in the Netherlands. The Dutch had, as yet, no army; and although all communication between the different fortresses

was in a great measure cut off by the good will and zeal of the peasantry, yet it is pretty evident that the liberation of Holland was, by no means, accomplished.

1814.

The French, government having reinforced their garrisons both of Antwerp and Bergenopzoom, gave orders for a detachment from the former, to endeavour to retake Breda. A corps of five thousand men marched from Antwerp accordingly, provided with howitzers, and threw a few shells into the place. A brigade of British infantry was sent from Steenberg to assist the Russian troops at Breda. The French did not persevere in their attempt, but retreated to Hoogstraaten about half way between Antwerp and Breda, where they remained, in advance of Antwerp, as a corps of observation.

The Russian troops which had entered Holland, were ordered to advance to Namur, to co-operate with another Russian corps, which (having crossed the Rhine at Cologne) was also directed upon the upper Meuse, with a view to invade France from thence. Namur was, in consequence, taken possession of by the Russians on the 24th January. On their further advance Avêsmes was surrendered to them. A Prussian corps d'armee crossed the

Rhine at Arnheim, and established its head quarters at Breda. This corps, being much stronger than that of the Russians which had preceded it, was able, not only to occupy Breda, but to blockade Gorcum and Bois-le-duc. Having found means to escalate the ramparts of the latter, the Prussians drove the garrison into the citadel, which afterwards capitulated. The garrison of Gorcum, in want of provisions, were also compelled to surrender that fortress.

A combined forward movement was agreed upon between General Bulow (who commanded the Prussian corps,) and Lord Lynedoch with the British, to dislodge the French troops from Hoogstraaten. The Prussians were to advance from Breda and to attack the French in front; whilst the British were to get upon the flank and rear of the enemy. The attack was to take place on the morning of the 12th January. The allied troops moved accordingly; but the French (getting information from their patrols, of the flank movement) fell back; and reinforced by a detachment of the garrison from Antwerp, put their right at the village of Merxheim, (about one thousand eight hundred yards from Antwerp,) and their left at that of Burgerhout. They were driven out of the village of Merxheim with great spirit by the British, as also out of that of Burgerhout by the Prussians, and compelled to retreat into

Antwerp with some loss. The British and Prussians returned to Rozendal and Breda.

Although the British were neither in possession of the means to besiege a place like Antwerp, nor would the season of the year have admitted of such an operation, yet their late advance inspired them with a hope of being able to destroy the French fleet consisting of thirteen line of battle ships, moored within the basin. As, however, there were twelve thousand French troops in Antwerp, it is evident that a corps of nine thousand British could not approach the place without the co-operation of the Prussians. This point for a limited time having been obtained, the next object was to collect the number of mortars required to project a sufficiency of shells and carcasses to accomplish the object in view. The continued severity of the weather, and the quantity of ice in the Biesbos, threw great difficulties in the way of unloading the ordnance transports at Williamstadt. Seventeen mortars of different sizes were all that could be assembled; of which number thirteen were French and Dutch, found upon the ramparts of Williamstadt; and, of course, with the ranges and qualities of which the British gunners could not be expected to be so well acquainted. The attempt, however, was worth the trouble; and it having been decided upon, the British and Prussians advanced on the 1st Febru-

ary, and on the 2d, soon after day-light, took possession, as before, of the villages of Merxheim and of Burgerhout. Merxheim, which fell to the lot of the British, had been strengthened by field-works. It was, however, attacked on both flanks, as well as in front, and the enemy abandoned it upon finding himself turned. The mortars were placed in battery, and a fire opened upon the basin, where the fleet were collected, without loss of time. One ship was partially injured and a naval storehouse burnt; but the activity of the French (so very little impeded by such an inconsiderable number of shells as could be thrown) prevented any further mischief from being done.

The Prussian corps of Bulow, in consequence of orders from the allied head quarters, separated from the British, and leaving the ground it occupied before Antwerp, marched into France by Malines, Brussels, Mons, and Avesne, to Lâon. The French garrison evacuated Brussels on the advance of the Prussians. They retreated to Lille. A French corps subsequently advancing from Lille and communicating with the garrison of Antwerp by the Tête-de-Flanders, a detachment of the Prussian army was sent from Brussels to Ghent, from whence it moved by Oudenarde, Tournai, and Maubeuge to Avêsnès, where it rejoined the corps it belonged to. An attempt was made to take possession of Maubeuge by a Saxon corps

with the Prussian army, and a few shells were thrown, but without effect.

The French pushed a corps of five thousand men out of Lille on the 5th March, towards Ghent. The Prussians had left a battalion at Oudenarde through which town the French were to pass. The Scheldt flows so rapidly through Oudenarde, that by shutting the sluices which are in the middle of the town, the ditches of the old fortifications can be filled, and a considerable inundation made in a few hours. The Prussians availed themselves of these local advantages, and the French were repulsed from before Oudenarde with some loss.

During the progress of these operations, the situation of the British corps on the frontiers of Holland was by no means secure. Since the separation of the Prussians, it had retreated, and remained about half way between Breda and Antwerp. It will be recollected that it did not consist of more than nine thousand men. The bill for rendering thirty thousand of the militia disposable, had not produced any thing like the effect that was expected; and, in consequence, the corps in Holland did not receive the augmentations originally intended. The French had twelve thousand troops in Antwerp. They could communicate with Lille (as the Prussians withdrew after the affair of the 5th March at

Oudenarde) without interruption; and, receiving reinforcements from thence, advance with a very considerable superiority against the small British army, which would have been obliged to submit to the mortification of falling back upon their transports at Williamstadt, the only fortified place in their possession. These reasons induced Lord Lynedoch to turn his mind to the means of getting possession of Bergenopzoom; the importance of which fortress, situated on the right bank of the Scheldt, and upon the right flank of his army, appears self-evident.

The place having been closely reconnoitered, it was discovered that it afforded facilities for an an assault, which, from the reputation of its fortifications could not have been expected. It was ascertained, beyond a doubt, that where the river Zoom passes through the rampart there was not more (at low tide) than two feet water. Here then was, at once, a practicable breach capable of admitting eight men abreast. In addition, the escarp was found generally to be but low; some of the front demi-revêted; and the three bastions next to the Scheldt not revêted at all. It is also to be observed that the severe frost which prevailed at the time, rendered it impossible for the enemy to avail himself of the water-defences of Bergenopzoom, by opening the sluices and suddenly filling his dry ditches, so as to impede the

passage. The same frost afforded, moreover, the facility of passing the wet-ditches; it having been ascertained that there only existed a narrow cut in the ice, made by the garrison, which could be got over with planks.

Under these circumstances it was determined to endeavour to carry the fortress of Bergenopzoom by assault on the night of the 8th March.

The troops destined for this service were formed into four columns. The first was to enter the fortress by the Zoom: upon quitting the bed of the river it was to turn to its right; to proceed along the ramparts, and to facilitate the entrance of the other attacking parties. The second column was to escalate the bastion upon the Antwerp front called the Pucelle Bastion, selected on account of the inundations from the Scheldt being retained by a batardeau opposite to its flanked angle; and the three bastions in the rear of the inundation not being revêted. If the ice should be found sufficiently firm to support the troops, the unrevêted bastions would, of course, be easily carried. If the ice should be rotten or weak, then the assault was to be made on the dry side of the batardeau. A third column was to escalate upon the Wouw front; and a fourth, which was meant only as a false attack, was to draw the attention of the enemy towards the Steenberg gate.

The columns destined to assault by the Zoom

river and the Pucelle bastion, were successful, and entered the fortress without much difficulty. The column which was to have escalated at the Wouw front, found the enemy prepared, and was repulsed. The troops composing it were, however, conducted to the foot of the Pucelle bastion, and, following the party which had already got possession of this and the neighbouring bastions, they ascended the ladders, and were also formed upon the ramparts. Thus far every thing had succeeded, and the capture of the place seemed inevitable. The three columns destined for the assault were all within the fortress, and the false attack upon the Steenberg gate, evidently occupied very considerably the attention of the garrison. The head, however, of the Zoom column only had advanced. By one of those mistakes which seem almost inseparable from enterprises of this nature, part of the troops got out of the bed of the river to their left, instead of their right. The French, rallying, attacked with very superior numbers this detachment, which, by the rising of the tide, was cut off from all support. Reverses were also experienced at other points, from the regiments being kept too much detached and unconnected, until at length it was judged necessary to withdraw altogether.

The British suffered considerably upon this occasion in killed, wounded, and prisoners. The

failure must, of course, ever be a subject of regret; but it may be said, with truth, the British army lost no credit by the attempt. The attack upon Bergenopzoom may, perhaps, in some measure, be compared to the battle of Fontenoy. The object in both cases was worth the risk, and had very nearly been obtained. The casualties upon such occasions, although to be lamented, are not thrown away. The attack at Fontenoy was unsuccessful, but it was so gallant and determined, that it made Marshal Saxe very shy of the allied army during the remainder of that campaign. Such an assault as that upon Bergenopzoom shows a spirit of enterprise by no means discreditable to the service. On the contrary, it commands the respect of the enemy, and makes him feel that he has to do with troops who are ready and willing to undertake whatever may be deemed practicable.

After the failure at Bergenopzoom, a Saxon corps occupied Lier and Malines, from whence they detached towards Antwerp, to watch the garrison of that fortress. A considerable body of Russian marines were also landed and garrisoned the town and island of Tholen. These reinforcements enabled Lord Lynedoch to send a brigade to besiege (in co-operation with the navy) Batz, a small fort situated at the point of South Beveland, where the Scheldt divides into its two branches,

and commanding the navigation of the river. The morning, however, of the very night on which it was proposed to break ground, a courier arrived with the news of the entrance of the allies into Paris, and of the change of government. Hostilities, of course, ceased immediately.

A treaty of peace was signed at Paris on the 30th May, by which France agreed to withdraw her troops from the fortresses she still occupied in Holland and the Austrian Netherlands. The limits between France and the Netherlands were fixed pretty nearly as they had been previous to the commencement of hostilities in 1792. The sovereignty of the House of Orange in Holland was acknowledged by France; and it was agreed in the treaty that the Dutch were to receive an extension of territory. The details, however, of this measure, were to be ultimately arranged at a congress to be forthwith assembled at Vienna. It did not, consequently, immediately appear, whether the Netherlands were to be incorporated with Holland, or the fortresses reconstructed and held upon some plan similar to the Barrier treaty of 1715. In the mean time these provinces were governed, in the name of the Allied Powers, by an Austrian general, Count Vincent; and the British army, which was placed under the command of the Prince of Orange, upon Lord Lyne-

dort's return to England, continued in military possession.

1815.

At the commencement of this year the British army was quietly cantoned in the Netherlands, with its head quarters at Brussels, awaiting the result of the deliberations at Vienna. It had been reinforced by the German Legion, as also by a corps composed of very well-disposed and efficient regiments from Hanover. Its numbers were however by no means equal to the task of defending such an open frontier, as the country between the Meuse and the Sea then was. It was indeed evident that this line could not be held, in its present state, by any force the Dutch would be able hereafter to allot for its defence. A negotiation was therefore commenced, and actually in progress relative to the reconstruction of the fortresses of the Netherlands, and committees of Dutch and of English engineers were appointed to report as to the time and probable expense such a step would require. Whilst these measures were in contemplation, accounts were received of the return to France, on the 1st March, of Napoleon. The renewal of hostilities being in consequence an event almost daily to be expected, no time was lost

in making the best arrangements circumstances would admit, for the immediate defence of the Low-Countries.. The Duke of Wellington had made a tour along the frontier in the preceding summer, and His Grace's opinions as to the points which ought to be primarily attended to, in the event of war, being known, no time was unnecessarily consumed in deliberation. Before Napoleon reached Paris on the 20th March, nearly ten thousand men were already at work upon the fortifications in the Netherlands. Sixty engineer officers, eleven companies of sappers, and twenty thousand peasants being subsequently employed, and guns and ammunition having been forwarded without delay from England, much more progress was made in placing the frontier in a state of defence before the commencement of hostilities, than was, at first expected, even by the most sanguine, it would have been possible to effect. Ostend and Nieuport were strengthened with a view to secure the communication with England. Ypres was repaired, armed, and placed in a very respectable state of defence. Tournai was rendered tenable, and the walls of the old citadel formed into a defensible post, mounted with ordnance, and provided with splinter-proof barracks. Mons was made capable of some resistance with the aid of its inundations, and a large redoubt of a respectable profile constructed on Mount Palisel, to serve as

a keep or citadel, furnished with splinter-proof accommodation, and mounted with heavy guns. Nothing was done upon the Lys, as there were no remains of fortifications either at Menin or Courtrai of which any use could have been made, and consequently every thing would have been to be created afresh, for which there was not sufficient time. It was also questionable whether it would have been prudent to place small garrisons so close to the frontier, and to such a fortress as Lille, covered by any fortifications short of permanent works. As it was by no means improbable, however, that the French would push a corps towards Ghent, between the Lys and the Scheldt, whilst they made their principal attack from Mons or from Charleroi, (as they had done upon former occasions,) some very strong field-works, well palisaded and fraized, were constructed in front of Ghent, with their right upon the Lys and their left upon the Scheldt, communicating with and supported by the old rampart of Ghent, which was repaired, and Ghent itself rendered tenable. With a view to facilitate the movements of the army on either side of the Scheldt, according to circumstances, Oudenarde was fortified and armed, and the possession of its bridge thus secured. A pontoon bridge was also constructed higher up the river at Avelghem and covered by field-works. The fortifications of the town of Ath, about equi-

distant between Mons and Tournai, were moreover repaired and placed in such a state of defence as to make it necessary to break ground against them. The Prussians advanced up the valley of the Meuse, and occupied in force, Namur and Charleroi, thus putting themselves in close communication with the British army: at these two places it became therefore unnecessary to do any thing, held as they were by an efficient Prussian army. The distance from Namur to Nieuport is about one hundred and twenty miles. To prevent the French from penetrating into some part of a frontier of such an extent, and in a flat and open country, could never have entered into the imagination of any military man; but to hinder them from invading the Netherlands, without affording time to assemble the army destined to oppose them, on the line by which they might advance, was the object to be effected, and which problem appears to have been very effectually accomplished. Neither does the possibility of the necessity of a temporary retreat, nor the advantages to be derived, in that case, from being able to move in several columns upon Antwerp, and to manœuvre from thence, according to circumstances, upon either side of the Scheldt, seem to have been overlooked, as a bridge over the Rupel at Boom, between Brussels and Antwerp, was constructed with the barges or craft of the country.

Antwerp itself was very considerably strengthened, and the flying bridge between Antwerp and the tête-de-Flandres, capable of carrying one thousand five hundred men at a time, was kept at anchor, and in perfect order and readiness.

The French government, on their part, shewed wonderful activity in organizing, equipping, and preparing their army for the field. Notwithstanding their exertions, the British had however sufficient time to complete their arrangements for the defence of the Netherlands; the Duke of Wellington, who had assumed the command, had his head-quarters at Brussels, and the army, which had been considerably reinforced from Holland and Hanover, as well as from England, was cantoned in front of Brussels upon the different roads leading from France, so as to be able to assemble in the least possible time at whatever point its presence might be required. This was the posture of affairs previous to the French commencing offensive operations.

The French troops destined for the invasion of the Netherlands were assembled at Beaumont between the Meuse and the Sambre on the 14th June. They amounted, according to the most authentic accounts, to one hundred and thirty-six thousand men, and were provided with three hundred and fifty pieces of artillery. Some French statements have given the numbers as low as one

hundred and twenty-two thousand. But there is no occasion to diminish the numbers of their army to add to its reputation. The French troops did every thing that gallant and experienced soldiers could do. It may perhaps rather be thought, after a careful consideration of all circumstances, that, defended and occupied as those provinces were, the invasion of the Netherlands even with an army of one hundred and thirty-six thousand men, presented more difficulties than the leader of the French seems to have been aware of, and that it ought not to have been undertaken without greater means. It would appear to have been overlooked by those who would thus diminish the army, that it necessarily follows, that a corresponding greater degree of rashness and presumption must be attributed to its Chief.

On the 15th June, the French army crossed the Sambre in three columns; the principal one at Charleroi, the two others at Marchiennes and at Chatêlet, at short distances above and below Charleroi. The Prussian corps of Zieten, consisting of twenty-six thousand men, held Charleroi, having detachments at Marchiennes and at Chatêlet, and with advanced posts on the right or French side of the Sambre. Zieten fell back slowly and leisurely with his troops from Charleroi and from Chatelêt, along the chaussée leading towards Namur, as far as Gilly, where he took up

a very excellent position, which (notwithstanding their immense superiority) kept the French in check for some time. He then retreated to Fleurus, which village he occupied until night. The Prussian detachment at Marchiennes retreated from thence to Gosselies on the Brussels road, from whence turning to its right it marched to Fleurus. Thus Zieten had the whole of his corps concentrated before night at Fleurus, only six miles and a half from Charleroi, which was the extent of his retreat, or of the French advance upon that road during the 15th June. The French columns, which had passed the Sambre at Charleroi and at Chatelêt, had been moved upon the Namur chaussée in pursuit of Zieten. Their troops bivouacked for the night in front of Fleurus. The column which crossed at Marchiennes was directed towards Gosselies, where Ney, who commanded it, established his head-quarters, pushing on an advanced guard towards the village of Frasne where it skirmished with a Nassau battalion in the Dutch service. From Gosselies, a division (consisting of five thousand men) was detached from this column towards Fleurus, in pursuit of the Prussian detachment, which, it will be remembered, had retreated from Marchiennes to Gosselies and from thence moved to Fleurus, to rejoin the corps to which it belonged. This circumstance it is necessary to keep in mind, to

clearly comprehend the transactions of the next day.

As soon as the intelligence of the French movements upon the Sambre reached Namur, the Prussian corps of Pirch and of Thielman, each consisting of about 26,000 men, were put in motion by Marshal Blucher, and directed upon Sombref, in the neighbourhood of which village a position had been previously selected, in which it had been determined to assemble the Prussian army. This position appears to have been very judiciously chosen by the Prussian staff. It is nearly equidistant from Namur and from Charleroi, to each of which places it communicates by a chaussée. From whichever of these two points, or from any other part of the Sambre between them, the French might have advanced, nothing, consequently, could have prevented the Prussian army from concentrating. The position was, moreover, strong in itself; its right was upon the village of St. Amand, its left upon Sombref. The village of Ligny was meant to be occupied in front, and that of Bry in the rear, with the reserves. To this position, which is only twelve miles from Namur, Marshal Blucher hastened on the 15th June, and was joined in it by the corps of Zieten, which evacuated Fleurus after it was dark. Three corps of the Prussian army, affording a total of 78,000 men, were thus assembled in

a position they had previously reconnoitred and determined to occupy, within a few hours after the enemy had crossed the Sambre.

The French army was divided into the guard, five corps d'armée, and four corps of cavalry. Two corps d'armée, namely those of Reille and d'Erlon, the light cavalry of the guard, and one corps of cuirassiers, (Kellerman's,) were employed upon the Quatre-bras road, under Ney, with the exception of one infantry division, that of Girard, which was sent from Gosselies towards Fleurus after the Prussian detachment, as already explained. Ney had under his orders, consequently, 35,000 infantry, 8000 cavalry, and 108 guns. The remainder of the French force upon the Namur chaussée consisted of the guard, (with the exception of its light cavalry, detached with Ney,) the three corps d'armée of Vandamme, Gérard, and Lobau, the infantry division of Girard belonging to the corps of Reille, and the cavalry corps of Pajol, Excelmans, and of Milhaud. It amounted to 77,000 infantry, 16,000 cavalry, and 242 guns.

Napoleon is stated to have expressed his satisfaction at the result of the movements of the 15th, and to have said that his plans had so far completely succeeded to his wish. It appears, however, difficult to discover any cause for exultation. The French army had crossed the Sambre; "this

was the very sum and height of their offending ; no more." Not only there was no surprise, as has been alleged by some French writers and others, but from a view of the preparatory measures, it appears to have been morally impossible that there should have been one. There was no cutting off of detached corps or columns, hastening to their alarm post ; no confusion or contradictory orders ; no interruption of the communication between the British and Prussian armies, or between the component parts of either ; all of which circumstances must have occurred, more or less, had the invasion of the enemy been so rapid, or his movements so unexpected as has been insinuated. 78,000 Prussians were assembled on that very night, ready to have marched the next morning on the right flank and rear of the French, had they made their principal movement towards Brussels ; or prepared, in a previously reconnoitred position, to defend themselves, should the first efforts of the enemy be directed against them. On the Gosselies road a division of the Duke of Wellington's army, (Dutch, Perponcher) to which the Nassau battalion at Frasné belonged, hastened from Nivelles to put itself between that village and Quatre-bras, towards which point the troops from Brussels, as also from the other places they occupied, upon the different communications leading from the frontier, were directed, as soon as the

serious nature of the attack at Charleroi had been ascertained.

Napoleon, and those who have advocated his conduct, have attempted to throw blame upon Ney, who conducted the operations upon this line, for not having pushed on to Quatre-bras on the 15th. A little reflection will, however, show the injustice of such remarks. The French troops had been under arms and their horses in harness for eighteen hours; it is impossible to say what distance they actually marched, as the country to the right of the Sambre is very intricate, without any chaussées or measured roads. From Solresur-Sambre to Charleroi cannot be calculated, however, at less than twenty-two miles; from Beaumont, the head-quarters, to Charleroi may be reckoned twenty-four miles. Some of the divisions had even still further to march. To have reached Gosselies, which is four miles beyond Charleroi, and to have pushed on an advanced guard as far as Frasnes, about four miles still further, making a total of twenty-six miles for the greater part of the column, and of thirty for the advanced light troops, seems to have been no common exertion, and to have required great good will on the part of the French soldier. When it is considered that, in addition to the distance, the Prussians were also to be forced from Marchiennes, and that there was a good deal of skir-

mishing during the whole of the march, it does not appear how more could have been performed or expected. It would seem that with equal justice, or rather with the same injustice, the troops which were employed upon the Namur chaussée might be reproached with not having taken possession of the position at Ligny on the evening of the 15th.

On the 16th Napoleon attacked the Prussian position at Ligny. He had, as has been detailed, ninety-three thousand men (cavalry and infantry) and two hundred and forty-two guns, disposable for this operation. The three Prussian corps amounted to about seventy-eight thousand. The plan of the attack adopted by the French does not appear to have been judicious. The right of the Prussian position was by far the weakest: it might have been turned altogether. It does not seem necessary that the detached village of Ligny, in front of the position, should have been attacked at all. Napoleon, however, moved against the front as well as the right. He succeeded, after a very heavy loss, and by the greatest exertions, in getting possession of the villages of St. Amand and of Ligny. Those of Bry and Sombref were still held by the Prussians, when night put end to the business. The French certainly gained the victory, but it was very dearly purchased. It was not one of that

nature they required to support the throne of Napoleon, or to re-establish the terror of their arms. According to their own accounts they had seven thousand men killed and wounded. The Prussians suffered to about double that extent, and also lost some guns.

During the attack upon the Prussian position D'Erlon's corps d'armée which had been placed under Ney's command upon the Brussels chaussée was brought to assist in the attack upon St. Amand. It was not employed upon this point when it did arrive, as its services were no longer wanted, the village of St. Amand having been carried. It has been denied that these troops were sent for; but as their commander was not likely to have made a movement of such consequence without instructions; and as it is clear that he was not ordered away by Ney, who required his assistance, it would appear to be most probable that he must have received the commands of Napoleon. The erroneous movements of this corps d'armée, with whomsoever they originated, were, at any rate, very detrimental to the French cause, the services of about twenty thousand infantry, one thousand eight hundred cavalry, and of forty-six guns, having been completely lost upon a very important and eventful occasion.

A reflection occurs here as to the propriety of

the disposition of the French army on the 16th June. As the object was to fall upon the Prussians with a superior force, and merely to prevent the Duke of Wellington's army from moving from Quatre-bras to their assistance, it seems to have been very unnecessary to have employed two corps d'armée upon the Brussels chaussée. One corps d'armée, short of one of its infantry divisions, was, in fact, (owing to D'Erlon's corps having been taken away,) all that did act upon this line, supported with the additional cavalry and guns as already explained. If, in the arrangements for the day, this disposition had been the one adopted, and there seems to have been no reason why it should not, the French would have had twenty thousand additional infantry to have employed in their attack upon the position at Ligny. The Prussian army might, perhaps, have been in consequence more crippled; the victory of a more decided character; and the results more advantageous and important.

It has been asserted that Ney was instructed to advance with both his corps d'armée to Quatre-bras; that he was to remain in position with one corps at the junction of the roads to prevent the Duke of Wellington's army from assembling; and that he was to detach the other from thence by the Namur chaussée to attack the rear of the Prussian position at Ligny, whilst Napoleon di-

rected the movements of the army, under his own immediate orders, against the right and front. Ney, however, denied the receipt of any such orders in the short statement of his proceedings that he published ; and he certainly did not act like a man, to whom such clear and positive directions had been given. If such instructions were ever thought of, the removal of one half of his force rendered the execution of them, at any rate, impossible. It may also be remarked, with respect to these orders, that even supposing them to have been issued, and that the movement therein described was really contemplated, it would have been injudicious as exposing the troops to a lengthened march, and to very unnecessary fatigue, to accomplish what might have been effected by a more simple process. It appears, therefore, that it would have been far preferable, as has been already suggested, to have augmented the army destined to attack the Prussians with this corps d'armée. The little river, the Ligny, could have been headed and the right of the position at St. Amand turned, by moving more to the French left ; and, with an additional corps of 20,000 infantry thus employed in co-operation with the troops which Napoleon did conduct against the Prussians, it is probable that the results would have been greater and acquired with less loss.

Soon after day-light, on the morning of the 16th June, whilst Napoleon was conducting his army towards the Prussians, Ney endeavoured to advance from Gosselies upon the Quatre-bras chaussée. He was opposed by the Dutch division at Frâsnes, which had been joined by the Prince of Orange. The Duke of Wellington shortly after made his appearance on the ground, and having directed these troops to remain upon the defensive until the reinforcements which were hastening to join them should arrive, his Grace rode to the left to Sombref, where he personally communicated with Blücher, and saw the Prussian army in position. Upon his return to Quatre-bras, one Anglo-Hanoverian division (Picton); the Brunswick corps, under their gallant Duke; and the three battalions of the contingent of Nassau-Weztingen had already arrived.

The Dutch division, previously to its being reinforced, defended itself with great gallantry. It was, however, compelled to fall back from Frâsnes towards Quatre-bras, having suffered much. The action was continued with great warmth after the arrival of the troops from Brussels, and both the British and Brunswick divisions also experienced considerable loss.

The French force, upon this line of operations, had, as already explained, originally consisted of thirty-five thousand infantry, eight thousand

cavalry, and one hundred and eight pieces of artillery. The corps of D'Erlon having been withdrawn, (which was composed of twenty thousand infantry, one thousand eight hundred cavalry, and forty-six guns,) there remained, consequently, with Ney, in front of Quatre-bras, fifteen thousand infantry, six thousand two hundred cavalry, and sixty-two guns. Their infantry and cavalry were conducted with great spirit. The latter may be said to have been gallant and enterprising in a very great degree. They did not, however, make that use of their formidable number of guns they might have done. No person who was in the action would have suspected that the French had had sixty-two pieces of artillery in the field. The fact is, however, unquestionable. They had the guns of the three divisions of infantry of Reille's corps, twenty-four; the reserve battery of the corps, eight; the battery of the division of the light cavalry of the corps, six; the guns of the Cuirassier division, twelve; and those of the light cavalry of the guard, twelve; making a total of sixty-two.

The French, towards the latter part of the day, pushed a considerable corps of infantry into a wood on the right, and a little to the front of the position of Quatre-bras, called the Bois de Bossu, with a view to turn the British right. At the same time they made a display of their cavalry, and brought

forward more guns than they hitherto had done. The British troops, which, very soon after the commencement of the action, had been fully equal to the enemy in infantry, and had received different reinforcements in succession, at this moment were further strengthened by the arrival of the Guards by the Nivelles road. Being close to the edge of the wood in question, these battalions were employed to dislodge the enemy, which they immediately did, although with a heavy loss. Night put an end to the action. The Duke of Wellington's army lay upon their arms in front of Quatre-bras, in which position it was now nearly assembled and joined by its cavalry and artillery.

As, perhaps, it may be thought by some that had the corps of D'Erlon not been removed from the Quatre-bras chaussée; and if Ney had advanced with the total of the force originally under his orders to Quatre-bras, in compliance with the instructions, whether real or imaginary, he is stated to have received, that the British army could in that case not have been assembled, and that the result of the campaign would have been very different, it may not be irrelevant to observe, in this place, that the very contrary appears to be the case; and that so far from preventing, such a measure would, in fact, have expedited the concentration of the Duke of Wellington's army, inasmuch as its component divisions would have had less

ground to march over. A slight view of the map will shew the correctness of this statement. If the Dutch division at Frasnes had been overpowered before it was supported, it must have retreated either towards Nivelles or Waterloo. If it had fallen back to the latter it would have met the reinforcements advancing from Brussels, and the position of Waterloo would, in all probability, have been the point on which the rest of the army would have been directed; and which would have given a much shorter march to the troops from Enghien and the Dender. Had the Dutch division retreated towards Nivelles it would have been still somewhat nearer to Brussels than it was at Quatre-bras, (about three miles,) having equally the advantage of a *chaussée* for the march of the troops from thence to its support; and it would have been six miles nearer to Enghien, Soignies, Braine-le-comte, and Ath. The divisions from these places, as also the cavalry from the Dender, would have been consequently enabled to reach Nivelles, had it been determined to assemble at this point, at least two hours sooner than they did at Quatre-bras. It will be remembered that in the proposed arrangement for Ney's force, (had the two corps d'armée penetrated to Quatre-bras,) it is stated that one was immediately to have been detached to the right on the Namur *chaussée* to co-operate in the attack upon the Prussians. The

The disadvantages of this circuitous movement, as far as regards the operation against the Prussian position, have already been explained; nor, on the other hand, with respect to the British army, does it appear that the French would have derived any benefits from having a corps at Quatre-bras of the same strength as that with which Ney attempted to move forward upon that *chaussée*. It could not have prevented the Duke of Wellington's army from being assembled either at Waterloo in its front, or at Nivelles upon its flank, as might have been judged proper: nor does there appear any reason why the Dutch, Brunswick, and Anglo-Hanoverian divisions, making a total of about nineteen thousand men, and which checked the advance of the French towards Quatre-bras, until the army had time to assemble, should not have been equally able to accomplish the same object at Waterloo, or at Nivelles, had they been attacked at either of those places. It would, indeed, rather appear that the latter would have been more easy, as the different divisions would have been able to arrive to their assistance in so much less time. It was the want of day-light which prevented the Duke of Wellington from availing himself of his superiority at Quatre-bras, after his army was assembled. As this would not have been the case in any other position to which the troops would not have had so far to march as to Quatre-bras, it almost necessarily

follows that the movement which it has been lamented on the part of the French was not made, would have been more to their disadvantage.

The Prussians left their position of Ligny in two columns, on the night of the 16th. The corps of Zieten and of Pirch retreated to the village of Tilly, about three miles from the field of battle; that of Thielman marched to Gembloux, about four and a half. The distance between Gembloux and Tilly is about five miles and a half. The corps of Bulow, consisting of twenty-six thousand men, joined that of Thielman, during the night, at Gembloux. The loss the Prussians had sustained, consequently, during the day, was more than made up. The distance they had fallen back was trifling, and, as they were not followed or molested in their retreat, the communication between the different corps was not interrupted. To cover their movement they had even continued to hold the villages of Bry and Sombref until after day-light on the 17th. After some deliberation the Prussians determined to fall back to Wâvre upon the Dyle, about twelve miles distant from Tilly and Gembloux, and the whole of their army was accordingly put in motion, and concentrated in the neighbourhood of Wavre, on the 17th June.

Under all circumstances this movement of the Prussian army appears to have been the most

judicious measure they could have adopted. The propriety of endeavouring to retake their position, in consequence of the arrival of the corps of Bulow, it has been stated, was discussed. They had, in fact, about eighty-six thousand men under arms. The troops, however, generally, were fatigued, and those of Bulow's corps had made a very harassing march on the preceding day and great part of the night. The French also had occupied Sombref as soon as it was evacuated, and the communication between the British and Prussian armies could consequently only be carried on by making a considerable detour to the rear. Blucher was therefore not certain in the early part of the day (of the 17th) whether the divisions of the Duke of Wellington's army, which had held Quatre-Bras on the morning of the 16th, had been able to keep the French in check until the whole of the army had assembled, or whether they might not have been compelled to fall back towards Brussels, and the British army have concentrated more to the rear than Quatre-bras. The banks of the Dyle were known to be very defensible; Blucher, therefore, was retiring to strong ground, within a few miles of the English line of operations, from whence he could either assist or be assisted, according to events and the movements of the enemy.

On the morning of the 17th, the French de-

tached, in the first instance, one division of cavalry and one of infantry after the Prussians, to ascertain their line of retreat. It appears most extraordinary that, in an open country, (where they were by no means popular,) any difficulty should have been experienced in acquiring this information, more particularly as the Prussians held the villages of Bry and of Sombref until daylight. Napoleon, however, appears to have assumed that their line of retreat would be upon Namur, and the French light cavalry were pushed in that direction without any previous inquiry. It was not until considerably later in the day that it was known that the corps of Zieten and of Pirch had retreated to Tilly. Marshal Grouchy was then detached in pursuit in that direction. He marched to Tilly, from whence, having heard of the Prussians having been at Gembloux, he made a flank movement to that place, where he arrived about five in the afternoon. The troops under Grouchy did not march more than nine miles on the 17th.

The force put under the orders of Grouchy to follow the Prussians, consisted of the corps d'armée of Vandamme (short of its cavalry division, which was sent to Lobau's corps) and of that of Gerard; of the corps of cavalry of Excelmans; as also of the infantry and cavalry divisions taken from Lobau's corps d'armée, and from Pajol's

light cavalry corps, which had been moved erroneously upon the Namur chaussée early in the morning. These troops formed seven infantry and four cavalry divisions; and after allowing for the casualties of the preceding day, their numbers may be estimated to have amounted to thirty thousand infantry, six thousand cavalry, and ninety-six guns.

It is impossible here not to be struck with the very inadequate numbers of the French troops destined to follow the Prussians, compared with the importance of the object to be attained, and the force of the retreating army. Napoleon must have been aware of the existence of the fourth Prussian corps. The probabilities were that it would make every effort to join Marshal Blücher, after it was known that the French had passed the Sambre. If his intelligence had been good, he ought to have been acquainted with its having arrived at Gembloux on the preceding night. But even putting the corps of Bülow entirely on one side, the victory the French had gained at Ligny was not of such a nature as to justify their following the troops who had fought in that position with such an inferior force. As it was, thirty-six thousand French troops were employed to pursue nearly eighty-six thousand Prussians. It seems to have been fortunate for Grouchy that he did not overtake or follow the Prussians too

closely. It would appear that his complete destruction must inevitably have taken place. These reflections corroborate the remark made in a preceding page, as to the impolicy of the French in not having allotted a greater force, in the first instance, to the attack of the Prussian position. A more decided victory at Ligny was required to have rendered the pursuit of the Prussian army by a corps of the strength of that placed under Grouchy's orders, either prudent or useful.

The retreat of the Prussians rendered a corresponding movement on the part of the Duke of Wellington requisite. His Grace determined to fall back to Waterloo, and to put his army across the Nivelles and Charleroi chaussées, which meet, in front of Brussels, at this point. He would thus be in line with the Prussians, at about eight miles distant. The infantry moved from the ground at Quatre-bras, at about eleven o'clock. The march was only eight miles to the new position. It was performed leisurely by the infantry without any molestation from the enemy. The cavalry covered the retreat, and were followed closely by the enemy's advance.

About the same time that the British infantry left Quatre-bras, the French troops at Ligny and Sombref got under arms. The troops destined to move after the Prussians having been placed under Marshal Grouchy's orders, and one divi-

sion (which had suffered severely in the attack upon St. Amand) being left in charge of the wounded, Napoleon marched with the remainder to Quatre-bras, from whence, after the retreat of the English was ascertained, he hurried the troops he had brought with him from Ligny, as well as those which had been in front of Quatre-bras, under Ney, towards Waterloo, in front of which position he arrived about dusk, and took up his ground for the night opposite to the Duke of Wellington's army, at about two miles distant.

It is said that Napoleon blamed Ney for not having renewed his attack upon the British force at Quatre-bras early in the morning of the 17th. But those who join in this censure, forget that nearly the whole of the allied army was by this time assembled, and that Reille's corps d'armée was not only short its division of five thousand men employed at St. Amand, but that it also was diminished by the casualties of the preceding day, which the French themselves acknowledge to have been more than four thousand men; a total, therefore, of nine thousand is to be deducted from this corps. It is true that d'Erlon's corps d'armée was now restored to Ney. The two together, however, only gave, in consequence of the deductions as explained, about thirty-one thousand infantry, a force by no means of a sufficient magnitude to have been employed against

the troops by this time assembled in front of Quatre-bras.

The allied army under the command of the Duke of Wellington, in position in front of the village of Waterloo, consisted of eighty-one battalions, of which twenty-five were British, eight of the King's German legion, fourteen Hanoverian, nine Brunswick, three contingent of Nassau Usingen, and twenty-two belonging to the Netherlands; making a total of about fifty thousand five hundred infantry. There were twenty-eight regiments of cavalry, of which fifteen were British, four of the King's German Legion, one Hanoverian, one Brunswick, and seven belonging to the Netherlands; amounting all together to about ten thousand two hundred and fifty cavalry. The artillery consisted of one hundred and thirty-eight guns, of which seventy-two were British, eighteen German Legion, twelve Hanoverian, twelve Brunswick, and twenty-four of the Netherlands. A division, composed of four British and five Hanoverian battalions, with three brigades of British artillery, or eighteen guns, was at Tubise, in front of Halle, on the Mons road, about seven miles to the right of the position. A corps of the Netherlands army, under Prince Frederick of Orange, was also employed in communication with this division, upon the same duty; namely to prevent any French force penetrating towards Brussels

by the Mons chaussée, on which line it was expected the French would have pushed forward a column by Nivelles, as soon as that road was open to them, in consequence of the retreat from Quatre-bras. That this measure ought to have been adopted by the enemy may safely be asserted. The retreat, however, from Quatre-bras, seems to have inspired too much confidence at the French head-quarters. They evidently did not anticipate any serious interruption in their march to Brussels.

The force of the French army, when it crossed the Sambre, was, as already stated, one hundred and thirty-six thousand men. The casualties at Quatre-bras, at Ligny, the division left at Ligny after the battle, and some troops at Charleroi, with the pontoons and reserve ammunition, may be calculated at eighteen thousand. The corps of Grouchy, amounting to thirty-six thousand men, is also to be deducted. The numbers of the French, under Napoleon's command, employed at Waterloo, may consequently be estimated to have been eighty-two thousand, of which seventeen thousand were cavalry. Ninety-six guns had accompanied Grouchy's corps; eight belonged to the division left at Ligny. The enemy must therefore have had two hundred and forty-six pieces of artillery in the field.

With an army composed of sixty-five thousand

infantry, seventeen thousand cavalry, and two hundred and forty-six guns, Napoleon was about to attack that of the Duke of Wellington, consisting of fifty thousand five hundred infantry, ten thousand two hundred and fifty cavalry, and one hundred and thirty-eight field-pieces, in position, and prepared for battle, in easy communication, by its left flank, with the Prussians at about only eight miles distant, and whose force was certainly not far short of eighty-six thousand men. Had there been no Prussian army, the composition, as well as the numbers of that of the French, (all old soldiers, and of one nation, attached to their leader, and anxious to restore the lustre of the French arms,) was, perhaps, such as to justify the risk and the hope of success. But as the Prussian army to such a formidable amount did exist, it was surely leaving more to fortune than an able general ought to have done,—to have trusted the result of so important an operation to the possibility of the Prussians being kept in check by such an inferior force as that of the corps of thirty-six thousand men detached for that purpose under Grouchy.

Another reflection occurs here, which seems to have been entirely overlooked by the French. The victory they were in pursuit of was only to be purchased, if acquired at all, by a very heavy loss. Had Napoleon succeeded in penetrating to

Brussels, his army must have been in such a crippled state, and so diminished in numbers, as to be unfit for any further operations, and, in all probability, would have fallen an easy prey to the Prussians on the ensuing day. He appears upon this occasion to have committed the same error in the disposition of his troops, as on the 16th, on which day, it has been already observed, that he did not direct so great a force as he might have done against the Prussians, in consequence of his having employed two of his corps d'armée upon the Quatre-bras chaussée, and where one was all that was required. There appears, upon the present occasion, no reason why thirty-six thousand men should have been detached to follow the Prussians. It was ridiculous to expect they could do any thing more than watch them, and follow their movements at a respectful distance, and which might have been fully as well performed by a corps of cavalry, with guns, and one or two infantry divisions. Such an arrangement would have given the French a greater superiority at Waterloo, and a consequent greater chance of success against the British, before they could be reinforced by the Prussians. The services of the corps of Grouchy appear to have been lost where they were wanted, and were of no use where they were employed.

The village, or rather small town of Braine-

la-leud, upon the right of the position of the allied army, was occupied by a division composed of twelve battalions of the Netherlands army. Although Braine-la-leud is nearly a mile from the ground to the right of the Nivelles chaussée, (which may be considered as the real right of the position,) yet it was absolutely necessary it should be held to prevent the enemy advancing by the hollow in which it is situated, and turning the army, as was done in the year 1794, when the French, under Jourdan, advanced by this road to Brussels, after the battle of Fleurus. Another division, reinforced by a brigade belonging to the division at Tubise, was placed upon the right of the Nivelles chaussée. Two divisions, the Brunswick corps, and the three battalions of the contingent of Nassau Usingen, were drawn up between the Nivelles and Charleroi chaussées, detaching to their front to occupy the Chateau de Hougomont, and the farm-house and buildings of La Haye-Sainte. A British and a Netherlands division, and a British brigade belonging to a division not as yet completed, held the ground from the left of the Charleroi chaussée to the left of the position, which rested upon a ravine which runs down to the farms of La Haye and of Papelotte, the former of which was occupied. The guns were placed on such points along the front of the position as appeared most advantageous. The

cavalry were formed by brigades in the rear of the infantry, ready to act as circumstances might require. In this situation the allied army awaited the enemy's attack. The battle commenced about eleven, by a column of the enemy advancing against Hougomont. The troops destined for this attack were formed a little to the right of the Belle Alliance, on the ridge opposite to the centre of the allies, and conducted from thence towards Hougomont, situated in front of the right of the position. This movement exposed the flank of the attacking column, very unnecessarily, to the fire of the British artillery, at about a distance of from nine hundred to one thousand yards. Eighteen nine-pounders immediately opened, and the first attack upon Hougomont was repulsed with a severe loss to the enemy, without a musket having been fired on either side.

The French renewed their movement against Hougomont, and availing themselves of the sinuosities of the ground, they avoided the fire of the guns from the British position, and approached Hougomont by its front and its right. They made every effort to gain possession of this post, but were constantly repulsed by the gallantry and coolness of the troops appointed to defend it.

The troops in position had as yet been very little seen by the enemy. The ridge which formed the position is very narrow, and the infantry had

been kept as much as possible on the reverse side of it, in order not to be unnecessarily exposed to the enemy's fire ; the guns only had been run forward to projecting points, or knolls, as required. It appeared to the enemy that they had no support, and that they might easily be taken. The French cavalry moved forward in the most gallant and enterprizing manner : upon ascending the ridge, they found the British infantry formed in squares. They charged these squares, and in their endeavours to penetrate, even rode round them, of course suffering severely from the effects of their musquetry. This manœuvre they repeated several times, losing a great number of men from the fire of the artillery in their advance, from that of the infantry squares whilst upon the position, and pursued down the hill by the allied cavalry. These desultory and unconnected movements could, however, be of no real service ; on the contrary, the French cavalry were in a great measure destroyed, in consequence, early in the day.

The repulse of his cavalry, and the obstinacy with which Hougomont was defended, appear to have convinced the chief of the French army, that he was engaged in a more serious undertaking than he seems at first to have been aware of. His formidable artillery, of which, in the early part of the day, he employed but a small proportion, were now brought forward, and the ground on the opposite

side of the valley to the position of the allied army was occupied by his numerous guns, from which a rapid and concentrated fire was opened, and directed principally against that part of the position above the farm of La Haye Sainte, as also towards the centre of the left. Under the protection of this fire, two columns of infantry now advanced: one got possession of La Haye Sainte, which was immediately filled with French troops. The walls and buildings of this farm-house were very inferior to that of Hougomont; and although bravely defended, it was not so well calculated for a post. Under its protection, it appears to have been the intention of the French to have pushed forward a column of infantry. Such a fire was, however, kept up from the guns in the British position upon both flanks of the Haye-Sainte, that the French were never able to debouch from thence. They acquired no advantage from their success at this point, although they had paid dearly for it.

The other column was directed against the centre of the left. It suffered severely on its advance, and was ultimately repulsed and driven back in great confusion, principally by a very sudden and well executed charge of a brigade of British heavy cavalry.

The fire of the enemy's artillery was continued with unabated vigour. The French guards, which had hitherto been kept in reserve, were brought

forward and formed into a solid column, which was conducted against the right of the position. These troops advanced with great gallantry nearly to the brow of the hill; they were, however, plunged into during their forward movement by a considerable number of British guns, and being received by a volley of musquetry on their approach to the British position, they went to the right about. This was the last effort of the enemy. A general forward movement was now ordered by the Duke of Wellington. The French, abandoning their guns, hastened in the greatest confusion to gain the Charleroi chaussée.

The Prussian army, it will be remembered, was divided into four corps : Marshal Blucher left one at Wavre, (that of Thielman,) to make head against Grouchy. Two roads lead from Wavres to the left of the field of battle at Waterloo : one, by the wood of Paris, between the château de Frischemont and the abbey of Aywiers, joins the Charleroi chaussée at the Maison du Roi, passing previously through the village of Planchenoit. By this road the corps of Bulow was directed to the assistance of the British. His advanced guard appears to have been upon the flank of the French, and in contact with the French light troops soon after it debouched from the wood of Paris, earlier than the British were aware of (about five o'clock.) The other road, by Ohain, leads directly on the ravine above

La Haye, which was the British left. By this road the two other divisions, those of Zieten and Pirch, arrived about dusk. The exhausted state of the Duke of Wellington's army prevented his Grace from following the French; but the Prussians readily undertook the pursuit, which was continued almost without a halt beyond the Sambre.

In reflecting upon the events of this important day, it is impossible not to be struck with the want of ensemble in the French operations. Their cavalry, their artillery, their infantry, were excellent. The efforts of the different arms were not, however, combined as, it would appear, they ought to have been. Hougomont was attacked, in the first instance, with infantry alone, although Napoleon had plenty of twelve-pounders in the field; the forward movements of the cavalry were made not only unsupported by infantry, but previously to the artillery being placed in position to favour their advance, or to cover their retreat; and when the infantry columns were put in motion, they had no corresponding assistance from the cavalry. Want of military talent can hardly be ascribed to Napoleon; his repeated victories could not all have been owing to good fortune. In this his last campaign, however, we seem to look in vain for those splendid abilities or skilful combinations which, from his reputation, might have been expected.

After the battle of Ramillies, the French lost the

Netherlands owing to their having left too many Spanish troops in the fortresses, numbers of whom sided with the Austrian claimant. It required, however, another campaign, and a great deal of preliminary arrangement, before the allies were able to penetrate into France, where they were obliged to advance step by step. After the battle of Oudenarde, where the confusion was very great, and the French army was divided and obliged to retreat in two contrary directions, yet a large corps rallied behind the canal between Ghent and Bruges, and continued there until the end of the campaign. The possibility of a retreat seems, however, to have been entirely overlooked by Napoleon. No attempt to rally the army, or to throw proper garrisons into the fortresses upon the frontier, appears to have been thought of.

Napoleon is stated to have criticised the position of Waterloo, and to have observed, that it had a very material defect; namely, that of only having one communication to the rear across the forest of Soignies; and consequently the total ruin of the Duke of Wellington's army must have taken place, had his Grace been forced to retreat. These consequences may not appear quite so evident to an impartial observer, although, from the fatal losses experienced by the French army, owing to their having had but one road and one bridge for their retreat, at Leipsic, in 1813, it was natural they

should so be seen by Napoleon. There appears a peculiar impropriety in any remark on the subject of how the British army was to retreat, being made by one who had so completely omitted to make any arrangement for that of his own. From the position of Waterloo, so far, however, from there being only one road towards Brussels, there are several. From Braine-la-leud, (to begin with the right,) there is a direct road, and almost the whole of it a good chaussée. Then comes the Waterloo chaussée. Close to Waterloo are the small villages of Rousart and Ransbeeck, from both of which there are very good cart-roads across the forest. From La Hulpe, a little more than two miles to the left of Ransbeeck, and only about three from Waterloo, there is a chaussée to Brussels; from Wavre a chaussée also leads to the same city. The forest of Soignies is the place from whence the inhabitants of Brussels draw their fuel. There is no under-wood; it is composed entirely of beech, and intersected, in every direction, by vistas and alleys, in which the nobility and gentry of Brussels ride and drive. The forest is practicable for cavalry, artillery, and infantry, in almost every direction.

If the allied army had been obliged to fall back from Waterloo, what steps the Duke of Wellington might have thought proper to take, it is impossible to say; but the loss of the army does by no means appear to have necessarily followed as the consequence of

a retrograde movement, as has been insinuated. The roads from Braine-la-leud, from Waterloo, and from Wavre, meet upon very strong ground about a mile and a half in front of Brussels. There exists a very excellent position extending across these three chaussées, the right of which may be said to be at Uccle upon the Senne, its centre at Vleugat, and its left thrown back to Ixelles; and in which the Netherlands troops from Braine-la-leud, the British from Waterloo, and the Prussians from Wavre, might have been assembled without any difficulty. As the division from Tubise, and the Netherlands corps under Prince Frederick of Orange, would in that case have fallen back by the Mons chaussée towards Brussels, they might have occupied the right of this new position, and in which, supposing the French to have been successful at Waterloo, they might still have found an army more numerous than that with which they had been engaged, drawn up and in readiness to receive them. It may also be observed, that if circumstances had compelled the Prussians to retreat to the Meuse instead of to Wavre, and the Duke of Wellington had thought proper for the moment to abandon Brussels in consequence, the British army could have retreated towards Antwerp, and from thence either moved towards Breda, until reinforced from Germany, as Marshal Bathiani did in 1746; or have crossed the Scheldt, and from

behind the Ghent canal have awaited succours from England by the way of Ostend. Marshal Bathiani, with a very inferior army, detained Marshal Saxe nearly a fortnight between Brussels and Antwerp, by manœuvring successively behind the Dyle and the Nette. There seems no reason why a British army under the Duke of Wellington, in 1815, should not have been able to do what was performed by an Austrian corps under Marshal Bathiani, in 1746, had circumstances rendered it necessary.

The foregoing observations have been offered in consequence of the criticisms and remarks on the Waterloo campaign, contained in the works of various French authors and others, which, however injudicious and incorrect they may appear to those acquainted with the Netherlands, and who have reflected upon the subject, yet, from being often repeated, might obtain currency, if not temperately canvassed and disproved. "What had been is unknown; what is, appears;" is a line of Dryden's, which might be quoted as a reply. It is, however, only by candidly discussing the causes of failure, and the measures which have led to success, that military history can be studied with advantage.

It may not be deemed irrelevant here to point out the great good will and exertions of the kingdom of Hanover, which had been only liberated from the yoke of France about eighteen months. There were fourteen very efficient battalions of

new-raised Hanoverians in the field at Waterloo, five at Tubise, and four in garrison at Antwerp, Ostend, and Nieuport, making a total, with the eight of the German Legion, of thirty-one battalions of that nation in the Netherlands. There were twenty-five British battalions at Waterloo, four at Tubise, and three in the garrisons; by which it appears that Great Britain only furnished one more battalion in this important struggle than Hanover. As many of the British battalions were very weak, and all those of Hanover very strong, it follows that there were considerably more Hanoverian than British infantry in the Duke of Wellington's army. As we were at war with America, and the greater part of our disposable force was employed upon distant services, thirty-two battalions were all that could be assembled. This comparative statement of the British and Hanoverian strength at Waterloo, cannot be too much known in England. It may, perhaps, be the cause of softening those illiberal and unjustifiable remarks occasionally made by some of our public speakers in the warmth of debate, and, as it is hoped, without due reflection, which being reported in our newspapers, and translated into those in Germany, have the worst possible effects, and are peculiarly mortifying to the feelings of an honourable and high-minded people, (not aware of the extreme freedom of speech assumed upon such occasions,) and conscious of hav-

ing made exertions more than commensurate with their means, and upon every occasion acted the part of brave, zealous, and faithful allies.

Napoleon recrossed the Sambre on the night of the 18th June, and proceeded rapidly to Paris. It was only on the 15th (four days before) that he had passed through Charleroi at the head of that army now flying and dispersed in all directions, in the greatest confusion. Lewis XIV., Lewis XV., and the French republican government, had sent more numerous armies into the Low Countries; but the reverses experienced by the former in the latter part of his reign, and those by the republican armies commanded by Dumourier, in 1793, were nothing compared to the results of the field of Waterloo. In the time of Louis XIV. the Elector of Bavaria, Villeroy, and Villars, when driven from one position, retreated to another; and, if turned upon one line of defence, fell back to a second more or less distant, according to circumstances. The army of Dumourier, although driven out of the Netherlands after the battle of Neerwinden, and left for some time without a chief, yet, by being kept assembled on the frontiers, prevented the immediate invasion of France. It is not supposed that the army of Napoleon, after their defeat at Waterloo, could have hindered the allies from advancing into France; but it is surely not rashly condemning his measures, to assert that, previously to or-

dering the attack, the steps which it might be necessary for his army to take in case of want of success, ought to have been considered and determined upon.

The words of the well-known climax of Cicero, in one of his orations against Catiline, have been cut in the key-stone of the arch of the gateway of Charleroi, leading to the Sambre, through which Napoleon fled on the night of the 18th June. The quotation 'appears so happy and so applicable to the conduct of Napoleon, and the events of this short, but memorable campaign, that it has been deemed the reader would not be sorry to see it repeated in this place.

Abiit, Excessit, Evasit, Erupit.

The allied army of the Duke of Wellington, as well as that of the Prussians under Blucher, followed the remains of the French army towards Paris. The line of defence taken up by the French in front of Paris, had its right at Mount Martyr, and its left at St. Denys. By making a considerable circuit by St. Germain and Versailles, the Prussians approached Paris on the left of the Seine. The British army threw pontoon-bridges over the Seine at Argenteuil and at Clichy, which completely turned the line of defence adopted by the enemy. The gates of Paris were taken possession of, by capitulation, on the 6th July, the French

army retreating behind the Loire; and on the 8th, Lewis XVIII. re-entered the palace of his ancestors.

During their advance to Paris, the Duke of Wellington's army took Cambrai and Peronne by escalade. Neither of these places had proper garrisons. A Prussian corps d'armée was also employed to besiege such fortresses upon the frontier as had been passed by the allies on their advance. Maubeuge, Landrecies, Marienbourg, Philipville, and Rocroy, were successively taken by the army of Prince Augustus of Prussia; and Quesnoi, after a few shells had been thrown in the town by the corps of Prince Frederick of the Netherlands, was also surrendered.

On the 20th November, the treaty of peace was signed between the Allied Sovereigns and Lewis XVIII. France agreed to pay seven hundred millions of francs (about twenty-nine millions sterling) to the allied powers, in compensation for the expenses of the war; and fifteen of her frontier fortresses were to be held by an allied army of one hundred and fifty thousand men, which was to be paid and fed by France for a period of three or five years, as circumstances might require. The kingdom of the Netherlands acquired the fortresses of Philipville and Marienbourg, and the ancient duchy of Bouillon was added to its territories. This arrangement considerably strengthened its frontier, and connected it with the duchy of Luxembourg

on the right of the Meuse, which it was now decided by the allies should be incorporated with the kingdom of the Netherlands.

Thus, after a period of two hundred and thirty-four years, the different provinces of the Low Countries, separated from each other by the bigotry of Philip II. and the cruelty and tyranny of his representative, the Duke of Alva, (which compelled the Dutch, in 1581, to throw off the Spanish yoke, and to declare their independence,) have been reunited and formed into the kingdom of the Netherlands. Alternately, during this length of time, in the possession of Spain, Austria, and of France, this rich and beautiful country has been the scene of wars with which it had no connection; and has been over-run by armies, strangers to its language and its customs. It is to be hoped, that a better fate will attend the kingdom of the Netherlands; and that, raised to the dignity of an independent nation, its government will embark in no wars, but for the security and defence of its inhabitants. The house of Orange, since its accession to the throne, has become closely connected, by marriage, with the Russian and Prussian courts. Every page of history shews us what very slight dependence can be placed on similar political connections, and how little real additional stability they afford to the throne they are meant to support. The kingdom of the Netherlands stands, fortunately,

however, upon firmer ground. The welfare and tranquillity of its neighbours are interested in its preservation. The policy of England could never permit France to be in possession of such an additional extent of country, and of coast, opposite to her shores; nor would the Prussian government feel very secure of its provinces on the left bank of the Rhine, should the French re-enter the Low Countries. Aided by England, and with the help of a considerable sum from the pecuniary indemnities placed by France at the disposal of the allied powers, by the treaty of the 20th November, 1815, the government of the Netherlands have not, moreover, been inattentive to the security of the kingdom. Dinant, the citadel of Namur, Huy, and Liege, all upon the Meuse, have been carefully and judiciously re-fortified, by which the navigation of that river and the communication with the Prussian provinces have been secured. Charleroi, Mons, the citadel of Tournai, Oudenarde, Ath, Menin, a new and beautiful citadel at Ghent, also Ypres, and Dendermonde, have all been rendered as strong as fortification can make them. The same may be said of Antwerp, Ostend, and Nieuport, the possession of which latter three places ensures an uninterrupted intercourse with England. Englishmen, accustomed to see the works upon Dover heights, or the towers and petty forts upon their own coast, have little or no idea of the splen-

dour, magnificence, or of the imposing utility of such fortresses. They are all provided with superb casemated barracks, and the errors or mistakes of the former systems of fortification have been avoided in the present construction.

The army of the Netherlands has also been placed upon a most respectable footing: their soldiers are well-fed, well-appointed, well-clothed; and are happy and contented with the service. The men of the infantry are balloted for, something upon the plan of our militia; they serve for a very limited period; they are then entitled to their furloughs, and are only called upon to join their respective battalions, in succession, for a few weeks in each summer. A considerable force is thus kept up at a comparatively small expense, as the men are only paid when actually present with their regiments.

The sentiments of the people of the Netherlands have, in consequence of these judicious measures, undergone a wonderful change within a few years. They feel assured of the stability of their government, and look forward to a long period of happiness and tranquillity. Neither does the difference of religion, as by some it was predicted it would, affect in the least the union of the provinces. The churches themselves can have no cause for hostility, as neither has any advantage over the other, or is made the beneficed religion in provinces where her tenets are not acknowledged. There are, for-

tunately, moreover, no forfeited estates to be attempted to be recovered ; no great changes of landed property, which would be attended with dreadful convulsions, to be avoided. The Catholics and Protestants of the Low Countries, consequently, serve in the same regiments, sit in the same council, and act together in the same assembly, without any inconvenience or unpleasant result. The nobility of the highest class may still have a little feeling towards a connection with France. The pleasures and the society of Paris ; the higher ranks of the French army, and of French diplomacy, open to their ambition, will be for some time regretted. But a steady government, founded upon a representative system, and under which every man enjoys as much liberty as is compatible with the welfare of his neighbour, and the tranquillity of the state, must, in the end, triumph over every obstacle, and overcome all considerations of a mere personal nature. As Englishmen, whether we reflect upon the political advantages we have gained by the formation of the kingdom of the Netherlands, or glory in the prospect of this fine country being no longer the arena on which the quarrels of Europe are to be decided ; and in the consequent increase of happiness thus conferred, and principally by our means, upon so beautiful a portion of the continent, we have every reason to pray that

nothing may interfere with or interrupt the re-union of the provinces of the Low Countries now happily accomplished; and that the kingdom of the Netherlands may last as long as the frail and perishable nature of all human institutions will permit.

THE END.

